[illegible] is, and has been, either was willed & [illegible] God to be, or it was not.

[illegible] was willed by God, it cannot be deserving of [illegible] punishment, however justifiable Mankind [illegible] in punishing what appears to them morally [illegible] detrimental to their social welfare & happ[illegible]

What is, and has been, was not willed by God, [illegible] must have been indifferent to what sh^d happ[illegible] and left things to go on without his direction [illegible] interference —

[illegible] He must have willed that things sh^d [illegible] different from what they are, and have been [illegible] failed in accomplishing his will —

[illegible] appear him indifferent — is to dissolve the [illegible] between him & his Creatures — to be [illegible] having created the world without design [illegible] to destroy the expectation of future [illegible] punishment —

[illegible] appear him to have failed in ~~his [illegible]~~ the accomplish[illegible] his Will is incompatible with his omni[illegible] and inconsiderable with the idea of a Creat[illegible] Universe.

747 838

[illegible]at then are we to believe?

That all things are according to [illegible] of God, the Creator and Preserver [illegible] Universe, and going on to accomp[illegible] the end proposed by him, tho' our limited faculties cannot discern the [illegible] form any accurate judgement of the [illegible]

J. H. H.

ESSAYS

ON THE

ACTIVE POWERS

OF MAN.

College of William

IV.L.22

ESSAYS

IV.L.22

IV.L.22

ON THE

ACTIVE POWERS

OF MAN.

By THOMAS REID, D.D. F.R.S. EDIN.
PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY
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He hath ſhewed thee, O Man, what is good. MICAH.

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ESSAYS

ON THE

ACTIVE POWERS OF THE HUMAN MIND.

INTRODUCTION.

THE diviſion of the faculties of the human mind into *Underſtanding* and *Will* is very ancient, and has been very generally adopted; the former comprehending all our ſpeculative, the latter all our active Powers.

It is evidently the intention of our Maker, that man ſhould be an active and not merely a ſpeculative being. For this purpoſe, certain active powers have been given him, limited indeed in many reſpects, but ſuited to his rank and place in the creation.

Our buſineſs is to manage theſe powers, by propoſing to ourſelves the beſt ends, planning the moſt proper ſyſtem of conduct that is in our power, and executing it with induſtry and zeal. This is true wiſdom; this is the very intention of our being.

Every thing virtuous and praiſe-worthy muſt lie in the right uſe of our power; every thing vicious and blameable in the abuſe of it. What is not within the ſphere of our power cannot be imputed to us either for blame or praiſe. Theſe are ſelf-evident

truths, to which every unprejudiced mind yields an immediate and invincible aſſent.

Knowledge derives its value from this, that it enlarges our power, and directs us in the application of it. For in the right employment of our active power conſiſts all the honour, dignity and worth of a man, and, in the abuſe and perverſion of it, all vice, corruption and depravity.

We are diſtinguiſhed from the brute-animals, not leſs by our active than by our ſpeculative powers.

The brutes are ſtimulated to various actions by their inſtincts, by their appetites, by their paſſions. But they ſeem to be neceſſarily determined by the ſtrongeſt impulſe, without any capacity of ſelf-government. Therefore we do not blame them for what they do; nor have we any reaſon to think that they blame themſelves. They may be trained up by diſcipline, but cannot be governed by law. There is no evidence that they have the conception of a law, or of its obligation.

Man is capable of acting from motives of a higher nature. He perceives a dignity and worth in one courſe of conduct, a demerit and turpitude in another, which brutes have not the capacity to diſcern.

He perceives it to be his duty to act the worthy and the honourable part, whether his appetites and paſſions incite him to it, or to the contrary. When he ſacrifices the gratification of the ſtrongeſt appetites or paſſions to duty, this is ſo far from diminiſhing the merit of his conduct, that it greatly increaſes it, and affords, upon reflection, an inward ſatisfaction and triumph, of which brute-animals are not ſuſceptible. When he acts a contrary part, he has a conſciouſneſs of demerit, to which they are no leſs ſtrangers.

Since,

Since, therefore, the active powers of man make ſo important a part of his conſtitution, and diſtinguiſh him ſo eminently from his fellow-animals, they deſerve no leſs to be the ſubject of philoſophical diſquiſition than his intellectual powers.

A juſt knowledge of our powers, whether intellectual or active, is ſo far of real importance to us, as it aids us in the exerciſe of them. And every man muſt acknowledge, that to act properly is much more valuable than to think juſtly or reaſon acutely.

ESSAY I.

OF ACTIVE POWER IN GENERAL.

CHAP. I.

Of the Notion of Active Power.

TO conſider gravely what is meant by Active Power, may ſeem altogether unneceſſary, and to be mere trifling. It is not a term of art, but a common word in our language, uſed every day in diſcourſe, even by the vulgar. We find words of the ſame meaning in all other languages; and there is no reaſon to think that it is not perfectly underſtood by all men who underſtand the Engliſh language.

I believe all this is true, and that an attempt to explain a word ſo well underſtood, and to ſhow that it has a meaning, requires an apology.

The apology is, That this term, ſo well underſtood by the vulgar, has been darkened by philoſophers, who, in this as in many other inſtances, have found great difficulties about a thing which, to the reſt of mankind, ſeems perfectly clear.

This has been the more eaſily effected, becauſe Power is a thing ſo much of its own kind, and ſo ſimple in its nature, as not to admit of a logical definition.

It is well known, that there are many things perfectly underſtood, and of which we have clear and diſtinct conceptions, which

CHAP. I. which cannot be logically defined. No man ever attempted to define magnitude; yet there is no word whoſe meaning is more diſtinctly or more generally underſtood. We cannot give a logical definition of thought, of duration, of number, or of motion.

When men attempt to define ſuch things, they give no light. They may give a ſynonymous word or phraſe, but it will probably be a worſe for a better. If they will define, the definition will either be grounded upon a hypotheſis, or it will darken the ſubject rather than throw light upon it.

The Ariſtotelian definition of motion, that it is "*Actus entis in* "*potentia, quatenus in potentia,*" has been juſtly cenſured by modern Philoſophers; yet I think it is matched by what a celebrated modern Philoſopher has given us, as the moſt accurate definition of belief, to wit, "That it is a lively idea related to or aſſociated "with a preſent impreſſion." *Treatiſe of Human Nature, vol.* i. *p.* 172. "Memory," according to the ſame Philoſopher, "is "the faculty by which we repeat our impreſſions, ſo as that "they retain a conſiderable degree of their firſt vivacity, and "are ſomewhat intermediate betwixt an idea and an impreſſion."

EUCLID, if his editors have not done him injuſtice, has attempted to define a right line, to define unity, ratio and number. But theſe definitions are good for nothing. We may indeed ſuſpect them not to be EUCLID's; becauſe they are never once quoted in the Elements, and are of no uſe.

I ſhall not therefore attempt to define active power, that I may not be liable to the ſame cenſure; but ſhall offer ſome obſervations that may lead us to attend to the conception we have of it in our own minds.

1. Power is not an object of any of our external ſenſes, nor even an object of conſciouſneſs.

That

That it is not ſeen, nor heard, nor touched, nor taſted, nor ſmelt, needs no proof. That we are not conſcious of it, in the proper ſenſe of that word, will be no leſs evident, if we reflect, that conſciouſneſs is that power of the mind by which it has an immediate knowledge of its own operations. Power is not an operation of the mind, and therefore no object of conſciouſneſs. Indeed every operation of the mind is the exertion of ſome power of the mind; but we are conſcious of the operation only, the power lies behind the ſcene; and though we may juſtly infer the power from the operation, it muſt be remembered, that inferring is not the province of conſciouſneſs, but of reaſon.

I acknowledge, therefore, that our having any conception or idea of power is repugnant to Mr Locke's theory, that all our ſimple ideas are got either by the external ſenſes, or by conſciouſneſs. Both cannot be true. Mr Hume perceived this repugnancy, and conſiſtently maintained, that we have no idea of power. Mr Locke did not perceive it. If he had, it might have led him to ſuſpect his theory; for when theory is repugnant to fact, it is eaſy to ſee which ought to yield. I am conſcious that I have a *conception* or *idea* of power, but, ſtrictly ſpeaking, I am not conſcious that I have *power*.

I ſhall have occaſion to ſhew, that we have very early, from our conſtitution, a conviction or belief of ſome degree of active power in ourſelves. This belief, however, is not conſciouſneſs: For we may be deceived in it; but the teſtimony of conſciouſneſs can never deceive. Thus, a man who is ſtruck with a palſy in the night commonly knows not that he has loſt the power of ſpeech till he attempts to ſpeak; he knows not whether he can move his hands and arms till he makes the trial; and if, without making trial, he conſults his conſciouſneſs ever ſo attentively, it will give him no information whether he has loſt theſe powers, or ſtill retains them.

From

CHAP. I.

From this we muſt conclude, that the powers we have are not an object of conſciouſneſs, though it would be fooliſh to cenſure this way of ſpeaking in popular diſcourſe, which requires not accurate attention to the different provinces of our various faculties. The teſtimony of conſciouſneſs is always unerring, nor was it ever called in queſtion by the greateſt ſceptics, ancient or modern.

2. A *ſecond* obſervation is, That as there are ſome things of which we have a direct, and others of which we have only a relative conception, power belongs to the latter claſs.

As this diſtinction is overlooked by moſt writers in logic, I ſhall beg leave to illuſtrate it a little, and then ſhall apply it to the preſent ſubject.

Of ſome things we know what they are in themſelves; our conception of ſuch things I call *direct*. Of other things, we know not what they are in themſelves, but only that they have certain properties or attributes, or certain relations to other things; of theſe our conception is only *relative*.

To illuſtrate this by ſome examples: In the univerſity-library, I call for the book, preſs L, ſhelf 10. No. 10.; the library-keeper muſt have ſuch a conception of the book I want, as to be able to diſtinguiſh it from ten thouſand that are under his care. But what conception does he form of it from my words? They inform him neither of the author, nor the ſubject, nor the language, nor the ſize, nor the binding, but only of its mark and place. His conception of it is merely relative to theſe circumſtances; yet this relative notion enables him to diſtinguiſh it from every other book in the library.

There are other relative notions that are not taken from accidental relations, as in the example juſt now mentioned, but from qualities or attributes eſſential to the thing.

Of

Of this kind are our notions both of body and mind. What is body? It is, ſay Philoſophers, that which is extended, ſolid and diviſible. Says the queriſt, I do not aſk what the properties of body are, but what is the thing itſelf; let me firſt know directly what body is, and then conſider its properties? To this demand I am afraid the queriſt will meet with no ſatisfactory anſwer; becauſe our notion of body is not direct but relative to its qualities. We know that it is ſomething extended, ſolid and diviſible, and we know no more.

Again, if it ſhould be aſked, What is mind? It is that which thinks. I aſk not what it does, or what its operations are, but what it is? To this I can find no anſwer; our notion of mind being not direct, but relative to its operations, as our notion of body is relative to its qualities.

There are even many of the qualities of body, of which we have only a relative conception. What is heat in a body? It is a quality which affects the ſenſe of touch in a certain way. If you want to know, not how it affects the ſenſe of touch, but what it is in itſelf; this I confeſs I know not. My conception of it is not direct, but relative to the effect it has upon bodies. The notions we have of all thoſe qualities which Mr LOCKE calls ſecondary, and of thoſe he calls powers of bodies, ſuch as the power of the magnet to attract iron, or of fire to burn wood, are relative.

Having given examples of things of which our conception is only relative, it may be proper to mention ſome of which it is direct. Of this kind, are all the primary qualities of body; figure, extenſion, ſolidity, hardneſs, fluidity, and the like. Of theſe we have a direct and immediate knowledge from our ſenſes. To this claſs belong alſo all the operations of mind of which we are conſcious. I know what thought is, what memory, what a purpoſe, what a promiſe.

CHAP. I.

There are ſome things of which we can have both a direct and a relative conception. I can directly conceive ten thouſand men or ten thouſand pounds, becauſe both are objects of ſenſe, and may be ſeen. But whether I ſee ſuch an object, or directly conceive it, my notion of it is indiſtinct; it is only that of a great multitude of men, or of a great heap of money; and a ſmall addition or diminution makes no perceptible change in the notion I form in this way. But I can form a relative notion of the ſame number of men or of pounds, by attending to the relations which this number has to other numbers, greater or leſs. Then I perceive that the relative notion is diſtinct and ſcientific. For the addition of a ſingle man, or a ſingle pound, or even of a penny, is eaſily perceived.

In like manner, I can form a direct notion of a polygon of a thouſand equal ſides and equal angles. This direct notion cannot be more diſtinct, when conceived in the mind, than that which I get by ſight, when the object is before me; and I find it ſo indiſtinct, that it has the ſame appearance to my eye, or to my direct conception, as a polygon of a thouſand and one, or of nine hundred and ninety-nine ſides. But when I form a relative conception of it, by attending to the relation it bears to polygons of a greater or leſs number of ſides, my notion of it becomes diſtinct and ſcientific, and I can demonſtrate the properties by which it is diſtinguiſhed from all other polygons. From theſe inſtances it appears, that our relative conceptions of things are not always leſs diſtinct, nor leſs fit materials for accurate reaſoning, than thoſe that are direct; and that the contrary may happen in a remarkable degree.

Our conception of power is relative to its exertions or effects. Power is one thing; its exertion is another thing. It is true, there can be no exertion without power; but there may be power that is not exerted. Thus a man may have power to ſpeak when he is ſilent; he may have power to riſe and walk when he ſits ſtill.

But

But though it be one thing to ſpeak, and another to have the power of ſpeaking, I apprehend we conceive of the power as ſomething which has a certain relation to the effect. And of every power we form our notion by the effect which it is able to produce.

3. It is evident that power is a quality, and cannot exiſt without a ſubject to which it belongs.

That power may exiſt without any being or ſubject to which that power may be attributed, is an abſurdity, ſhocking to every man of common underſtanding.

It is a quality which may be varied, not only in degree, but alſo in kind; and we diſtinguiſh both the kinds and degrees by the effects which they are able to produce.

Thus a power to fly, and a power to reaſon, are different kinds of power, their effects being different in kind. But a power to carry one hundred weight, and a power to carry two hundred, are different degrees of the ſame kind.

4. We cannot conclude the want of power from its not being exerted; nor from the exertion of a leſs degree of power, can we conclude that there is no greater degree in the ſubject. Thus, though a man on a particular occaſion ſaid nothing, we cannot conclude from that circumſtance, that he had not the power of ſpeech; nor from a man's carrying ten pound weight, can we conclude that he had not power to carry twenty.

5. There are ſome qualities that have a contrary, others that have not; power is a quality of the latter kind.

Vice is contrary to virtue, miſery to happineſs, hatred to love, negation to affirmation; but there is no contrary to power. Weak-

CHAP. I. neſs or impotence are defects or privations of power, but not contraries to it.

If what has been ſaid of power be eaſily underſtood, and readily aſſented to, by all who underſtand our language, as I believe it is, we may from this juſtly conclude, That we have a diſtinct notion of power, and may reaſon about it with underſtanding, though we can give no logical definition of it.

If power were a thing of which we have no idea, as ſome Philoſophers have taken much pains to prove, that is, if power were a word without any meaning, we could neither affirm nor deny any thing concerning it with underſtanding. We ſhould have equal reaſon to ſay that it is a ſubſtance, as that it is a quality; that it does not admit of degrees as that it does. If the underſtanding immediately aſſents to one of theſe aſſertions, and revolts from the contrary, we may conclude with certainty, that we put ſome meaning upon the word *power*, that is, that we have ſome idea of it. And it is chiefly for the ſake of this concluſion, that I have enumerated ſo many obvious things concerning it.

The term active power is uſed, I conceive, to diſtinguiſh it from ſpeculative powers. As all languages diſtinguiſh action from ſpeculation, the ſame diſtinction is applied to the powers by which they are produced. The powers of ſeeing, hearing, remembering, diſtinguiſhing, judging, reaſoning, are ſpeculative powers; the power of executing any work of art or labour is active power.

There are many things related to power, in ſuch a manner, that we can have no notion of them if we have none of power.

The exertion of active power we call *action;* and as every action produces ſome change, ſo every change muſt be cauſed by ſome

ſome exertion, or by the ceſſation of ſome exertion of power. That which produces a change by the exertion of its power, we call the *cauſe* of that change; and the change produced, the *effect* of that cauſe.

When one being, by its active power, produces any change upon another, the laſt is ſaid to be *paſſive*, or to be acted upon. Thus we ſee that action and paſſion, cauſe and effect, exertion and operation, have ſuch a relation to active power, that if it be underſtood, they are underſtood of conſequence; but if power be a word without any meaning, all thoſe words which are related to it, muſt be words without any meaning. They are, however, common words in our language; and equivalent words have always been common in all languages.

It would be very ſtrange indeed, if mankind had always uſed theſe words ſo familiarly, without perceiving that they had no meaning; and that this diſcovery ſhould have been firſt made by a Philoſopher of the preſent age.

With equal reaſon it might be maintained, that though there are words in all languages to expreſs ſight, and words to ſignify the various colours which are objects of ſight; yet that all mankind from the beginning of the world had been blind, and never had an idea of ſight or of colour. But there are no abſurdities ſo groſs as thoſe which Philoſophers have advanced concerning ideas.

CHAP. II.

The ſame Subject.

THERE are, I believe, no abſtract notions, that are to be found more early, or more univerſally, in the minds of men, than thoſe of acting, and being acted upon. Every child that underſtands

CHAP. II. underſtands the diſtinction between ſtriking and being ſtruck, muſt have the conception of action and paſſion.

We find accordingly, that there is no language ſo imperfect, but that it has active and paſſive verbs, and participles; the one ſignifying ſome kind of action; the other the being acted upon. This diſtinction enters into the original contexture of all languages.

Active verbs have a form and conſtruction proper to themſelves; paſſive verbs a different form and a different conſtruction. In all languages, the nominative to an active verb is the agent; the thing acted upon is put in an oblique caſe. In paſſive verbs, the thing acted upon is the nominative, and the agent, if expreſſed, muſt be in an oblique caſe; as in this example: *Raphael drew the Cartoons; the Cartoons were drawn by Raphael.*

Every diſtinction which we find in the ſtructure of all languages, muſt have been familiar to thoſe who framed the languages at firſt, and to all who ſpeak them with underſtanding.

It may be objected to this argument, taken from the ſtructure of language, in the uſe of active and paſſive verbs, that active verbs are not always uſed to denote an action, nor is the nominative before an active verb, conceived in all caſes to be an agent, in the ſtrict ſenſe of that word; that there are many paſſive verbs which have an active ſignification, and active verbs which have a paſſive. From theſe facts, it may be thought a juſt concluſion, that in contriving the different forms of active and paſſive verbs, and their different conſtruction, men have not been governed by a regard to any diſtinction between action and paſſion, but by chance, or ſome accidental cauſe.

In anſwer to this objection, the fact on which it is founded, muſt

must be admitted; but I think the conclusion not justly drawn from it, for the following reasons: CHAP. II.

1. It seems contrary to reason, to attribute to chance or accident, what is subject to rules, even though there may be exceptions to the rule. The exceptions may, in such a case, be attributed to accident, but the rule cannot. There is perhaps hardly any thing in language so general, as not to admit of exceptions. It cannot be denied to be a general rule, that verbs and participles have an active and a passive voice; and as this is a general rule, not in one language only, but in all the languages we are acquainted with, it shews evidently that men, in the earliest stages, and in all periods of society, have distinguished action from passion.

2. It is to be observed, that the forms of language are often applied to purposes different from those for which they were originally intended. The varieties of a language, even the most perfect, can never be made equal to all the variety of human conceptions. The forms and modifications of language must be confined within certain limits, that they may not exceed the capacity of human memory. Therefore, in all languages, there must be a kind of frugality used, to make one form of expression serve many different purposes, like Sir Hudibras' dagger, which, though made to stab or break a head, was put to many other uses. Many examples might be produced of this frugality in language. Thus the Latins and Greeks had five or six cases of nouns, to express the various relations that one thing could bear to another. The genitive case must have been at first intended to express some one capital relation, such as that of possession or of property; but it would be very difficult to enumerate all the relations which, in the progress of language, it was used to express. The same observation may be applied to other cases of nouns.

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The ſlighteſt ſimilitude or analogy is thought ſufficient to juſtify the extenſion of a form of ſpeech beyond its proper meaning, whenever the language does not afford a more proper form. In the moods of verbs, a few of thoſe which occur moſt frequently are diſtinguiſhed by different forms, and theſe are made to ſupply all the forms that are wanting. The ſame obſervation may be applied to what is called the *voices* of verbs. An active and a paſſive are the capital ones; ſome languages have more, but no language ſo many as to anſwer to all the variations of human thought. We cannot always coin new ones, and therefore muſt uſe ſome one or other of thoſe that are to be found in the language, though at firſt intended for another purpoſe.

3. A third obſervation in anſwer to the objection is, That we can point out a cauſe of the frequent miſapplication of active verbs, to things which have no proper activity: A cauſe which extends to the greater part of ſuch miſapplications, and which confirms the account I have given of the proper intention of active and paſſive verbs.

As there is no principle, that appears to be more univerſally acknowledged by mankind, from the firſt dawn of reaſon, than, that every change we obſerve in nature muſt have a cauſe; ſo this is no ſooner perceived, than there ariſes in the human mind, a ſtrong deſire to know the cauſes of thoſe changes that fall within our obſervation. *Felix qui potuit rerum cognoſcere cauſas*, is the voice of nature in all men. Nor is there any thing that more early diſtinguiſhes the rational from the brute creation, than this avidity to know the cauſes of things, of which I ſee no ſign in brute-animals.

It muſt ſurely be admitted, that in thoſe periods wherein languages are formed, men are but poorly furniſhed for carrying on this inveſtigation with ſucceſs. We ſee, that the experience of thouſands of years is neceſſary to bring men into the right track

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in this inveſtigation, if indeed they can yet be ſaid to be brought into it. What innumerable errors rude ages muſt fall into, with regard to cauſes; from impatience to judge, and inability to judge right, we may conjecture from reaſon, and may ſee from experience; from which I think, it is evident, that ſuppoſing active verbs to have been originally intended to expreſs what is properly called action, and their nominatives to expreſs the agent; yet, in the rude and barbarous ſtate wherein languages are formed, there muſt be innumerable miſapplications of ſuch verbs and nominatives, and many things ſpoken of as active, which have no real activity.

To this we may add, that it is a general prejudice of our early years, and of rude nations, when we perceive any thing to be changed, and do not perceive any other thing which we can believe to be the cauſe of that change, to impute it to the thing itſelf, and conceive it to be active and animated, ſo far as to have the power of producing that change in itſelf. Hence, to a child, or to a ſavage, all nature ſeems to be animated; the ſea, the earth, the air, the ſun, moon, and ſtars, rivers, fountains and groves, are conceived to be active and animated beings. As this is a ſentiment natural to man in his rude ſtate, it has, on that account, even in poliſhed nations, the veriſimilitude that is required in poetical fiction and fable, and makes perſonification one of the moſt agreeable figures in poetry and eloquence.

The origin of this prejudice probably is, that we judge of other things by ourſelves, and therefore are diſpoſed to aſcribe to them that life and activity which we know to be in ourſelves.

A little girl aſcribes to her doll, the paſſions and ſentiments ſhe feels in herſelf. Even brutes ſeem to have ſomething of this nature. A young cat, when ſhe ſees any briſk motion in a feather or a ſtraw, is prompted, by natural inſtinct, to hunt it as ſhe would hunt a mouſe.

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Whatever be the origin of this prejudice in mankind, it has a powerful influence upon language, and leads men, in the ſtructure of language, to aſcribe action to many things that are merely paſſive; becauſe, when ſuch forms of ſpeech were invented, thoſe things were really believed to be active. Thus we ſay, the wind blows, the ſea rages, the ſun riſes and ſets, bodies gravitate and move.

When experience diſcovers that theſe things are altogether inactive, it is eaſy to correct our opinion about them; but it is not ſo eaſy to alter the eſtabliſhed forms of language. The moſt perfect and the moſt poliſhed languages are like old furniture, which is never perfectly ſuited to the preſent taſte, but retains ſomething of the faſhion of the times when it was made.

Thus, though all men of knowledge believe, that the ſucceſſion of day and night is owing to the rotation of the earth round its axis, and not to any diurnal motion of the heavens; yet we find ourſelves under a neceſſity of ſpeaking in the old ſtyle, of the ſun's riſing and going down, and coming to the meridian. And this ſtyle is uſed, not only in converſing with the vulgar, but when men of knowledge converſe with one another. And if we ſhould ſuppoſe the vulgar to be at laſt ſo far enlightened, as to have the ſame belief with the learned, of the cauſe of day and night, the ſame ſtyle would ſtill be uſed.

From this inſtance we may learn, that the language of mankind may furniſh good evidence of opinions which have been early and univerſally entertained, and that the forms contrived for expreſſing ſuch opinions, may remain in uſe after the opinions which gave riſe to them have been greatly changed.

Active verbs appear plainly to have been firſt contrived to expreſs action. They are ſtill in general applied to this purpoſe. And though we find many inſtances of the application of active verbs

verbs to things which we now believe not to be active, this ought to be aſcribed to mens having once had the belief that thoſe things are active, and perhaps, in ſome caſes, to this, that forms of expreſſion are commonly extended, in courſe of time, beyond their original intention, either from analogy, or becauſe more proper forms for the purpoſe are not found in language.

Even the miſapplication of this notion of action and active power ſhews that there is ſuch a notion in the human mind, and ſhews the neceſſity there is in philoſophy of diſtinguiſhing the proper application of theſe words, from the vague and improper application of them, founded on common language, or on popular prejudice.

Another argument to ſhew that all men have a notion or idea of active power is, that there are many operations of mind common to all men who have reaſon, and neceſſary in the ordinary conduct of life, which imply a belief of active power in ourſelves and in others.

All our volitions and efforts to act, all our deliberations, our purpoſes and promiſes, imply a belief of active power in ourſelves; our counſels, exhortations and commands, imply a belief of active power in thoſe to whom they are addreſſed.

If a man ſhould make an effort to fly to the moon; if he ſhould even deliberate about it, or reſolve to do it, we ſhould conclude him to be lunatic; and even lunacy would not account for his conduct, unleſs it made him believe the thing to be in his power.

If a man promiſes to pay me a ſum of money to-morrow, without believing that it will then be in his power, he is not an honeſt man; and, if I did not believe that it will then be in his power, I ſhould have no dependence on his promiſe.

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All our power is, without doubt, derived from the Author of our being, and, as he gave it freely, he may take it away when he will. No man can be certain of the continuance of any of his powers of body or mind for a moment; and, therefore, in every promiſe, there is a condition underſtood, to wit, if we live, if we retain that health of body and ſoundneſs of mind which is neceſſary to the performance, and if nothing happen, in the providence of GOD, which puts it out of our power. The rudeſt ſavages are taught by nature to admit theſe conditions in all promiſes, whether they be expreſſed or not; and no man is charged with breach of promiſe, when he fails through the failure of theſe conditions.

It is evident, therefore, that, without the belief of ſome active power, no honeſt man would make a promiſe, no wiſe man would truſt to a promiſe; and it is no leſs evident, that the belief of active power, in ourſelves or in others, implies an idea or notion of active power.

The ſame reaſoning may be applied to every inſtance wherein we give counſel to others, wherein we perſuade or command. As long, therefore, as mankind are beings who can deliberate and reſolve and will, as long as they can give counſel, and exhort, and command, they muſt believe the exiſtence of active power in themſelves, and in others, and therefore muſt have a notion or idea of active power.

It might farther be obſerved, that power is the proper and immediate object of ambition, one of the moſt univerſal paſſions of the human mind, and that which makes the greateſt figure in the hiſtory of all ages. Whether Mr HUME, in defence of his ſyſtem, would maintain that there is no ſuch paſſion in mankind as ambition, or that ambition is not a vehement deſire of power, or that men may have a vehement deſire of power, without having any idea of power, I will not pretend to divine.

I cannot help repeating my apology for inſiſting ſo long in the refutation of ſo great an abſurdity. It is a capital doctrine in a late celebrated ſyſtem of human nature, that we have no idea of power, not even in the Deity; that we are not able to diſcover a ſingle inſtance of it, either in body or ſpirit, either in ſuperior or inferior natures; and that we deceive ourſelves when we imagine that we are poſſeſſed of any idea of this kind.

To ſupport this important doctrine, and the out-works that are raiſed in its defence, a great part of the firſt volume of the Treatiſe of Human Nature is employed. That ſyſtem abounds with concluſions the moſt abſurd that ever were advanced by any Philoſopher, deduced with great acuteneſs and ingenuity from principles commonly received by Philoſophers. To reject ſuch concluſions as unworthy of a hearing, would be diſreſpectful to the ingenious author; and to refute them is difficult, and appears ridiculous.

It is difficult, becauſe we can hardly find principles to reaſon from, more evident than thoſe we wiſh to prove; and it appears ridiculous, becauſe, as this author juſtly obſerves, next to the ridicule of denying an evident truth, is that of taking much pains to prove it.

Proteſtants complain, with juſtice, of the hardſhip put upon them by Roman Catholics, in requiring them to prove that bread and wine is not fleſh and blood. They have, however, ſubmitted to this hardſhip for the ſake of truth. I think it is no leſs hard to be put to prove that men have an idea of power.

What convinces myſelf that I have an idea of power is, that I am conſcious that I know what I mean by that word, and, while I have this conſciouſneſs, I diſdain equally to hear arguments for or againſt my having ſuch an idea. But if we would convince thoſe, who, being led away by prejudice, or by authority,

CHAP. II. rity, deny that they have any ſuch idea, we muſt condeſcend to uſe ſuch arguments as the ſubject will afford, and ſuch as we ſhould uſe with a man who ſhould deny that mankind have any idea of magnitude or of equality.

The arguments I have adduced are taken from theſe five topics: 1. That there are many things that we can affirm or deny concerning power, with underſtanding. 2. That there are, in all languages, words ſignifying, not only power, but ſignifying many other things that imply power, ſuch as, action and paſſion, cauſe and effect, energy, operation, and others. 3. That in the ſtructure of all languages, there is an active and paſſive form in verbs and participles, and a different conſtruction adapted to theſe forms, of which diverſity no account can be given, but that it has been intended to diſtinguiſh action from paſſion. 4. That there are many operations of the human mind familiar to every man come to the uſe of reaſon, and neceſſary in the ordinary conduct of life, which imply a conviction of ſome degree of power in ourſelves and in others. 5. That the deſire of power is one of the ſtrongeſt paſſions of human nature.

CHAP. III.

Of Mr LOCKE's *Account of our Idea of Power.*

THIS author, having refuted the Carteſian doctrine of innate ideas, took up, perhaps too raſhly, an opinion that all our ſimple ideas are got, either by ſenſation or by reflection; that is, by our external ſenſes, or by conſciouſneſs of the operations of our own minds.

Through the whole of his Eſſay, he ſhews a fatherly affection to this opinion, and often ſtrains very hard to reduce our ſimple ideas to one of thoſe ſources, or both. Of this, ſeveral inſtances

inſtances might be given, in his account of our idea of ſubſtance, of duration, of perſonal identity. Omitting theſe, as foreign to the preſent ſubject, I ſhall only take notice of the account he gives of our idea of power.

The ſum of it is, That obſerving, by our ſenſes, various changes in objects, we collect a poſſibility in one object to be changed, and in another a poſſibility of making that change, and ſo come by that idea which we call power.

Thus we ſay the fire has a power to melt gold, and gold has power to be melted; the firſt he calls active, the ſecond paſſive power.

He thinks, however, that we have the moſt diſtinct notion of active power, by attending to the power which we ourſelves exert, in giving motion to our bodies when at reſt, or in directing our thoughts to this or the other object as we will. And this way of forming the idea of power he attributes to reflection, as he refers the former to ſenſation.

On this account of the origin of our idea of power, I would beg leave to make two remarks, with the reſpect that is moſt juſtly due to ſo great a Philoſopher, and ſo good a man.

1. Whereas he diſtinguiſhes power into *active* and *paſſive*, I conceive paſſive power is no power at all. He means by it, the poſſibility of being changed. To call this *power*, ſeems to be a miſapplication of the word. I do not remember to have met with the phraſe *paſſive power* in any other good author. Mr LOCKE ſeems to have been unlucky in inventing it; and it deſerves not to be retained in our language.

Perhaps he was unwarily led into it, as an oppoſite to active power. But I conceive we call certain powers *active*, to diſtinguiſh

CHAP. III. guiſh them from other powers that are called *ſpeculative.* As all mankind diſtinguiſh action from ſpeculation, it is very proper to diſtinguiſh the powers by which thoſe different operations are performed, into active and ſpeculative. Mr LOCKE indeed acknowledges that active power is more properly called power; but I ſee no propriety at all in paſſive power; it is a powerleſs power, and a contradiction in terms.

2. I would obſerve, that Mr LOCKE ſeems to have impoſed upon himſelf, in attempting to reconcile this account of the idea of power to his favourite doctrine, That all our ſimple ideas are ideas of ſenſation, or of reflection.

There are two ſteps, according to his account, which the mind takes, in forming this idea of power; *firſt*, It obſerves changes in things; and, *ſecondly*, From theſe changes, it infers a cauſe of them, and a power to produce them.

If both theſe ſteps are operations of the external ſenſes, or of conſciouſneſs, then the idea of power may be called an idea of ſenſation, or of reflection. But, if either of thoſe ſteps requires the co-operation of other powers of the mind, it will follow, that the idea of power cannot be got by ſenſation, nor by reflection, nor by both together. Let us, therefore, conſider each of theſe ſteps by itſelf.

Firſt, We obſerve various changes in things. And Mr LOCKE takes it for granted, that changes in external things are obſerved by our ſenſes, and that changes in our thoughts are obſerved by conſciouſneſs.

I grant that it may be ſaid, that changes in things are obſerved by our ſenſes, when we do not mean to exclude every other faculty from a ſhare in this operation. And it would be ridiculous to cenſure the phraſe, when it is ſo uſed in popular diſcourſe.

But

But it is neceſſary to Mr LOCKE's purpoſe, that changes in external things ſhould be obſerved by the ſenſes alone, excluding every other faculty; becauſe every faculty that is neceſſary in order to obſerve the change, will claim a ſhare in the origin of the idea of power.

Now, it is evident, that memory is no leſs neceſſary than the ſenſes, in order to our obſerving changes in external things, and therefore the idea of power, derived from the changes obſerved, may as juſtly be aſcribed to memory as to the ſenſes.

Every change ſuppoſes two ſtates of the thing changed. Both theſe ſtates may be paſt; one of them at leaſt muſt be paſt; and one only can be preſent. By our ſenſes we may obſerve the preſent ſtate of the thing; but memory muſt ſupply us with the paſt; and, unleſs we remember the paſt ſtate, we can perceive no change.

The ſame obſervation may be applied to conſciouſneſs. The truth, therefore, is, that, by the ſenſes alone, without memory, or by conſciouſneſs alone, without memory, no change can be obſerved. Every idea, therefore, that is derived from obſerving changes in things, muſt have its origin, partly from memory, and not from the ſenſes alone, nor from conſciouſneſs alone, nor from both together.

The *ſecond* ſtep made by the mind in forming this idea of power is this: From the changes obſerved we collect a cauſe of thoſe changes, and a power to produce them.

Here one might aſk Mr LOCKE, whether it is by our ſenſes that we draw this concluſion, or is it by conſciouſneſs? Is reaſoning the province of the ſenſes, or is it the province of conſciouſneſs? If the ſenſes can draw one concluſion from premiſes,

CHAP. IV. they may draw five hundred, and demonſtrate the whole elements of EUCLID.

THUS, I think, it appears, that the account which Mr LOCKE himſelf gives of the origin of our idea of power, cannot be reconciled to his favourite doctrine, That all our ſimple ideas have their origin from ſenſation or reflection; and that, in attempting to derive the idea of power from theſe two ſources only, he unawares brings in our memory, and our reaſoning power, for a ſhare in its origin.

CHAP. IV.

Of Mr HUME's *Opinion of the Idea of Power.*

THIS very ingenious author adopts the principle of Mr LOCKE before mentioned, That all our ſimple ideas are derived either from ſenſation or reflection. This he ſeems to underſtand, even in a ſtricter ſenſe than Mr LOCKE did. For he will have all our ſimple ideas to be copies of preceeding impreſſions, either of our external ſenſes or of conſciouſneſs. "After "the moſt accurate examination," ſays he, "of which I am "capable, I venture to affirm, that the rule here holds without "any exception, and that every ſimple idea has a ſimple im- "preſſion which reſembles it, and every ſimple impreſſion a "correſpondent idea. Every one may ſatisfy himſelf in this "point, by running over as many as he pleaſes."

I obſerve here, by the way, that this concluſion is formed by the author raſhly and unphiloſophically. For it is a concluſion that admits of no proof, but by induction; and it is upon this ground that he himſelf founds it. The induction cannot be perfect till every ſimple idea that can enter into the human mind be examined, and be ſhewn to be copied from a reſembling impreſſion

preſſion of ſenſe or of conſciouſneſs. No man can pretend to have made this examination of all our ſimple ideas without exception; and, therefore, no man can, conſiſtently with the rules of philoſophiſing, aſſure us, that this concluſion holds without any exception. CHAP. IV.

The author profeſſes, in his title-page, to introduce into moral ſubjects the experimental method of reaſoning. This was a very laudable attempt; but he ought to have known, that it is a rule in the experimental method of reaſoning, That concluſions eſtabliſhed by induction ought never to exclude exceptions, if any ſuch ſhould afterwards appear from obſervation or experiment. Sir ISAAC NEWTON, ſpeaking of ſuch concluſions, ſays, "Et ſi "quando in experiundo poſtea reperiatur aliquid, quod a parte "contraria faciat; tum demum, non ſine iſtis exceptionibus af- "firmetur concluſio opportebit." "But," ſays our author, "I "will venture to affirm, that the rule here holds without any ex- "ception."

Accordingly, throughout the whole treatiſe, this general rule is conſidered as of ſufficient authority, in itſelf, to exclude, even from a hearing, every thing that appears to be an exception to it. This is contrary to the fundamental principles of the experimental method of reaſoning, and therefore may be called raſh and unphiloſophical.

Having thus eſtabliſhed this general principle, the author does great execution by it among our ideas. He finds, that we have no idea of ſubſtance, material or ſpiritual; that body and mind are only certain trains of related impreſſions and ideas; that we have no idea of ſpace or duration, and no idea of power, active or intellective.

Mr LOCKE uſed his principle of ſenſation and reflection with greater moderation and mercy. Being unwilling to thruſt the

CHAP. IV. ideas we have mentioned into the *limbo* of non-exiſtence, he ſtretches ſenſation and reflection to the very utmoſt, in order to receive theſe ideas within the pale; and draws them into it, as it were by violence.

But this author, inſtead of ſhewing them any favour, ſeems fond to get rid of them.

Of the ideas mentioned, it is only that of power that concerns our preſent ſubject. And, with regard to this, the author boldly affirms, "That we never have any idea of power; that "we deceive ourſelves when we imagine we are poſſeſſed of any "idea of this kind."

He begins with obſerving, "That the terms *efficacy*, *agency*, "*power*, *force*, *energy*, are all nearly ſynonymous; and therefore "it is an abſurdity to employ any of them in defining the reſt. "By this obſervation," ſays he, "we reject at once all the vul "gar definitions which Philoſophers have given of *power* and "*efficacy*."

Surely this author was not ignorant, that there are many things of which we have a clear and diſtinct conception, which are ſo ſimple in their nature, that they cannot be defined any other way than by ſynonymous words. It is true that this is not a logical definition, but that there is, as he affirms, an abſurdity in uſing it, when no better can be had, I cannot perceive.

He might here have applied to *power* and *efficacy* what he ſays, in another place, of *pride* and *humility*. "The paſſions of *pride* "and *humility*," he ſays, "being ſimple and uniform impreſ- "ſions, it is impoſſible we can ever give a juſt definition of "them. As the words are of general uſe, and the things they "repreſent the moſt common of any, every one, of himſelf,

"will

" will be able to form a juſt notion of them without danger of CHAP. IV.
" miſtake."

He mentions Mr LOCKE's account of the idea of power, That, obſerving various changes in things, we conclude, that there muſt be ſomewhere a power capable of producing them, and ſo arrive at laſt, by this reaſoning, at the idea of power and efficacy.

" But," ſays he, " to be ſatisfied that this explication is more
" popular than philoſophical, we need but reflect on two very
" obvious principles; *firſt*, That reaſon alone can never give
" riſe to any original idea; and, *ſecondly*, That reaſon, as di-
" ſtinguiſhed from experience, can never make us conclude,
" that a cauſe, or productive quality, is abſolutely requiſite to
" every beginning of exiſtence."

Before we conſider the two principles which our author oppoſes to the popular opinion of Mr LOCKE, I obſerve,

Firſt, That there are ſome *popular* opinions, which, on that very account, deſerve more regard from Philoſophers, than this author is willing to beſtow.

That things cannot begin to exiſt, nor undergo any change, without a cauſe that hath power to produce that change, is indeed ſo popular an opinion, that, I believe, this author is the firſt of mankind that ever called it in queſtion. It is ſo popular, that there is not a man of common prudence who does not act from this opinion, and rely upon it every day of his life. And any man who ſhould conduct himſelf by the contrary opinion, would ſoon be confined as inſane, and continue in that ſtate, till a ſufficient cauſe was found for his enlargement.

Such a popular opinion as this, ſtands upon a higher authori-

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CHAP. IV. ty than that of philoſophy, and philoſophy muſt ſtrike ſail to it, if ſhe would not render herſelf contemptible to every man of common underſtanding.

For though, in matters of deep ſpeculation, the multitude muſt be guided by Philoſophers, yet, in things that are within the reach of every man's underſtanding, and upon which the whole conduct of human life turns, the Philoſopher muſt follow the multitude, or make himſelf perfectly ridiculous.

Secondly, I obſerve, that whether this popular opinion be true or falſe, it follows from mens having this opinion, that they have an idea of power. A falſe opinion about power, no leſs than a true, implies an idea of power; for how can men have any opinion, true or falſe, about a thing of which they have no idea?

The *firſt* of the very obvious principles which the author oppoſes to Mr LOCKE's account of the idea of power, is, That reaſon alone can never give riſe to any original idea.

This appears to me ſo far from being a very obvious principle, that the contrary is very obvious.

Is it not our reaſoning faculty that gives riſe to the idea of reaſoning itſelf? As our idea of ſight takes its riſe from our being endowed with that faculty; ſo does our idea of reaſoning. Do not the ideas of demonſtration, of probability, our ideas of a ſyllogiſm, of major, minor and concluſion, of an enthymeme, dilemma, ſorites, and all the various modes of reaſoning, take their riſe from the faculty of reaſon? Or is it poſſible, that a being, not endowed with the faculty of reaſoning, ſhould have theſe ideas? This principle, therefore, is ſo far from being obviouſly true, that it appears to be obviouſly falſe.

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The *ſecond* obvious principle is, That reaſon, as diſtinguiſhed from experience, can never make us conclude, that a cauſe, or productive quality, is abſolutely requiſite to every beginning of exiſtence.

In ſome Eſſays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, I had occaſion to treat of this principle, That every change in nature muſt have a cauſe; and, to prevent repetition, I beg leave to refer the reader to what is ſaid upon this ſubject, *Eſſay* VI. *chap.* 6. I endeavoured to ſhew that it is a firſt principle, evident to all men come to years of underſtanding. Beſides its having been univerſally received, without the leaſt doubt, from the beginning of the world, it has this ſure mark of a firſt principle, that the belief of it is abſolutely neceſſary in the ordinary affairs of life, and, without it, no man could act with common prudence, or avoid the imputation of infanity. Yet a Philoſopher, who acted upon the firm belief of it every day of his life, thinks fit, in his cloſet, to call it in queſtion.

He inſinuates here, that we may know it from experience. I endeavoured to ſhew, that we do not learn it from experience, for two reaſons.

Firſt, Becauſe it is a neceſſary truth, and has always been received as a neceſſary truth. Experience gives no information of what is neceſſary, or of what muſt be.

We may know from experience, what is, or what was, and from that may probably conclude what ſhall be in like circumſtances; but, with regard to what muſt neceſſarily be, experience is perfectly ſilent.

Thus we know, by unvaried experience, from the beginning of the world, that the ſun and ſtars riſe in the eaſt and ſet in the weſt. But no man believes, that it could not poſſibly have been otherwiſe,

CHAP. IV. otherwiſe, or that it did not depend upon the will and power of him who made the world, whether the earth ſhould revolve to the eaſt or to the weſt.

In like manner, if we had experience, ever ſo conſtant, that every change in nature we have obſerved, actually had a cauſe, this might afford ground to believe, that, for the future, it ſhall be ſo; but no ground at all to believe that it muſt be ſo, and cannot be otherwiſe.

Another reaſon to ſhew that this principle is not learned from experience is, That experience does not ſhew us a cauſe of one in a hundred of thoſe changes which we obſerve, and therefore can never teach us that there muſt be a cauſe of all.

Of all the paradoxes this author has advanced, there is not one more ſhocking to the human underſtanding than this, That things may begin to exiſt without a cauſe. This would put an end to all ſpeculation, as well as to all the buſineſs of life. The employment of ſpeculative men, ſince the beginning of the world, has been to inveſtigate the cauſes of things. What pity is it, they never thought of putting the previous queſtion, Whether things have a cauſe or not? This queſtion has at laſt been ſtarted; and what is there ſo ridiculous as not to be maintained by ſome Philoſopher?

Enough has been ſaid upon it, and more, I think, than it deſerves. But, being about to treat of the active powers of the human mind, I thought it improper to take no notice of what has been ſaid by ſo celebrated a Philoſopher, to ſhew, that there is not, in the human mind, any idea of power.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Whether Beings that have no Will nor Underſtanding may have Active Power?

THAT active power is an attribute, which cannot exiſt but in ſome being poſſeſſed of that power, and the ſubject of that attribute, I take for granted as a ſelf-evident truth. Whether there can be active power in a ſubject which has no thought, no underſtanding, no will, is not ſo evident.

The ambiguity of the words *power*, *cauſe*, *agent*, and of all the words related to theſe, tends to perplex this queſtion. The weakneſs of human underſtanding, which gives us only an indirect and relative conception of power, contributes to darken our reaſoning, and ſhould make us cautious and modeſt in our determinations.

We can derive little light in this matter from the events which we obſerve in the courſe of nature. We perceive changes innumerable in things without us. We know that thoſe changes muſt be produced by the active power of ſome agent; but we neither perceive the agent nor the power, but the change only. Whether the things be active, or merely paſſive, is not eaſily diſcovered. And though it may be an object of curioſity to the ſpeculative few, it does not greatly concern the many.

To know the event and the circumſtances that attended it, and to know in what circumſtances like events may be expected, may be of conſequence in the conduct of life; but to know the real efficient, whether it be matter or mind, whether of a ſuperior or inferior order, concerns us little.

CHAP. V. Thus it is with regard to all the effects we aſcribe to nature.

Nature is the name we give to the efficient cauſe of innumerable effects which fall daily under our obſervation. But if it be aſked what nature is? Whether the firſt univerſal cauſe, or a ſubordinate one, whether one or many, whether intelligent or unintelligent? Upon theſe points we find various conjectures and theories, but no ſolid ground upon which we can reſt. And I apprehend the wiſeſt men are they who are ſenſible that they know nothing of the matter.

From the courſe of events in the natural world, we have ſufficient reaſon to conclude the exiſtence of an eternal intelligent Firſt Cauſe. But whether he acts immediately in the production of thoſe events, or by ſubordinate intelligent agents, or by inſtruments that are unintelligent, and what the number, the nature, and the different offices of thoſe agents or inſtruments may be; theſe I apprehend to be myſteries placed beyond the limits of human knowledge. We ſee an eſtabliſhed order in the ſucceſſion of natural events, but we ſee not the bond that connects them together.

Since we derive ſo little light, with regard to efficient cauſes and their active power, from attention to the natural world, let us next attend to the moral, I mean, to human actions and conduct.

Mr LOCKE obſerves very juſtly, "That, from the obſervation of the operation of bodies by our ſenſes, we have but a very imperfect obſcure idea of active power, ſince they afford us not any idea in themſelves of the power to begin any action, either of motion or thought." He adds, "That we find in ourſelves a power to begin or forbear, continue or end ſeveral actions of our minds and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought

" thought or preference of the mind, ordering, or, as it were,
" commanding the doing or not doing ſuch a particular action.
" This power which the mind has thus to order the conſidera-
" tion of any idea, or the forbearing to conſider it, or to pre-
" fer the motion of any part of the body to its reſt, and *vice ver-*
" *ſa*, in any particular inſtance, is that which we call *the will.*
" The actual exerciſe of that power, by directing any particular
" action, or its forbearance, is that which we call *volition* or
" *willing.*"

According to Mr LOCKE, therefore, the only clear notion or idea we have of active power, is taken from the power which we find in ourſelves to give certain motions to our bodies, or a certain direction to our thoughts; and this power in ourſelves can be brought into action only by willing or volition.

From this, I think, it follows, that, if we had not will, and that degree of underſtanding which will neceſſarily implies, we could exert no active power, and conſequently could have none: For power that cannot be exerted is no power. It follows alſo, that the active power, of which only we can have any diſtinct conception, can be only in beings that have underſtanding and will.

Power to produce any effect implies power not to produce it. We can conceive no way in which power may be determined to one of theſe rather than the other, in a being that has no will.

Whatever is the effect of active power muſt be ſomething that is contingent. Contingent exiſtence is that which depended upon the power and will of its cauſe. Oppoſed to this, is neceſſary exiſtence, which we aſcribe to the Supreme Being, becauſe his exiſtence is not owing to the power of any being. The ſame diſtinction there is between contingent and neceſſary truth.

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That the planets of our ſyſtem go round the ſun from weſt to eaſt, is a contingent truth; becauſe it depended upon the power and will of him who made the planetary ſyſtem, and gave motion to it. That a circle and a right line can cut one another only in two points, is a truth which depends upon no power nor will, and therefore is called neceſſary and immutable. Contingency, therefore, has a relation to active power, as all active power is exerted in contingent events; and as ſuch events can have no exiſtence, but by the exertion of active power.

When I obſerve a plant growing from its ſeed to maturity, I know that there muſt be a cauſe that has power to produce this effect. But I ſee neither the cauſe nor the manner of its operation.

But in certain motions of my body and directions of my thought, I know, not only that there muſt be a cauſe that has power to produce theſe effects, but that I am that cauſe; and I am conſcious of what I do in order to the production of them.

From the conſciouſneſs of our own activity, ſeems to be derived, not only the cleareſt, but the only conception we can form of activity, or the exertion of active power.

As I am unable to form a notion of any intellectual power different in kind from thoſe I poſſeſs, the ſame holds with reſpect to active power. If all men had been blind, we ſhould have had no conception of the power of ſeeing, nor any name for it in language. If man had not the powers of abſtraction and reaſoning, we could not have had any conception of theſe operations. In like manner, if he had not ſome degree of active power, and if he were not conſcious of the exertion of it in his voluntary actions, it is probable he could have no conception of activity, or of active power.

A train of events following one another ever ſo regularly, could never lead us to the notion of a cauſe, if we had not, from our conſtitution, a conviction of the neceſſity of a cauſe to every event.

And of the manner in which a cauſe may exert its active power, we can have no conception, but from conſciouſneſs of the manner in which our own active power is exerted.

With regard to the operations of nature, it is ſufficient for us to know, that, whatever the agents may be, whatever the manner of their operation, or the extent of their power, they depend upon the firſt cauſe, and are under his control; and this indeed is all that we know; beyond this we are left in darkneſs. But, in what regards human actions, we have a more immediate concern.

It is of the higheſt importance to us, as moral and accountable creatures, to know what actions are in our own power, becauſe it is for theſe only that we can be accountable to our Maker, or to our fellow-men in ſociety; by theſe only we can merit praiſe or blame; in theſe only all our prudence, wiſdom and virtue muſt be employed; and, therefore, with regard to them, the wiſe Author of nature has not left us in the dark.

Every man is led by nature to attribute to himſelf the free determinations of his own will, and to believe thoſe events to be in his power which depend upon his will. On the other hand, it is ſelf-evident, that nothing is in our power that is not ſubject to our will.

We grow from childhood to manhood, we digeſt our food, our blood circulates, our heart and arteries beat, we are ſometimes ſick and ſometimes in health; all theſe things muſt be done by the power of ſome agent; but they are not done by our

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our power. How do we know this? Becauſe they are not ſubject to our will. This is the infallible criterion by which we diſtinguiſh what is our doing from what is not; what is in our power from what is not.

Human power, therefore, can only be exerted by will, and we are unable to conceive any active power to be exerted without will. Every man knows infallibly that what is done by his conſcious will and intention, is to be imputed to him, as the agent or cauſe; and that whatever is done without his will and intention, cannot be imputed to him with truth.

We judge of the actions and conduct of other men by the ſame rule as we judge of our own. In morals, it is ſelf-evident that no man can be the object either of approbation or of blame for what he did not. But how ſhall we know whether it is his doing or not? If the action depended upon his will, and if he intended and willed it, it is his action in the judgment of all mankind. But if it was done without his knowledge, or without his will and intention, it is as certain that he did it not, and that it ought not to be imputed to him as the agent.

When there is any doubt to whom a particular action ought to be imputed, the doubt ariſes only from our ignorance of facts; when the facts relating to it are known, no man of underſtanding has any doubt to whom the action ought to be imputed.

The general rules of imputation are ſelf-evident. They have been the ſame in all ages, and among all civilized nations. No man blames another for being black or fair, for having a fever or the falling ſickneſs; becauſe theſe things are believed not to be in his power; and they are believed not to be in his power, becauſe they depend not upon his will. We can never conceive that

that a man's duty goes beyond his power, or that his power goes beyond what depends upon his will.

Reaſon leads us to aſcribe unlimited power to the Supreme Being. But what do we mean by unlimited power? It is power to do whatſoever he wills. To ſuppoſe him to do what he does not will to do, is abſurd.

The only diſtinct conception I can form of active power is, that is is an attribute in a being by which he can do certain things if he wills. This, after all, is only a relative conception. It is relative to the effect, and to the will of producing it. Take away theſe, and the conception vaniſhes. They are the handles by which the mind takes hold of it. When they are taken away, our hold is gone. The ſame is the caſe with regard to other relative conceptions. Thus velocity is a real ſtate of a body, about which Philoſophers reaſon with the force of demonſtration; but our conception of it is relative to ſpace and time. What is velocity in a body? It is a ſtate in which it paſſes through a certain ſpace in a certain time. Space and time are very different from velocity; but we cannot conceive it but by its relation to them. The effect produced, and the will to produce it, are things different from active power, but we can have no conception of it, but by its relation to them.

Whether the conception of an efficient cauſe, and of real activity, could ever have entered into the mind of man, if we had not had the experience of activity in ourſelves, I am not able to determine with certainty. The origin of many of our conceptions, and even of many of our judgments, is not ſo eaſily traced as Philoſophers have generally conceived. No man can recollect the time when he firſt got the conception of an efficient cauſe, or the time when he firſt got the belief that an efficient cauſe is neceſſary to every change in nature. The conception of an efficient cauſe may very probably be derived from the experience

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perience we have had in very early life of our own power to produce certain effects. But the belief, that no event can happen without an efficient cauſe, cannot be derived from experience. We may learn from experience what is, or what was, but no experience can teach us what neceſſarily muſt be.

In like manner, we probably derive the conception of pain from the experience we have had of it in ourſelves; but our belief that pain can only exiſt in a being that hath life, cannot be got by experience, becauſe it is a neceſſary truth; and no neceſſary truth can have its atteſtation from experience.

If it be ſo that the conception of an efficient cauſe enters into the mind, only from the early conviction we have that we are the efficients of our own voluntary actions, (which I think is moſt probable) the notion of efficiency will be reduced to this, That it is a relation between the cauſe and the effect, ſimilar to that which is between us and our voluntary actions. This is ſurely the moſt diſtinct notion, and, I think, the only notion we can form of real efficiency.

Now it is evident, that, to conſtitute the relation between me and my action, my conception of the action, and will to do it, are eſſential. For what I never conceived, nor willed, I never did.

If any man, therefore, affirms, that a being may be the efficient cauſe of an action, and have power to produce it, which that being can neither conceive nor will, he ſpeaks a language which I do not underſtand. If he has a meaning, his notion of power and efficiency muſt be eſſentially different from mine; and, until he conveys his notion of efficiency to my underſtanding, I can no more aſſent to his opinion, than if he ſhould affirm, that a being without life may feel pain.

It ſeems, therefore, to me moſt probable, that ſuch beings only as have ſome degree of underſtanding and will, can poſſeſs active power; and that inanimate beings muſt be merely paſſive, and have no real activity. Nothing we perceive without us affords any good ground for aſcribing active power to any inanimate being; and every thing we can diſcover in our own conſtitution, leads us to think, that active power cannot be exerted without will and intelligence.

CHAP. VI.

Of the efficient Cauſes of the Phænomena of Nature.

IF active power, in its proper meaning, requires a ſubject endowed with will and intelligence, what ſhall we ſay of thoſe active powers which Philoſophers teach us to aſcribe to matter; the powers of corpuſcular attraction, magnetiſm, electricity, gravitation, and others? Is it not univerſally allowed, that heavy bodies deſcend to the earth by the power of gravity; that, by the ſame power, the moon, and all the planets and comets, are retained in their orbits? Have the moſt eminent natural Philoſophers been impoſing upon us, and giving us words inſtead of real cauſes?

In anſwer to this, I apprehend, that the principles of natural philoſophy have, in modern times, been built upon a foundation that cannot be ſhaken, and that they can be called in queſtion only by thoſe who do not underſtand the evidence on which they ſtand. But the ambiguity of the words *cauſe*, *agency*, *active power*, and the other words related to theſe, has led many to underſtand them, when uſed in natural philoſophy, in a wrong ſenſe, and in a ſenſe which is neither neceſſary for eſtabliſhing

CHAP. VI. the true principles of natural philoſophy, nor was ever meant by the moſt enlightened in that ſcience.

To be convinced of this, we may obſerve, that thoſe very Philoſophers who attribute to matter the power of gravitation, and other active powers, teach us, at the ſame time, that matter is a ſubſtance altogether inert, and merely paſſive; that gravitation, and the other attractive or repulſive powers which they aſcribe to it, are not inherent in its nature, but impreſſed upon it by ſome external cauſe, which they do not pretend to know, or to explain. Now, when we find wiſe men aſcribing action and active power to a ſubſtance which they expreſsly teach us to conſider as merely paſſive and acted upon by ſome unknown cauſe, we muſt conclude, that the action and active power aſcribed to it are not to be underſtood ſtrictly, but in ſome popular ſenſe.

It ought likewiſe to be obſerved, that although Philoſophers, for the ſake of being underſtood, muſt ſpeak the language of the vulgar, as when they ſay, the ſun riſes and ſets, and goes through all the ſigns of the zodiac, yet they often think differently from the vulgar. Let us hear what the greateſt of natural Philoſophers ſays, in the 8th definition prefixed to his *Principia*, "Voces autem attractionis, impulſus, vel propenſionis cu-
" juſcunque in centrum, indifferenter et pro ſe mutuo promiſcue
" uſurpo; has voces non phyſicè ſed mathematicè conſiderando.
" Unde caveat lector, ne per hujus modi voces cogitet me ſpe-
" ciem vel modum actionis, cauſamve aut rationem phyſicam,
" alicubi definire; vel centris (quæ ſunt puncta mathematica)
" vires vere et phyſice tribuere, ſi forte centra trahere, aut vires
" centrorum eſſe, dixero."

In all languages, action is attributed to many things which all men of common underſtanding believe to be merely paſſive; thus we ſay, the wind blows, the rivers flow, the ſea rages, the fire burns, bodies move, and impel other bodies.

Every

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Every object which undergoes any change, muſt be either active or paſſive in that change. This is ſelf-evident to all men from the firſt dawn of reaſon; and therefore the change is always expreſſed in language, either by an active or a paſſive verb. Nor do I know any verb, expreſſive of a change, which does not imply either action or paſſion. The thing either changes, or it is changed. But it is remarkable in language, that when an external cauſe of the change is not obvious, the change is always imputed to the thing changed, as if it were animated, and had active power to produce the change in itſelf. So we ſay, the moon changes, the ſun riſes and goes down.

Thus active verbs are very often applied, and active power imputed to things, which a little advance in knowledge and experience teaches us to be merely paſſive. This property, common to all languages, I endeavoured to account for in the ſecond chapter of this Eſſay, to which the reader is referred.

A like irregularity may be obſerved in the uſe of the word ſignifying *cauſe*, in all languages, and of the words related to it.

Our knowledge of cauſes is very ſcanty in the moſt advanced ſtate of ſociety, much more is it ſo in that early period in which language is formed. A ſtrong deſire to know the cauſes of things, is common to all men in every ſtate; but the experience of all ages ſhews, that this keen appetite, rather than go empty, will feed upon the huſks of real knowledge where the fruit cannot be found.

While we are very much in the dark with regard to the real agents or cauſes which produce the phænomena of nature, and have, at the ſame time, an avidity to know them, ingenious men frame conjectures, which thoſe of weaker underſtanding take for truth. The fare is coarſe, but appetite makes it go down.

CHAP. VI. Thus, in a very ancient ſyſtem, love and ſtrife were made the cauſes of things. PLATO made the cauſes of things to be matter, ideas, and an efficient architect. ARISTOTLE, matter, form, and privation. DES CARTES thought matter, and a certain quantity of motion given it by the Almighty at firſt, to be all that is neceſſary to make the material world. LEIBNITZ conceived the whole univerſe, even the material part of it, to be made up of *monades*, each of which is active and intelligent, and produces in itſelf, by its own active power, all the changes it undergoes from the beginning of its exiſtence to eternity.

In common language, we give the name of a *cauſe* to a reaſon, a motive, an end, to any circumſtance which is connected with the effect, and goes before it.

ARISTOTLE, and the ſchoolmen after him, diſtinguiſhed four kinds of cauſes, the efficient, the material, the formal, and the final. This, like many of ARISTOTLE's diſtinctions, is only a diſtinction of the various meanings of an ambiguous word; for the efficient, the matter, the form and the end, have nothing common in their nature, by which they may be accounted ſpecies of the ſame *genus;* but the Greek word which we tranſlate *cauſe*, had theſe four different meanings in ARISTOTLE's days, and we have added other meanings. We do not indeed call the matter or the form of a thing its cauſe; but we have final cauſes, inſtrumental cauſes, occaſional cauſes, and I know not how many others.

Thus the word *cauſe* has been ſo hackneyed, and made to have ſo many different meanings in the writings of Philoſophers, and in the diſcourſe of the vulgar, that its original and proper meaning is loſt in the crowd.

With regard to the phænomena of nature, the important end of knowing their cauſes, beſides gratifying our curioſity, is, that

that we may know when to expect them, or how to bring them about. This is very often of real importance in life; and this purpoſe is ſerved, by knowing what, by the courſe of nature, goes before them and is connected with them; and this, therefore, we call the *cauſe* of ſuch a phænomenon.

If a magnet be brought near to a mariner's compaſs, the needle, which was before at reſt, immediately begins to move, and bends its courſe towards the magnet, or perhaps the contrary way. If an unlearned ſailor is aſked the cauſe of this motion of the needle, he is at no loſs for an anſwer. He tells you it is the magnet; and the proof is clear; for, remove the magnet, and the effect ceaſes; bring it near, and the effect is again produced. It is, therefore, evident to ſenſe, that the magnet is the cauſe of this effect.

A Carteſian Philoſopher enters deeper into the cauſe of this phænomenon. He obſerves, that the magnet does not touch the needle, and therefore can give it no impulſe. He pities the ignorance of the ſailor. The effect is produced, ſays he, by magnetic effluvia, or ſubtile matter, which paſſes from the magnet to the needle, and forces it from its place. He can even ſhew you, in a figure, where theſe magnetic effluvia iſſue from the magnet, what round they take, and what way they return home again. And thus he thinks he comprehends perfectly how, and by what cauſe, the motion of the needle is produced.

A Newtonian Philoſopher enquires what proof can be offered for the exiſtence of magnetic effluvia, and can find none. He therefore holds it as a fiction, a hypotheſis; and he has learned that hypotheſes ought to have no place in the philoſophy of nature. He confeſſes his ignorance of the real cauſe of this motion, and thinks, that his buſineſs, as a Philoſopher, is only to find from experiment the laws by which it is regulated in all caſes.

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Theſe three perſons differ much in their ſentiments with regard to the real cauſe of this phænomenon; and the man who knows moſt is he who is ſenſible that he knows nothing of the matter. Yet all the three ſpeak the ſame language, and acknowledge, that the cauſe of this motion is the attractive or repulſive power of the magnet.

What has been ſaid of this, may be applied to every phænomenon that falls within the compaſs of natural philoſophy. We deceive ourſelves, if we conceive, that we can point out the real efficient cauſe of any one of them.

The grandeſt diſcovery ever made in natural philoſophy, was that of the law of gravitation, which opens ſuch a view of our planetary ſyſtem, that it looks like ſomething divine. But the author of this diſcovery was perfectly aware, that he diſcovered no real cauſe, but only the law or rule, according to which the unknown cauſe operates.

Natural Philoſophers, who think accurately, have a preciſe meaning to the terms they uſe in the ſcience; and when they pretend to ſhew the cauſe of any phænomenon of nature, they mean by the cauſe, a law of nature of which that phænomenon is a neceſſary conſequence.

The whole object of natural philoſophy, as NEWTON expreſsly teaches, is reducible to theſe two heads; firſt, by juſt induction from experiment and obſervation, to diſcover the laws of nature, and then to apply thoſe laws to the ſolution of the phænomena of nature. This was all that this great Philoſopher attempted, and all that he thought attainable. And this indeed he attained in a great meaſure, with regard to the motions of our planetary ſyſtem, and with regard to the rays of light.

But ſuppoſing that all the phænomena that fall within the reach

reach of our ſenſes, were accounted for from general laws of nature, juſtly deduced from experience; that is, ſuppoſing natural philoſophy brought to its utmoſt perfection, it does not diſcover the efficient cauſe of any one phænomenon in nature.

The laws of nature are the rules according to which the effects are produced; but there muſt be a cauſe which operates according to theſe rules. The rules of navigation never navigated a ſhip. The rules of architecture never built a houſe.

Natural philoſophers, by great attention to the courſe of nature, have diſcovered many of her laws, and have very happily applied them to account for many phænomena; but they have never diſcovered the efficient cauſe of any one phænomenon; nor do thoſe who have diſtinct notions of the principles of the ſcience, make any ſuch pretence.

Upon the theatre of nature we ſee innumerable effects, which require an agent endowed with active power; but the agent is behind the ſcene. Whether it be the Supreme Cauſe alone, or a ſubordinate cauſe or cauſes; and if ſubordinate cauſes be employed by the Almighty, what their nature, their number, and their different offices may be, are things hid, for wiſe reaſons without doubt, from the human eye.

It is only in human actions, that may be imputed for praiſe or blame, that it is neceſſary for us to know who is the agent; and in this, nature has given us all the light that is neceſſary for our conduct.

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CHAP. VII.

Of the Extent of Human Power.

EVERY thing laudable and praiſe-worthy in man, muſt conſiſt in the proper exerciſe of that power which is given him by his Maker. This is the talent which he is required to occupy, and of which he muſt give an account to him who committed it to his truſt.

To ſome perſons more power is given than to others; and to the ſame perſon more at one time and leſs at another. Its exiſtence, its extent, and its continuance, depend ſolely upon the pleaſure of the Almighty; but every man that is accountable muſt have more or leſs of it. For, to call a perſon to account, to approve or diſapprove of his conduct, who had no power to do good or ill, is abſurd. No axiom of Euclid appears more evident than this.

As power is a valuable gift, to under-rate it is ingratitude to the giver; to over-rate it, begets pride and preſumption, and leads to unſucceſsful attempts. It is therefore, in every man, a point of wiſdom to make a juſt eſtimate of his own power. *Quid ferre recuſent, quid valeant humeri.*

We can only ſpeak of the power of man in general; and as our notion of power is relative to its effects, we can eſtimate its extent only by the effects which it is able to produce.

It would be wrong to eſtimate the extent of human power by the effects which it has actually produced. For every man had power to do many things which he did not, and not to do many things

things which he did; otherwiſe he could not be an object either of approbation or of diſapprobation, to any rational being.

The effects of human power are either immediate, or they are more remote.

The immediate effects, I think, are reducible to two heads. We can give certain motions to our own bodies; and we can give a certain direction to our own thoughts.

Whatever we can do beyond this, muſt be done by one of theſe means, or both.

We can produce no motion in any body in the univerſe, but by moving firſt our own body as an inſtrument. Nor can we produce thought in any other perſon, but by thought and motion in ourſelves.

Our power to move our own body, is not only limited in its extent, but in its nature is ſubject to mechanical laws. It may be compared to a ſpring endowed with the power of contracting or expanding itſelf, but which cannot contract without drawing equally at both ends, nor expand without puſhing equally at both ends; ſo that every action of the ſpring is always accompanied with an equal reaction in a contrary direction.

We can conceive a man to have power to move his whole body in any direction, without the aid of any other body, or a power to move one part of his body without the aid of any other part. But philoſophy teaches us that man has no ſuch power.

If he carries his whole body in any direction with a certain quantity of motion, this he can do only by puſhing the earth, or ſome other body, with an equal quantity of motion in the con-

CHAP. VII. trary direction. If he but ſtretch out his arm in one direction, the reſt of his body is puſhed with an equal quantity of motion in the contrary direction.

This is the caſe with regard to all animal and voluntary motions, which come within the reach of our ſenſes. They are performed by the contraction of certain muſcles; and a muſcle, when it is contracted, draws equally at both ends. As to the motions antecedent to the contraction of the muſcle, and conſequent upon the volition of the animal, we know nothing, and can ſay nothing about them.

We know not even how thoſe immediate effects of our power are produced by our willing them. We perceive not any neceſſary connection between the volition and exertion on our part, and the motion of our body that follows them.

Anatomiſts inform us, that every voluntary motion of the body is performed by the contraction of certain muſcles, and that the muſcles are contracted by ſome influence derived from the nerves. But, without thinking in the leaſt, either of muſcles or nerves, we will only the external effect, and the internal machinery, without our call, immediately produces that effect.

This is one of the wonders of our frame, which we have reaſon to admire; but to account for it, is beyond the reach of our underſtanding.

That there is an eſtabliſhed harmony between our willing certain motions of our bodies, and the operation of the nerves and muſcles which produces thoſe motions, is a fact known by experience. This volition is an act of the mind. But whether this act of the mind have any phyſical effect upon the nerves and muſcles; or whether it be only an occaſion of their being acted upon

upon by ſome other efficient; according to the eſtabliſhed laws of nature, is hid from us. So dark is our conception of our own power when we trace it to its origin. CHAP. VII.

We have good reaſon to believe, that matter had its origin from mind, as well as all its motions; but how, or in what manner, it is moved by mind, we know as little as how it was created.

It is poſſible therefore, for any thing we know, that what we call the immediate effects of our power, may not be ſo in the ſtricteſt ſenſe. Between the will to produce the effect, and the production of it, there may be agents or inſtruments of which we are ignorant.

This may leave ſome doubt, whether we be in the ſtricteſt ſenſe, the efficient cauſe of the voluntary motions of our own body. But it can produce no doubt with regard to the moral eſtimation of our actions.

The man who knows that ſuch an event depends upon his will, and who deliberately wills to produce it, is, in the ſtricteſt moral ſenſe, the cauſe of the event; and it is juſtly imputed to him, whatever phyſical cauſes may have concurred in its production.

Thus, he who maliciouſly intends to ſhoot his neighbour dead, and voluntarily does it, is undoubtedly the cauſe of his death, though he did no more to occaſion it than draw the trigger of the gun. He neither gave to the ball its velocity, nor to the powder its expanſive force, nor to the flint and ſteel the power to ſtrike fire; but he knew that what he did muſt be followed by the man's death, and did it with that intention; and therefore he is juſtly chargeable with the murder.

Philoſophers may therefore diſpute innocently, whether we

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be the proper efficient cauſes of the voluntary motions of our own body; or whether we be only, as MALEBRANCHE thinks, the occaſional cauſes. The determination of this queſtion, if it can be determined, can have no effect on human conduct.

The other branch of what is immediately in our power, is to give a certain direction to our own thoughts. This, as well as the firſt branch, is limited in various ways. It is greater in ſome perſons than in others, and in the ſame perſon is very different, according to the health of his body, and the ſtate of his mind. But that men, when free from diſeaſe of body and of mind, have a conſiderable degree of power of this kind, and that it may be greatly increaſed by practice and habit, is ſufficiently evident from experience, and from the natural conviction of all mankind.

Were we to examine minutely into the connection between our volitions, and the direction of our thoughts which obeys theſe volitions; were we to conſider how we are able to give attention to an object for a certain time, and turn our attention to another when we chuſe, we might perhaps find it difficult to determine, whether the mind itſelf be the ſole efficient cauſe of the voluntary changes in the direction of our thoughts, or whether it requires the aid of other efficient cauſes.

I ſee no good reaſon why the diſpute about efficient and occaſional cauſes, may not be applied to the power of directing our thoughts, as well as to the power of moving our bodies. In both caſes, I apprehend the diſpute is endleſs, and, if it could be brought to an iſſue, would be fruitleſs.

Nothing appears more evident to our reaſon, than that there muſt be an efficient cauſe of every change that happens in nature. But when I attempt to comprehend the manner in which an efficient cauſe operates, either upon body or upon mind, there

there is a darkneſs which my faculties are not able to penetrate. CHAP. VII.

However ſmall the immediate effects of human power ſeem to be, its more remote effects are very conſiderable.

In this reſpect, the power of man may be compared to the Nile, the Ganges, and other great rivers, which make a figure upon the globe of the earth, and, traverſing vaſt regions, bring ſometimes great benefit, at other times great miſchief to many nations; yet, when we trace thoſe rivers to their ſource, we find them to riſe from inconſiderable fountains and rills.

The command of a mighty prince, what is it, but the ſound of his breath, modified by his organs of ſpeech? But it may have great conſequences; it may raiſe armies, equip fleets, and ſpread war and deſolation over a great part of the earth.

The meaneſt of mankind has conſiderable power to do good, and more to hurt himſelf and others.

From this I think we may conclude, that, although the degeneracy of mankind be great, and juſtly to be lamented, yet men, in general, are more diſpoſed to employ their power in doing good, than in doing hurt to their fellow-men. The laſt is much *more in their power than the firſt; and, if they were as much* diſpoſed to it, human ſociety could not ſubſiſt, and the ſpecies muſt ſoon periſh from the earth.

We may firſt conſider the effects which may be produced by human power upon the material ſyſtem.

It is confined indeed to the planet which we inhabit; we cannot remove to another; nor can we produce any change in the annual or diurnal motions of our own.

But,

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But, by human power, great changes may be made upon the face of the earth; and thoſe treaſures of metals and minerals that are ſtored up in its bowels, may be diſcovered and brought forth.

The Supreme Being could, no doubt, have made the earth to ſupply the wants of man, without any cultivation by human labour. Many inferior animals, who neither plant, nor ſow, nor ſpin, are provided for by the bounty of Heaven. But this is not the caſe with man.

He has active powers and ingenuity given him, by which he can do much for ſupplying his wants; and his labour is made neceſſary for that purpoſe.

His wants are more than thoſe of any other animal that inhabits this globe; and his reſources are proportioned to them, and put within the ſphere of his power.

The earth is left by nature in ſuch a ſtate as to require cultivation for the accommodation of man.

It is capable of cultivation, in moſt places, to ſuch a degree, that, by human labour, it may afford ſubſiſtence to an hundred times the number of men it could in its natural ſtate.

Every tribe of men, in every climate, muſt labour for their ſubſiſtence and accommodation; and their ſupply is more or leſs comfortable, in proportion to the labour properly employed for that purpoſe.

It is evidently the intention of Nature, that man ſhould be laborious, and that he ſhould exert his powers of body and mind for his own, and for the common good. And, by his power properly applied, he may make great improvement upon the fertility

tility of the earth, and a great addition to his own accommodation and comfortable ſtate.

By clearing, tilling and manuring the ground, by planting and ſowing, by building cities and harbours, draining marſhes and lakes, making rivers navigable, and joining them by canals, by manufacturing the rude materials which the earth, duly cultivated, produces in abundance, by the mutual exchange of commodities and of labour, he may make the barren wilderneſs the habitation of rich and populous ſtates.

If we compare the city of Venice, the province of Holland, the empire of China, with thoſe places of the earth which never felt the hand of induſtry, we may form ſome conception of the extent of human power upon the material ſyſtem, in changing the face of the earth, and furniſhing the accommodations of human life.

But, in order to produce thoſe happy changes, man himſelf muſt be improved.

His animal faculties are ſufficient for the preſervation of the ſpecies; they grow up of themſelves, like the trees of the foreſt, which require only the force of nature and the influences of Heaven.

His rational and moral faculties, like the earth itſelf, are rude and barren by nature, but capable of a high degree of culture; and this culture he muſt receive from parents, from inſtructors, from thoſe with whom he lives in ſociety, joined with his own induſtry.

If we conſider the changes that may be produced by man upon his own mind, and upon the minds of others, they appear to be great.

Upon

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Upon his own mind he may make great improvement, in acquiring the treaſures of uſeful knowledge, the habits of ſkill in arts, the habits of wiſdom, prudence, ſelf-command, and every other virtue. It is the conſtitution of nature, that ſuch qualities as exalt and dignify human nature are to be acquired by proper exertions; and, by a contrary conduct, ſuch qualities as debaſe it below the condition of brutes.

Even upon the minds of others, great effects may be produced by means within the compaſs of human power; by means of good education, of proper inſtruction, of perſuaſion, of good example, and by the diſcipline of laws and government.

That theſe have often had great and good effects on the civilization and improvement of individuals, and of nations, cannot be doubted. But what happy effects they might have, if applied univerſally with the ſkill and addreſs that is within the reach of human wiſdom and power, is not eaſily conceived, or to what pitch the happineſs of human ſociety, and the improvement of the ſpecies, might be carried.

What a noble, what a divine employment of human power is here aſſigned us? How ought it to rouſe the ambition of parents, of inſtructors, of lawgivers, of magiſtrates, of every man in his ſtation, to contribute his part towards the accompliſhment of ſo glorious an end?

The power of man over his own and other minds, when we trace it to its origin, is involved in darkneſs, no leſs than his power to move his own and other bodies.

How far we are properly efficient cauſes, how far occaſional cauſes, I cannot pretend to determine.

We know that habit produces great changes in the mind; but how

how it does ſo, we know not. We know, that example has a powerful, and, in the early period of life, almoſt an irreſiſtible effect; but we know not how it produces this effect. The communication of thought, ſentiment and paſſion, from one mind to another, has ſomething in it as myſterious as the communication of motion from one body to another.

We perceive one event to follow another, according to eſtabliſhed laws of nature, and we are accuſtomed to call the firſt the cauſe, and the laſt the effect, without knowing what is the bond that unites them. In order to produce a certain event, we uſe means which, by laws of nature, are connected with that event; and we call ourſelves the cauſe of that event, though other efficient cauſes may have had the chief hand in its production.

Upon the whole, human power, in its exiſtence, in its extent, and in its exertions, is entirely dependent upon GOD, and upon the laws of nature which he has eſtabliſhed. This ought to baniſh pride and arrogance from the moſt mighty of the ſons of men. At the ſame time, that degree of power which we have received from the bounty of Heaven, is one of the nobleſt gifts of GOD to man; of which we ought not to be inſenſible, that we may not be ungrateful, and that we may be excited to make the proper uſe of it.

The extent of human power is perfectly ſuited to the ſtate of man, as a ſtate of improvement and diſcipline. It is ſufficient to animate us to the nobleſt exertions. By the proper exerciſe of this gift of GOD, human nature, in individuals and in ſocieties, may be exalted to a high degree of dignity and felicity, and the earth become a paradiſe. On the contrary, its perverſion and abuſe is the cauſe of moſt of the evils that afflict human life.

ESSAY II.

OF THE WILL.

CHAP. I.

Obſervations concerning the Will.

EVERY man is conſcious of a power to determine, in things which he conceives to depend upon his determination. To this power we give the name of *will:* and, as it is uſual, in the operations of the mind, to give the ſame name to the power and to the act of that power, the term *will* is often put to ſignify the act of determining, which more properly is called *volition.*

Volition, therefore, ſignifies the act of willing and determining, and will is put indifferently to ſignify either the power of willing or the act.

But the term *will* has very often, eſpecially in the writings of Philoſophers, a more extenſive meaning, which we muſt carefully diſtinguiſh from that which we have now given.

In the general diviſion of our faculties into underſtanding and will, our paſſions, appetites and affections are comprehended under the will; and ſo it is made to ſignify, not only our determination to act or not to act, but every motive and incitement to action.

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It is this, probably, that has led ſome Philoſophers to repreſent deſire, averſion, hope, fear, joy, ſorrow, all our appetites, paſſions and affections, as different modifications of the will, which, I think, tends to confound things which are very different in their nature.

The advice given to a man, and his determination conſequent to that advice, are things ſo different in their nature, that it would be improper to call them modifications of one and the ſame thing. In like manner, the motives to action, and the determination to act or not to act, are things that have no common nature, and therefore ought not to be confounded under one name, or repreſented as different modifications of the ſame thing.

For this reaſon, in ſpeaking of the will in this Eſſay, I do not comprehend under that term any of the incitements or motives which may have an influence upon our determinations, but ſolely the determination itſelf, and the power to determine.

Mr LOCKE has conſidered this operation of the mind more attentively, and diſtinguiſhed it more accurately, than ſome very ingenious authors who wrote after him.

He defines volition to be, "An act of the mind knowingly "exerting that dominion it takes itſelf to have over any part "of the man, by employing it in, or with-holding it from any "particular action."

It may more briefly be defined, The determination of the mind to do, or not to do ſomething which we conceive to be in our power.

If this were given as a ſtrictly logical definition, it would be liable to this objection, that the determination of the mind is only

only another term for volition. But it ought to be obſerved, that the moſt ſimple acts of the mind do not admit of a logical definition. The way to form a clear notion of them is, to reflect attentively upon them as we feel them in ourſelves. Without this reflection, no definition can give us a diſtinct conception of them.

For this reaſon, rather than ſift any definition of the will, I ſhall make ſome obſervations upon it, which may lead us to reflect upon it, and to diſtinguiſh it from other acts of mind, which, from the ambiguity of words, are apt to be confounded with it.

Firſt, Every act of will muſt have an object. He that wills muſt will ſomething; and that which he wills is called the object of his volition. As a man cannot think without thinking of ſomething, nor remember without remembering ſomething, ſo neither can he will without willing ſomething. Every act of will, therefore, muſt have an object; and the perſon who wills muſt have ſome conception, more or leſs diſtinct, of what he wills.

By this, things done voluntarily are diſtinguiſhed from things done merely from inſtinct, or merely from habit.

A healthy child, ſome hours after its birth, feels the ſenſation of hunger, and, if applied to the breaſt, ſucks and ſwallows its food very perfectly. We have no reaſon to think, that, before it ever ſucked, it has any conception of that complex operation, or how it is performed. It cannot, therefore, with propriety, be ſaid, that it wills to ſuck.

Numberleſs inſtances might be given of things done by animals without any previous conception of what they are to do; without the intention of doing it. They act by ſome inward blind impulſe,

CHAP. I. pulſe, of which the efficient cauſe is hid from us; and though there is an end evidently intended by the action, this intention is not in the animal, but in its Maker.

Other things are done by habit, which cannot properly be called voluntary. We ſhut our eyes ſeveral times every minute while we are awake; no man is conſcious of willing this every time he does it.

A *ſecond* obſervation is, That the immediate object of will muſt be ſome action of our own.

By this, will is diſtinguiſhed from two acts of the mind, which ſometimes take its name, and thereby are apt to be confounded with it; theſe are deſire and command.

The diſtinction between will and deſire has been well explained by Mr LOCKE; yet many later writers have overlooked it, and have repreſented deſire as a modification of will.

Deſire and will agree in this, that both muſt have an object, of which we muſt have ſome conception; and therefore both muſt be accompanied with ſome degree of underſtanding. But they differ in ſeveral things.

The object of deſire may be any thing which appetite, paſſion or affection, leads us to purſue; it may be any event which we think good for us, or for thoſe to whom we are well affected. I may deſire meat, or drink, or eaſe from pain: But to ſay that I will meat, or will drink, or will eaſe from pain, is not Engliſh. There is therefore a diſtinction in common language between deſire and will. And the diſtinction is, That what we will muſt be an action, and our own action; what we deſire may not be our own action, it may be no action at all.

A man deſires that his children may be happy, and that they may behave well. Their being happy is no action at all; their behaving well is not his action but theirs.

With regard to our own actions, we may deſire what we do not will, and will what we do not deſire; nay, what we have a great averſion to.

A man a-thirſt has a ſtrong deſire to drink, but, for ſome particular reaſon, he determines not to gratify his deſire. A judge, from a regard to juſtice, and to the duty of his office, dooms a criminal to die, while, from humanity or particular affection, he deſires that he ſhould live. A man for health may take a nauſeous draught, for which he has no deſire but a great averſion. Deſire therefore, even when its object is ſome action of our own, is only an incitement to will, but it is not volition. The determination of the mind may be, not to do what we deſire to do. But as deſire is often accompanied by will, we are apt to overlook the diſtinction between them.

The command of a perſon is ſometimes called his will, ſometimes his deſire; but when theſe words are uſed properly, they ſignify three different acts of the mind.

The immediate object of will is ſome action of our own; the object of a command is ſome action of another perſon, over whom we claim authority; the object of deſire may be no action at all.

In giving a command all theſe acts concur; and as they go together, it is not uncommon in language, to give to one the name which properly belongs to another.

A command being a voluntary action, there muſt be a will to give

CHAP. I. give the command: Some deſire is commonly the motive to that act of will, and the command is the effect of it.

Perhaps it may be thought that a command is only a deſire expreſſed by language, that the thing commanded ſhould be done. But it is not ſo. For a deſire may be expreſſed by language when there is no command; and there may poſſibly be a command without any deſire that the thing commanded ſhould be done. There have been inſtances of tyrants who have laid grievous commands upon their ſubjects, in order to reap the penalty of their diſobedience, or to furniſh a pretence for their puniſhment.

We might farther obſerve, that a command is a ſocial act of the mind. It can have no exiſtence but by a communication of thought to ſome intelligent being; and therefore implies a belief that there is ſuch a being, and that we can communicate our thoughts to him.

Deſire and will are ſolitary acts, which do not imply any ſuch communication or belief.

The immediate object of volition therefore, muſt be ſome action, and our own action.

A *third* obſervation is, That the object of our volition muſt be ſomething which we believe to be in our power, and to depend upon our will.

A man may deſire to make a viſit to the moon, or to the planet Jupiter, but he cannot will or determine to do it; becauſe he knows it is not in his power. If an inſane perſon ſhould make an attempt, his inſanity muſt firſt make him believe it to be in his power.

A

A man in his ſleep may be ſtruck with a palſy, which deprives him of the power of ſpeech; when he awakes, he attempts to ſpeak, not knowing that he has loſt the power. But when he knows by experience that the power is gone, he ceaſes to make the effort.

The ſame man, knowing that ſome perſons have recovered the power of ſpeech after they had loſt it by a paralytical ſtroke, may now and then make an effort. In this effort, however, there is not properly a will to ſpeak, but a will to try whether he can ſpeak or not.

In like manner, a man may exert his ſtrength to raiſe a weight which is too heavy for him. But he always does this, either from the belief that he can raiſe the weight, or for a trial whether he can or not. It is evident therefore, that what we will muſt be believed to be in our power, and to depend upon our will.

The *next* obſervation is, That when we will to do a thing immediately, the volition is accompanied with an effort to execute that which we willed.

If a man wills to raiſe a great weight from the ground by the ſtrength of his arm, he makes an effort for that purpoſe proportioned to the weight he determines to raiſe. A great weight requires a great effort; a ſmall weight a leſs effort. We ſay indeed, that to raiſe a very ſmall body requires no effort at all. But this, I apprehend, muſt be underſtood either as a figurative way of ſpeaking, by which things very ſmall are accounted as nothing; or it is owing to our giving no attention to very ſmall efforts, and therefore having no name for them.

Great efforts, whether of body or mind, are attended with difficulty, and when long continued produce laſſitude, which re-

CHAP. I. quires that they ſhould be intermitted. This leads us to reflect upon them and to give them a name. The name *effort* is commonly appropriated to them; and thoſe that are made with eaſe, and leave no ſenſible effect, paſs without obſervation and without a name, though they be of the ſame kind, and differ only in degree from thoſe to which the name is given.

This effort we are conſcious of, if we will but give attention to it; and there is nothing in which we are in a more ſtrict ſenſe active.

The *laſt* obſervation is, That in all determinations of the mind that are of any importance, there muſt be ſomething in the preceding ſtate of the mind that diſpoſes or inclines us to that determination.

If the mind were always in a ſtate of perfect indifference, without any incitement, motive, or reaſon, to act, or not to act, to act one way rather than another, our active power, having no end to purſue, no rule to direct its exertions, would be given in vain. We ſhould either be altogether inactive, and never will to do any thing, or our volitions would be perfectly unmeaning and futile, being neither wiſe nor fooliſh, virtuous nor vicious.

We have reaſon therefore to think, that to every being to whom GOD hath given any degree of active power, he hath alſo given ſome principles of action, for the direction of that power to the end for which it was intended.

It is evident that, in the conſtitution of man, there are various principles of action ſuited to our ſtate and ſituation. A particular conſideration of theſe is the ſubject of the next eſſay; in this we are only to conſider them in general, with a view to examine the relation they bear to volition, and how it is influenced by them.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the Influence of Incitements and Motives upon the Will.

WE come into the world ignorant of every thing, yet we muſt do many things in order to our ſubſiſtence and well-being. A new-born child may be carried in arms, and kept warm by his nurſe; but he muſt ſuck and ſwallow his food for himſelf. And this muſt be done before he has any conception of ſucking or ſwallowing, or of the manner in which they are to be performed. He is led by nature to do theſe actions without knowing for what end, or what he is about. This we call *inſtinct*.

In many caſes there is no time for voluntary determination. The motions muſt go on ſo rapidly, that the conception and volition of every movement cannot keep pace with them. In ſome caſes of this kind, inſtinct, in others habit, comes in to our aid.

When a man ſtumbles and loſes his balance, the motion neceſſary to prevent his fall would come too late, if it were the conſequence of thinking what is fit to be done, and making a voluntary effort for that purpoſe. He does this inſtinctively.

When a man beats a drum or plays a tune, he has not time to direct every particular beat or ſtop, by a voluntary determination; but the habit which may be acquired by exerciſe, anſwers the purpoſe as well.

By inſtinct therefore, and by habit, we do many things without any exerciſe either of judgment or will.

In other actions the will is exerted, but without judgment.

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Suppoſe a man to know that, in order to live, he muſt eat. What ſhall he eat? How much? And how often? His reaſon can anſwer none of theſe queſtions; and therefore can give no direction how he ſhould determine. Here again nature, as an indulgent parent, ſupplies the defects of his reaſon; giving him appetite, which ſhews him when he is to eat, how often, and how much; and taſte, which informs him what he is, and what he is not to eat. And by theſe principles he is much better directed than he could be without them, by all the knowledge he can acquire.

As the Author of nature has given us ſome principles of action to ſupply the defects of our knowledge, he has given others to ſupply the defects of our wiſdom and virtue.

The natural deſires, affections and paſſions, which are common to the wiſe and to the fooliſh, to the virtuous and to the vicious, and even to the more ſagacious brutes, ſerve very often to direct the courſe of human actions. By theſe principles men may perform the moſt laborious duties of life, without any regard to duty; and do what is proper to be done, without regard to propriety; like a veſſel that is carried on in her proper courſe by a proſperous gale, without the ſkill or judgment of thoſe that are aboard.

Appetite, affection, or paſſion, give an impulſe to a certain action. In this impulſe there is no judgment implied. It may be weak or ſtrong; we can even conceive it irreſiſtible. In the caſe of madneſs it is ſo. Madmen have their appetites and paſſions; but they want the power of ſelf-government; and therefore we do not impute their actions to the man but to the diſeaſe.

In actions that proceed from appetite or paſſion, we are paſſive in part, and only in part active. They are therefore partly

ly imputed to the paſſion; and if it is ſuppoſed to be irreſiſtible, we do not impute them to the man at all.

Even an American ſavage judges in this manner: When in a fit of drunkenneſs he kills his friend: As ſoon as he comes to himſelf, he is very ſorry for what he has done; but pleads that drink, and not he, was the cauſe.

We conceive brute-animals to have no ſuperior principle to control their appetites and paſſions. On this account, their actions are not ſubject to law. Men are in a like ſtate in infancy, in madneſs, and in the delirium of a fever. They have appetites and paſſions, but they want that which makes them moral agents, accountable for their conduct, and objects of moral approbation or of blame.

In ſome caſes, a ſtronger impulſe of appetite or paſſion may oppoſe a weaker. Here alſo there may be determination and action without judgment.

Suppoſe a ſoldier ordered to mount a breach, and certain of preſent death if he retreats, this man needs not courage to go on, fear is ſufficient. The certainty of preſent death if he retreats, is an overbalance to the probability of being killed if he goes on. The man is puſhed by contrary forces, and it requires neither judgment nor exertion to yield to the ſtrongeſt.

A hungry dog acts by the ſame principle, if meat is ſet before him, with a threatening to beat him if he touch it. Hunger puſhes him forward, fear puſhes him back with more force, and the ſtrongeſt force prevails.

Thus we ſee, that, in many even of our voluntary actions, we may act from the impulſe of appetite, affection, or paſſion, without

CHAP. II. without any exercise of judgment, and much in the same manner as brute-animals seem to act.

Sometimes, however, there is a calm in the mind from the gales of passion or appetite, and the man is left to work his way, in the voyage of life, without those impulses which they give. Then he calmly weighs goods and evils, which are at too great a distance to excite any passion. He judges what is best upon the whole, without feeling any bias drawing him to one side. He judges for himself as he would do for another in his situation; and the determination is wholly imputable to the man, and not in any degree to his passion.

Every man come to years of understanding, who has given any attention to his own conduct, and to that of others, has, in his mind, a scale or measure of goods and evils, more or less exact. He makes an estimate of the value of health, of reputation, of riches, of pleasure, of virtue, of self-approbation, and of the approbation of his Maker. These things, and their contraries, have a comparative importance in his cool and deliberate judgment.

When a man considers whether health ought to be preferred to bodily strength, fame to riches, whether a good conscience and the approbation of his Maker, to every thing that can come in competition with it; this appears to me to be an exercise of judgment, and not any impulse of passion or appetite.

Every thing worthy of pursuit, must be so, either intrinsically, and upon its own account, or as the means of procuring something that is intrinsically valuable. That it is by judgment that we discern the fitness of means for attaining an end, is self-evident; and in this, I think, all Philosophers agree. But that it is the office of judgment to appreciate the value of an end, or the preference

preference due to one end above another, is not granted by ſome Philoſophers.

In determining what is good or ill, and, of different goods, which is beſt, they think we muſt be guided, not by judgment, but by ſome natural or acquired taſte, which makes us reliſh one thing and diſlike another.

Thus, if one man prefers cheeſe to lobſters, another lobſters to cheeſe, it is vain, ſay they, to apply judgment to determine which is right. In like manner, if one man prefers pleaſure to virtue, another virtue to pleaſure, this is a matter of taſte, judgment has nothing to do in it. This ſeems to be the opinion of ſome Philoſophers.

I cannot help being of a contrary opinion. I think we may form a judgment, both in the queſtion about cheeſe and lobſters, and in the more important queſtion about pleaſure and virtue.

When one man feels a more agreeable reliſh in cheeſe, another in lobſters, this, I grant, requires no judgment; it depends only upon the conſtitution of the palate. But, if we would determine which of the two has the beſt taſte, I think the queſtion muſt be determined by judgment; and that, with a ſmall ſhare of this faculty, we may give a very certain determination, to wit, that the two taſtes are equally good, and that both of the perſons do equally well, in preferring what ſuits their palate and their ſtomach.

Nay, I apprehend, that the two perſons who differ in their taſte will, notwithſtanding that difference, agree perfectly in their judgment, that both taſtes are upon a footing of equality, and that neither has a juſt claim to preference.

Thus it appears, that, in this inſtance, the office of taſte is very

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very different from that of judgment; and that men, who differ moſt in taſte, may agree perfectly in their judgment, even with reſpect to the taſtes wherein they differ.

To make the other caſe parallel with this, it muſt be ſuppoſed, that the man of pleaſure and the man of virtue agree in their judgment, and that neither ſees any reaſon to prefer the one courſe of life to the other.

If this be ſuppoſed, I ſhall grant, that neither of theſe perſons has reaſon to condemn the other. Each chuſes according to his taſte, in matters which his beſt judgment determines to be perfectly indifferent.

But it is to be obſerved, that this ſuppoſition cannot have place, when we ſpeak of men, or indeed of moral agents. The man who is incapable of perceiving the obligation of virtue, when he uſes his beſt judgment, is a man in name, but not in reality. He is incapable either of virtue or vice, and is not a moral agent.

Even the man of pleaſure, when his judgment is unbiaſſed, ſees, that there are certain things which a man ought not to do, though he ſhould have a taſte for them. If a thief breaks into his houſe and carries off his goods, he is perfectly convinced that he did wrong and deſerves puniſhment, although he had as ſtrong a reliſh for the goods as he himſelf has for the pleaſures he purſues.

It is evident, that mankind, in all ages, have conceived two parts in the human conſtitution that may have influence upon our voluntary actions. Theſe we call by the general names of *paſſion* and *reaſon*; and we ſhall find, in all languages, names that are equivalent.

Under

Under the former, we comprehend various principles of action, ſimilar to thoſe we obſerve in brute-animals, and in men who have not the uſe of reaſon. *Appetites*, *affections*, *paſſions*, are the names by which they are denominated; and theſe names are not ſo accurately diſtinguiſhed in common language, but that they are uſed ſomewhat promiſcuouſly. This, however, is common to them all, that they draw a man toward a certain object, without any farther view, by a kind of violence; a violence which indeed may be reſiſted if the man is maſter of himſelf, but cannot be reſiſted without a ſtruggle.

CICERO's phraſe for expreſſing their influence is, "Hominem "huc et illuc rapiunt." Dr HUTCHESON uſes a ſimilar phraſe, "Quibus agitatur mens et bruto quodam impetu fertur." There is no exerciſe of reaſon or judgment neceſſary in order to feel their influence.

With regard to this part of the human conſtitution, I ſee no difference between the vulgar and Philoſophers.

As to the other part of our conſtitution, which is commonly called *reaſon*, as oppoſed to paſſion, there have been very ſubtile diſputes among modern Philoſophers, whether it ought to be called reaſon, or be not rather ſome internal ſenſe or taſte.

Whether it ought to be called reaſon, or by what other name, I do not here enquire, but what kind of influence it has upon our voluntary actions.

As to this point, I think, all men muſt allow that this is the manly part of our conſtitution, the other the brute part. This operates in a calm and diſpaſſionate manner; a manner ſo like to judgment or reaſon, that even thoſe who do not allow it to be called by that name, endeavour to account for its having al-

CHAP II. ways had the name; becauſe, in the manner of its operation, it has a ſimilitude to reaſon.

As the ſimilitude between this principle and reaſon has led mankind to give it that name, ſo the diſſimilitude between it and paſſion has led them to ſet the two in oppoſition. They have conſidered this cool principle, as having an influence upon our actions ſo different from paſſion, that what a man does coolly and deliberately, without paſſion, is imputed ſolely to the man, whether it have merit or demerit; whereas, what he does from paſſion is imputed in part to the paſſion. If the paſſion be conceived to be irreſiſtible, the action is imputed ſolely to it, and not at all to the man. If he had power to reſiſt, and ought to have reſiſted, we blame him for not doing his duty; but, in proportion to the violence of the paſſion, the fault is alleviated.

By this cool principle, we judge what ends are moſt worthy to be purſued, how far every appetite and paſſion may be indulged, and when it ought to be reſiſted.

It directs us, not only to reſiſt the impulſe of paſſion when it would lead us wrong, but to avoid the occaſions of inflaming it; like CYRUS, who refuſed to ſee the beautiful captive princeſs. In this he acted the part both of a wiſe and a good man; firm in the love of virtue, and, at the ſame time, conſcious of the weakneſs of human nature, and unwilling to put it to too ſevere a trial. In this caſe, the youth of CYRUS, the incomparable beauty of his captive, and every circumſtance which tended to inflame his deſire, exalts the merit of his conduct in reſiſting it.

It is in ſuch actions that the ſuperiority of human nature appears, and the ſpecific difference between it and that of brutes. In them we may obſerve one paſſion combating another, and the ſtrongeſt prevailing; but we perceive no calm principle in their conſtitution,

conſtitution, thatis ſuperior to every paſſion, and able to give law to it. CHAP. II.

The difference between theſe two parts of our conſtitution may be farther illuſtrated by an inſtance or two wherein paſſion prevails.

If a man, upon great provocation, ſtrike another when he ought to keep the peace, he blames himſelf for what he did, and acknowledges that he ought not to have yielded to his paſſion. Every other perſon agrees with his ſober judgment. They think he did wrong in yielding to his paſſion, when he might and ought to have reſiſted its impulſe. If they thought it impoſſible to bear the provocation, they would not blame him at all; but believing that it was in his power, and was his duty, they impute to him ſome degree of blame, acknowledging, at the ſame time, that it is alleviated in proportion to the provocation; ſo that the treſpaſs is imputed, partly to the man, and partly to the paſſion. But, if a man deliberately conceives a deſign of miſchief againſt his neighbour, contrives the means, and executes it, the action admits of no alleviation, it is perfectly voluntary, and he bears the whole guilt of the evil intended and done.

If a man, by the agony of the rack, is made to diſcloſe a ſecret of importance, with which he is entruſted, we pity him more than we blame him. We conſider, that ſuch is the weakneſs of human nature, that the reſolution, even of a good man, might be overcome by ſuch a trial. But if he have ſtrength of mind, which even the agony of the rack could not ſubdue, we admire his fortitude as truly heroical.

Thus, I think, it appears, that the common ſenſe of men (which, in matters of common life, ought to have great authority) has led them to diſtinguiſh two parts in the human conſtitu-

CHAP. II.

tion, which have influence upon our voluntary determinations. There is an irrational part, common to us with brute-animals, conſiſting of appetites, affections and paſſions, and there is a cool and rational part. The firſt, in many caſes, gives a ſtrong impulſe, but without judgment, and without authority. The ſecond is always accompanied with authority. All wiſdom and virtue conſiſt in following its dictates; all vice and folly in diſobeying them. We may reſiſt the impulſes of appetite and paſſion, not only without regret, but with ſelf-applauſe and triumph; but the calls of reaſon and duty can never be reſiſted, without remorſe and ſelf-condemnation.

The ancient Philoſophers agreed with the vulgar, in making this diſtinction of the principles of action. The irrational part the Greeks called ὁρμη. CICERO calls it *appetitus*, taking that word in an extenſive ſenſe, ſo as to include every propenſity to action which is not grounded on judgment.

The other principle the Greeks called νους; PLATO calls it the ἡγεμονικον, or leading principle. "*Duplex enim eſt vis animorum atque naturæ*, ſays CICERO, *una pars in appetitu poſita eſt, quæ eſt* "ὁρμη *Græcè, quæ hominem huc et illuc rapit; altera in ratione, quæ* "*docet, et explanat, quid faciendum fugiendumve ſit; ita fit ut ratio* "*præſit appetitus, obtemperet.*"

The reaſon of explaining this diſtinction here is, that theſe two principles influence the will in different ways. Their influence differs, not in degree only, but in kind. This difference we feel, though it may be difficult to find words to expreſs it. We may perhaps more eaſily form a notion of it by a ſimilitude.

It is one thing to puſh a man from one part of the room to another; it is a thing of a very different nature to uſe arguments to perſuade him to leave his place, and go to another. He

He may yield to the force which puſhes him, without any exerciſe of his rational faculties; nay, he muſt yield to it, if he do not oppoſe an equal or a greater force. His liberty is impaired in ſome degree; and, if he has not power ſufficient to oppoſe, his liberty is quite taken away, and the motion cannot be imputed to him at all. The influence of appetite or paſſion ſeems to me to be very like to this. If the paſſion be ſuppoſed irreſiſtible, we impute the action to it ſolely, and not to the man. If he had power to reſiſt, but yields after a ſtruggle, we impute the action, partly to the man, and partly to the paſſion.

If we attend to the other caſe, when the man is only urged by arguments to leave his place, this reſembles the operation of the cool or rational principle. It is evident, that, whether he yields to the arguments or not, the determination is wholly his own act, and is entirely to be imputed to him. Arguments, whatever be the degree of their ſtrength, diminiſh not a man's liberty; they may produce a cool conviction of what we ought to do, and they can do no more. But appetite and paſſion give an impulſe to act and impair liberty, in proportion to their ſtrength.

With moſt men, the impulſe of paſſion is more effectual than bare conviction; and, on this account, orators, who would perſuade, find it neceſſary to addreſs the paſſions, as well as to convince the underſtanding; and, in all ſyſtems of rhetoric, theſe two have been conſidered as different intentions of the orator, and to be accompliſhed by different means.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of Operations of Mind which may be called Voluntary.

THE faculties of underſtanding and will are eaſily diſtinguiſhed in thought, but very rarely, if ever, disjoined in operation.

In moſt, perhaps in all the operations of mind for which we have names in language, both faculties are employed, and we are both intellective and active.

Whether it be poſſible that intelligence may exiſt without ſome degree of activity, or impoſſible, is perhaps beyond the reach of our faculties to determine; but, I apprehend, that, in fact, they are always conjoined in the operations of our minds.

It is probable, I think, that there is ſome degree of activity in thoſe operations which we refer to the underſtanding; accordingly, they have always, and in all languages, been expreſſed by active verbs; as, I ſee, I hear, I remember, I apprehend, I judge, I reaſon. And it is certain, that every act of will muſt be accompanied by ſome operation of the underſtanding; for he that wills muſt apprehend what he wills, and apprehenſion belongs to the underſtanding.

The operations I am to conſider in this chapter, I think, have commonly been referred to the underſtanding; but we ſhall find that the will has ſo great a ſhare in them, that they may, with propriety, be called *voluntary*. They are theſe three, *attention*, *deliberation*, and *fixed purpoſe* or *reſolution*.

Attention may be given to any object, either of ſenſe or of intellect,

intellect, in order to form a diſtinct notion of it, or to diſcover its nature, its attributes, or its relations. And ſo great is the effect of attention, that, without it, it is impoſſible to acquire or retain a diſtinct notion of any object of thought.

If a man hear a diſcourſe without attention, what does he carry away with him? If he ſee St Peter's or the Vatican without attention, What account can he give of it? While two perſons are engaged in intereſting diſcourſe, the clock ſtrikes within their hearing, to which they give no attention, What is the conſequence? The next minute they know not whether the clock ſtruck or not. Yet their ears were not ſhut. The uſual impreſſion was made upon the organ of hearing, and upon the auditory nerve and brain; but from inattention the ſound either was not perceived, or paſſed in the twinkling of an eye, without leaving the leaſt veſtige in the memory.

A man ſees not what is before his eyes when his mind is occupied about another object. In the tumult of a battle a man may be ſhot through the body without knowing any thing of the matter, till he diſcover it by the loſs of blood or of ſtrength.

The moſt acute ſenſation of pain may be deadened, if the attention can be vigorouſly directed to another object. A gentleman of my acquaintance, in the agony of a fit of the gout, uſed to call for the cheſs-board. As he was fond of that game, he acknowledged that, as the game advanced and drew his attention, the ſenſe of pain abated, and the time ſeemed much ſhorter.

ARCHIMEDES, it is ſaid, being intent upon a mathematical propoſition, when Syracuſe was taken by the Romans, knew not the calamity of the city, till a Roman ſoldier broke in upon his retirement,

CHAP. III. retirement, and gave him a deadly wound; on which he lamented only that he had loſt a fine demonſtration.

It is needleſs to multiply inſtances to ſhew, that when one faculty of the mind is intenſely engaged about any object, the other faculties are laid as it were faſt aſleep.

It may be farther obſerved, that if there be any thing that can be called *genius* in matters of mere judgment and reaſoning, it ſeems to conſiſt chiefly in being able to give that attention to the ſubject which keeps it ſteady in the mind, till we can ſurvey it accurately on all ſides.

There is a talent of imagination, which bounds from earth to heaven, and from heaven to earth in a moment. This may be favourable to wit and imagery; but the powers of judging and reaſoning depend chiefly upon keeping the mind to a clear and ſteady view of the ſubject.

Sir ISAAC NEWTON, to one who complimented him upon the force of genius, which had made ſuch improvements in mathematics and natural philoſophy, is ſaid to have made this reply, which was both modeſt and judicious, That, if he had made any improvements in thoſe ſciences, it was owing more to patient attention than to any other talent.

Whatever be the effects which attention may produce, (and I apprehend they are far beyond what is commonly believed,) it is for the moſt part in our power.

Every man knows that he can turn his attention to this ſubject or to that, for a longer or a ſhorter time, and with more or leſs intenſeneſs, as he pleaſes. It is a voluntary act, and depends upon his will.

But what was before obſerved of the will in general, is applicable

cable to this particular exertion of it, That the mind is rarely in a ſtate of indifference, left to turn its attention to the object which to reaſon appears moſt deſerving of it. There is, for the moſt part, a bias to ſome particular object, more than to any other; and this not from any judgment of its deſerving our attention more, but from ſome impulſe or propenſity, grounded on nature or habit.

It is well known that things new and uncommon, things grand, and things that are beautiful, draw our attention, not in proportion to the intereſt we have, or think we have in them, but in a much greater proportion.

Whatever moves our paſſions or affections draws our attention, very often, more than we wiſh.

You deſire a man not to think of an unfortunate event which torments him. It admits of no remedy. The thought of it anſwers no purpoſe but to keep the wound bleeding. He is perfectly convinced of all you ſay. He knows that he would not feel the affliction, if he could only not think of it; yet he hardly thinks of any thing elſe. Strange! when happineſs and miſery ſtand before him, and depend upon his choice, he chuſes miſery, and rejects happineſs with his eyes open!

Yet he wiſhes to be happy, as all men do. How ſhall we reconcile this contradiction between his judgment and his conduct?

The account of it ſeems to me to be this: The afflicting event draws his attention ſo ſtrongly, by a natural and blind force, that he either hath not the power, or hath not the vigour, of mind to reſiſt its impulſe, though he knows that to yield to it is miſery, without any good to balance it.

CHAP. III.

Acute bodily pain draws our attention, and makes it very difficult to attend to any thing elſe, even when attention to the pain ſerves no other purpoſe but to aggravate it tenfold.

The man who played a game at cheſs in the agony of the gout, to engage his attention to another object, acted the reaſonable part, and conſulted his real happineſs; but it required a great effort to give that attention to his game, which was neceſſary to produce the effect intended by it.

Even when there is no particular object that draws away our attention, there is a deſultorineſs of thought in man, and in ſome more than in others, which makes it very difficult to give that fixed attention to important objects which reaſon requires.

It appears, I think, from what has been ſaid, that the attention we give to objects, is for the moſt part voluntary: That a great part of wiſdom and virtue conſiſts in giving a proper direction to our attention; and that however reaſonable this appears to the judgment of every man, yet, in ſome caſes, it requires an effort of ſelf-command no leſs than the moſt heroic virtues.

Another operation that may be called *voluntary*, is deliberation about what we are to do or to forbear.

Every man knows that it is in his power to deliberate or not to deliberate about any part of his conduct; to deliberate for a ſhorter, or a longer time, more careleſsly, or more ſeriouſly: And when he has reaſon to ſuſpect that his affection may bias his judgment, he may either honeſtly uſe the beſt means in his power to form an impartial judgment, or he may yield to his bias, and only ſeek arguments to juſtify what inclination leads him to do. In all theſe points, he determines, he wills, the right or the wrong.

The

The general rules of deliberation are perfectly evident to reaſon when we conſider them abſtractly. They are axioms in morals.

We ought not to deliberate in caſes that are perfectly clear. No man deliberates whether he ought to chuſe happineſs or miſery. No honeſt man deliberates whether he ſhall ſteal his neighbour's property. When the caſe is not clear, when it is of importance, and when there is time for deliberation, we ought to deliberate with more or leſs care, in proportion to the importance of the action. In deliberation we ought to weigh things in an even balance, and to allow to every conſideration the weight which, in ſober judgment, we think it ought to have, and no more. This is to deliberate impartially. Our deliberation ſhould be brought to an iſſue in due time, ſo that we may not loſe the opportunity of acting while we deliberate.

The axioms of Euclid do not appear to me to have a greater degree of ſelf-evidence, than theſe rules of deliberation. And as far as a man acts according to them, his heart approves of him, and he has confidence of the approbation of the Searcher of hearts.

But though the manner in which we ought to deliberate be evident to reaſon, it is not always eaſy to follow it. Our appetites, our affections and paſſions, oppoſe all deliberation, but that which is employed in finding the means of their gratification. Avarice may lead to deliberate upon the ways of making money, but it does not diſtinguiſh between the honeſt and the diſhoneſt.

We ought ſurely to deliberate how far every appetite and paſſion may be indulged, and what limits ſhould be ſet to it. But our appetites and paſſions puſh us on to the attainment of their objects, in the ſhorteſt road, and without delay.

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Thus it happens, that, if we yield to their impulſe, we ſhall often tranſgreſs thoſe rules of deliberation, which reaſon approves. In this conflict between the dictates of reaſon, and the blind impulſe of paſſion, we muſt voluntarily determine. When we take part with our reaſon, though in oppoſition to paſſion, we approve of our own conduct.

What we call a fault of ignorance, is always owing to the want of due deliberation. When we do not take due pains to be rightly informed, there is a fault, not indeed in acting according to the light we have, but in not uſing the proper means to get light. For if we judge wrong, after uſing the proper means of information, there is no fault in acting according to that wrong judgment; the error is invincible.

The natural conſequence of deliberation on any part of our conduct, is a determination how we ſhall act; and if it is not brought to this iſſue it is loſt labour.

There are two caſes in which a determination may take place; when the opportunity of putting it in execution is preſent, and when it is at a diſtance.

When the opportunity is preſent, the determination to act is immediately followed by the action. Thus, if a man determine to riſe and walk, he immediately does it, unleſs he is hindered by force, or has loſt the power of walking. And if he ſit ſtill when he has power to walk, we conclude infallibly that he has not determined, or willed to walk immediately.

Our determination or will to act, is not always the reſult of deliberation, it may be the effect of ſome paſſion or appetite, without any judgment interpoſed. And when judgment is interpoſed, we may determine and act either according to that judgment or contrary to it.

When

When a man ſits down hungry to dine, he eats from appetite, very often without exerciſing his judgment at all; nature invites and he obeys the call, as the ox, or the horſe, or as an infant does.

When we converſe with perſons whom we love or reſpect, we ſay and do civil things merely from affection or from reſpect. They flow ſpontaneouſly from the heart, without requiring any judgment. In ſuch caſes we act as brute-animals do, or as children before the uſe of reaſon. We feel an impulſe in our nature, and we yield to it.

When a man eats merely from appetite, he does not conſider the pleaſure of eating, or its tendency to health. Theſe conſiderations are not in his thoughts. But we can ſuppoſe a man who eats with a view to enjoy the pleaſure of eating. Such a man reaſons and judges. He will take care to uſe the proper means of procuring an appetite. He will be a critic in taſtes, and make nice diſcriminations. This man uſes his rational faculties even in eating. And however contemptible this application of them may be, it is an exerciſe of which, I apprehend, brute-animals are not capable.

In like manner, a man may ſay or do civil things to another, not from affection, but in order to ſerve ſome end by it, or becauſe he thinks it his duty.

To act with a view to ſome diſtant intereſt, or to act from a ſenſe of duty, ſeems to be proper to man as a reaſonable being; but to act merely from paſſion, from appetite, or from affection, is common to him with the brute-animals. In the laſt caſe there is no judgment required, but in the firſt there is.

To act againſt what one judges to be for his real good upon the whole, is folly. To act againſt what he judges to be his duty,

CHAP. III. ty, is immorality. It cannot be denied that there are too many inſtances of both in human life. *Video meliora proboque, deteriora ſequor,* is neither an impoſſible, nor an unfrequent caſe.

While a man does what he really thinks wiſeſt and beſt to be done, the more his appetites, his affections and paſſions draw him the contrary way, the more he approves of his own conduct, and the more he is entitled to the approbation of every rational being.

The *third* operation of mind I mentioned, which may be called voluntary, is, A fixed purpoſe or reſolution with regard to our future conduct.

This naturally takes place, when any action, or courſe of action, about which we have deliberated, is not immediately to be executed, the occaſion of acting being at ſome diſtance.

A fixed purpoſe to do, ſome time hence, ſomething which we believe ſhall then be in our power, is ſtrictly and properly a determination of will, no leſs than a determination to do it inſtantly. Every definition of volition agrees to it. Whether the opportunity of doing what we have determined to do be preſent or at ſome diſtance, is an accidental circumſtance which does not affect the nature of the determination, and no good reaſon can be aſſigned why it ſhould not be called *volition* in the one caſe, as well as in the other. A purpoſe or reſolution, therefore, is truly and properly an act of will.

Our purpoſes are of two kinds. We may call the one *particular*, the other *general*. By a *particular* purpoſe, I mean that which has for its object an individual action, limited to one time and place; by a *general* purpoſe, that of a courſe or train of action, intended for ſome general end, or regulated by ſome general rule.

Thus,

Thus, I may purpoſe to go to London next winter. When the time comes, I execute my purpoſe, if I continue of the ſame mind; and the purpoſe, when executed, is no more. Thus it is with every particular purpoſe.

A general purpoſe may continue for life; and, after many particular actions have been done in conſequence of it, may remain and regulate future actions.

Thus, a young man propoſes to follow the profeſſion of law, of medicine, or of theology. This general purpoſe directs the courſe of his reading and ſtudy. It directs him in the choice of his company and companions, and even of his diverſions. It determines his travels and the place of his abode. It has influence upon his dreſs and manners, and a conſiderable effect in forming his character.

There are other fixed purpoſes which have a ſtill greater effect in forming the character. I mean ſuch as regard our moral conduct.

Suppoſe a man to have exerciſed his intellectual and moral faculties, ſo far as to have diſtinct notions of juſtice and injuſtice, and of the conſequences of both, and, after due deliberation, to have formed a fixed purpoſe to adhere inflexibly to juſtice, and never to handle the wages of iniquity.

Is not this the man whom we ſhould call a juſt man? We conſider the moral virtues as inherent in the mind of a good man, even when there is no opportunity of exerciſing them. And what is it in the mind which we can call the virtue of juſtice, when it is not exerciſed? It can be nothing but a fixed purpoſe, or determination, to act according to the rules of juſtice, when there is opportunity.

The

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The Roman law defined juſtice, *A ſteady and perpetual will to give to every man his due.* When the opportunity of doing juſtice is not preſent, this can mean nothing elſe than a ſteady purpoſe, which is very properly called will. Such a purpoſe, if it is ſteady, will infallibly produce juſt conduct; for every known tranſgreſſion of juſtice demonſtrates a change of purpoſe, at leaſt for that time.

What has been ſaid of juſtice, may be ſo eaſily applied to every other moral virtue, that it is unneceſſary to give inſtances. They are all fixed purpoſes of acting according to a certain rule.

By this, the virtues may be eaſily diſtinguiſhed, in thought at leaſt, from natural affections that bear the ſame name. Thus, benevolence is a capital virtue, which, though not ſo neceſſary to the being of ſociety, is entitled to a higher degree of approbation than even juſtice. But there is a natural affection of benevolence, common to good and bad men, to the virtuous and to the vicious. How ſhall theſe be diſtinguiſhed?

In practice, indeed, we cannot diſtinguiſh them in other men, and with difficulty in ourſelves; but in theory, nothing is more eaſy. The virtue of benevolence is a fixed purpoſe or reſolution to do good when we have opportunity, from a conviction that it is right, and is our duty. The affection of benevolence is a propenſity to do good, from natural conſtitution or habit, without regard to rectitude or duty.

There are good tempers and bad, which are a part of the conſtitution of the man, and are really involuntary, though they often lead to voluntary actions. A good natural temper is not virtue, nor is a bad one vice. Hard would it be indeed to think, that a man ſhould be born under a decree of reprobation, becauſe he has the misfortune of a bad natural temper.

The

The Phyſiognomiſt ſaw, in the features of SOCRATES, the ſignatures of many bad diſpoſitions, which that good man acknowledged he felt within him; but the triumph of his virtue was the greater in having conquered them.

In men who have no fixed rules of conduct, no ſelf-government, the natural temper is variable by numberleſs accidents. The man who is full of affection and benevolence this hour, when a croſs accident happens to ruffle him, or perhaps when an eaſterly wind blows, feels a ſtrange revolution in his temper. The kind and benevolent affections give place to the jealous and malignant, which are as readily indulged in their turn, and for the ſame reaſon, becauſe he feels a propenſity to indulge them.

We may obſerve, that men who have exerciſed their rational powers, are generally governed in their opinions by fixed principles of belief; and men who have made the greateſt advance in ſelf-government, are governed, in their practice, by general fixed purpoſes. Without the former, there would be no ſteadineſs and conſiſtence in our belief; nor without the latter, in our conduct.

When a man is come to years of underſtanding, from his education, from his company, or from his ſtudy, he forms to himſelf a ſet of general principles, a creed, which governs his judgment in particular points that occur.

If new evidence is laid before him which tends to overthrow any of his received principles, it requires in him a great degree of candour and love of truth, to give it an impartial examination, and to form a new judgment. Moſt men, when they are fixed in their principles, upon what they account ſufficient evidence, can hardly be drawn into a new and ſerious examination of them.

CHAP. III. They get a habit of believing them, which is ſtrengthened by repeated acts, and remains immoveable, even when the evidence upon which their belief was at firſt grounded, is forgot.

It is this that makes converſions, either from religious or political principles, ſo difficult.

A mere prejudice of education ſticks faſt, as a propoſition of EUCLID does with a man who hath long ago forgot the proof. Both indeed are upon a ſimilar footing. We reſt in both, becauſe we have long done ſo, and think we received them at firſt upon good evidence, though that evidence be quite forgot.

When we know a man's principles, we judge by them, rather than by the degree of his underſtanding, how he will determine in any point which is connected with them.

Thus, the judgment of moſt men who judge for themſelves is governed by fixed principles; and, I apprehend, that the conduct of moſt men who have any ſelf-government, and any conſiſtency of conduct, is governed by fixed purpoſes.

A man of breeding may, in his natural temper, be proud, paſſionate, revengeful, and in his morals a very bad man; yet, in good company, he can ſtifle every paſſion that is inconſiſtent with good breeding, and be humane, modeſt, complaiſant, even to thoſe whom in his heart he deſpiſes or hates. Why is this man, who can command all his paſſions before company, a ſlave to them in private? The reaſon is plain: He has a fixed reſolution to be a man of breeding, but hath no ſuch reſolution to be a man of virtue. He hath combated his moſt violent paſſions a thouſand times before he became maſter of them in company. The ſame reſolution and perſeverance would have given him the command of them when alone.

A fixed reſolution retains its influence upon the conduct, even when the motives to it are not in view, in the ſame manner as a fixed principle retains its influence upon the belief, when the evidence of it is forgot. The former may be called a habit of the *will*, the latter a habit of the *underſtanding*. By ſuch habits chiefly, men are governed in their opinions and in their practice.

A man who has no general fixed purpoſes, may be ſaid, as POPE ſays of moſt women, (I hope unjuſtly) to have no character at all. He will be honeſt or diſhoneſt, benevolent or malicious, compaſſionate or cruel, as the tide of his paſſions and affections drives him. This, however, I believe, is the caſe of but a few in advanced life, and theſe, with regard to conduct, the weakeſt and moſt contemptible of the ſpecies.

A man of ſome conſtancy may change his general purpoſes once or twice in life, ſeldom more. From the purſuit of pleaſure in early life, he may change to that of ambition, and from ambition to avarice. But every man who uſes his reaſon in the conduct of life, will have ſome end, to which he gives a preference above all others. To this he ſteers his courſe; his projects and his actions will be regulated by it. Without this, there would be no conſiſtency in his conduct. He would be like a ſhip in the ocean, which is bound to no port, under no government, but left to the mercy of winds and tides.

We obſerved before, that there are moral rules reſpecting the attention we ought to give to objects and reſpecting our deliberations, which are no leſs evident than mathematical axioms. The ſame thing may be obſerved with reſpect to our fixed purpoſes, whether particular or general.

Is it not ſelf-evident, that, after due deliberation, we ought to reſolve upon that conduct, or that courſe of conduct, which,

CHAP. IV. *to our ſober judgment, appears to be beſt and moſt approvable?* That we ought to be firm and ſteady in adhering to ſuch reſolutions, while we are perſuaded that they are right; but open to conviction, and ready to change our courſe, when we have good evidence that it is wrong?

Fickleneſs, inconſtancy, facility, on the one hand, wilfulneſs, inflexibility, and obſtinacy, on the other, are moral qualities, reſpecting our purpoſes, which every one ſees to be wrong. A manly firmneſs, grounded upon rational conviction, is the proper mean which every man approves and reveres.

CHAP. IV.

Corollaries.

FROM what has been ſaid concerning the will, it appears, *firſt*, That, as ſome acts of the will are tranſient and momentary, ſo others are permanent, and may continue for a long time, or even through the whole courſe of our rational life.

When I will to ſtretch out my hand, that will is at an end as ſoon as the action is done. It is an act of the will which begins and ends in a moment. But when I will to attend to a mathematical propoſition, to examine the demonſtration, and the conſequences that may be drawn from it, this will may continue for hours. It muſt continue as long as my attention continues; for no man attends to a mathematical propoſition longer than he wills.

The ſame thing may be ſaid of deliberation, with regard, either to any point of conduct, or with regard to any general courſe

courſe of conduct. We will to deliberate as long as we do de- CHAP. IV.
liberate; and that may be for days or for weeks.

A purpoſe or reſolution, which we have ſhewn to be an act of the will, may continue for a great part of life, or for the whole, after we are of age to form a reſolution.

Thus, a merchant may reſolve, that, after he has made ſuch a fortune by traffic, he will give it up, and retire to a country life. He may continue this reſolution for thirty or forty years, and execute it at laſt; but he continues it no longer than he wills, for he may at any time change his reſolution.

There are therefore acts of the will which are not tranſient and momentary, which may continue long, and grow into a habit. This deſerves the more to be obſerved, becauſe a very eminent Philoſopher has advanced a contrary principle, to wit, That all the acts of the will are tranſient and momentary; and from that principle has drawn very important concluſions, with regard to what conſtitutes the moral character of man.

A *ſecond* corollary is, That nothing in a man, wherein the will is not concerned, can juſtly be accounted either virtuous or immoral.

That no blame can be imputed to a man for what is altogether involuntary, is ſo evident in itſelf, that no arguments can make it more evident. The practice of all criminal courts, in all enlightened nations, is founded upon it.

If it ſhould be thought an objection to this maxim, that, by the laws of all nations, children often ſuffer for the crimes of parents, in which they had no hand, the anſwer is eaſy.

For, *firſt*, Such is the connection between parents and children, that

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that the puniſhment of a parent muſt hurt his children whether the law will or not. If a man is fined, or impriſoned; if he loſes life, or limb, or eſtate, or reputation, by the hand of juſtice, his children ſuffer by neceſſary conſequence. *Secondly* When laws intend to appoint any puniſhment of innocent children for the father's crime, ſuch laws are either unjuſt, or they are to be conſidered as acts of police, and not of juriſprudence, and are intended as an expedient to deter parents more effectually from the commiſſion of the crime. The innocent children, in this caſe, are ſacrificed to the public good, in like manner, as, to prevent the ſpreading of the plague, the ſound are ſhut up with the infected in a houſe or ſhip, that has the infection.

By the law of England, if a man is killed by an ox goring him, or a cart running over him, though there be no fault or neglect in the owner, the ox or the cart is a *deodand*, and is confiſcated to the Church. The Legiſlature ſurely did not intend to puniſh the ox as a criminal, far leſs the cart. The intention evidently was, to inſpire the people with a ſacred regard to the life of man.

When the Parliament of Paris, with a ſimilar intention, ordained the houſe in which Ravilliac was born, to be razed to the ground, and never to be rebuilt, it would be great weakneſs to conclude, that the wiſe judicature intended to puniſh the houſe.

If any judicature ſhould, in any inſtance, find a man guilty, and an object of puniſhment, for what they allowed to be altogether involuntary, all the world would condemn them as men who knew nothing of the firſt and moſt fundamental rules of juſtice.

I have endeavoured to ſhew, that, in our attention to objects, in order to form a right judgment of them; in our deliberation about particular actions, or about general rules of conduct; in our

our purpoſes and reſolutions, as well as in the execution of them, the will has a principal ſhare. If any man could be found, who, in the whole courſe of his life, had given due attention to things that concern him, had deliberated duly and impartially about his conduct, had formed his reſolutions, and executed them according to his beſt judgment and capacity, ſurely ſuch a man might hold up his face before GOD and man, and plead innocence. He muſt be acquitted by the impartial Judge, whatever his natural temper was, whatever his paſſions and affections, as far as they were involuntary.

A *third* corollary is, That all virtuous habits, when we diſtinguiſh them from virtuous actions, conſiſt in fixed purpoſes of acting according to the rules of virtue, as often as we have opportunity.

We can conceive in a man a greater or a leſs degree of ſteadineſs to his purpoſes or reſolutions; but that the general tenor of his conduct ſhould be contrary to them, is impoſſible.

The man who has a determined reſolution to do his duty in every inſtance, and who adheres ſteadily to his reſolution, is a perfect man. The man who has a determined purpoſe of carrying on a courſe of action which he knows to be wrong, is a hardened offender. Between theſe extremes there are many intermediate degrees of virtue and vice.

ESSAY III.

OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ACTION.

PART I.

Of the Mechanical Principles of Action.

CHAP. I.

Of the Principles of Action in general.

IN the ſtrict philoſophical ſenſe, nothing can be called the action of a man, but what he previouſly conceived and willed or determined to do. In morals we commonly employ the word in this ſenſe, and never impute any thing to a man as his doing, in which his will was not interpoſed. But when moral imputation is not concerned, we call many things actions of the man, which he neither previouſly conceived nor willed. Hence the actions of men have been diſtinguiſhed into three claſſes, the voluntary, the involuntary, and the mixed. By the laſt are meant ſuch actions as are under the command of the will, but are commonly performed without any interpoſition of will.

We cannot avoid uſing the word *action* in this popular ſenſe, without deviating too much from the common uſe of language; and it is in this ſenſe we uſe it when we enquire into the principles of action in the human mind.

By *principles* of action, I underſtand every thing that incites us to act.

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If there were no incitements to action, active power would be given us in vain. Having no motive to direct our active exertions, the mind would, in all caſes, be in a ſtate of perfect indifference, to do this or that, or nothing at all. The active power would either not be exerted at all, or its exertions would be perfectly unmeaning and frivolous, neither wiſe nor fooliſh, neither good nor bad. To every action that is of the ſmalleſt importance, there muſt be ſome incitement, ſome motive, ſome reaſon.

It is therefore a moſt important part of the philoſophy of the human mind, to have a diſtinct and juſt view of the various principles of action, which the Author of our being hath planted in our nature, to arrange them properly, and to aſſign to every one its rank.

By this it is, that we may diſcover the end of our being, and the part which is aſſigned us upon the theatre of life. In this part of the human conſtitution the nobleſt work of God that falls within our notice, we may diſcern moſt clearly the character of him who made us, and how he would have us to employ that active power which he hath given us.

I cannot without great diffidence enter upon this ſubject, obſerving that almoſt every author of reputation, who has given attention to it, has a ſyſtem of his own; and that no man has been ſo happy as to give general ſatisfaction to thoſe who came after him.

There is a branch of knowledge much valued, and very juſtly, which we call knowledge of the world, knowledge of mankind, knowledge of human nature: This, I think, conſiſts in knowing from what principles men generally act; and it is commonly the fruit of natural ſagacity joined with experience.

A man of ſagacity, who has had occaſion to deal in intereſting matters, with a great variety of perſons of different age, ſex, rank and profeſſion, learns to judge what may be expected from men in given circumſtances; and how they may be moſt effectually induced to act the part which he deſires. To know this is of ſo great importance to men in active life, that it is called knowing men, and knowing human nature.

This knowledge may be of conſiderable uſe to a man who would ſpeculate upon the ſubject we have propoſed, but is not, by itſelf, ſufficient for that purpoſe.

The man of the world conjectures, perhaps with great probability, how a man will act in certain given circumſtances; and this is all he wants to know. To enter into a detail of the various principles which influence the actions of men, to give them diſtinct names, to define them, and to aſcertain their different provinces, is the buſineſs of a philoſopher, and not of a man of the world; and, indeed, it is a matter attended with great difficulty from various cauſes.

Firſt, On account of the great number of active principles that influence the actions of men.

Man has, not without reaſon, been called an epitome of the univerſe. His body, by which his mind is greatly affected, being a part of the material ſyſtem, is ſubject to all the laws of inanimate matter. During ſome part of his exiſtence, his ſtate is very like that of a vegetable. He riſes, by imperceptible degrees, to the animal, and, at laſt, to the rational life, and has the principles that belong to all.

Another cauſe of the difficulty of tracing the various principles of action in man, is, That the ſame action, nay, the ſame courſe and train of action may proceed from very different principles.

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Men who are fond of a hypotheſis, commonly ſeek no other proof of its truth, but that it ſerves to account for the appearances which it is brought to explain. This is a very ſlippery kind of proof in every part of philoſophy, and never to be truſted; but leaſt of all, when the appearances to be accounted for are human actions.

Moſt actions proceed from a variety of principles concurring in their direction; and according as we are diſpoſed to judge favourably or unfavourably of the perſon, or of human nature in general, we impute them wholly to the beſt, or wholly to the worſt, overlooking others which had no ſmall ſhare in them.

The principles from which men act can be diſcovered only in theſe two ways; by attention to the conduct of other men, or by attention to our own conduct, and to what we feel in ourſelves. There is much uncertainty in the former, and much difficulty in the latter.

Men differ much in their characters; and we can obſerve the conduct of a few only of the ſpecies. Men differ not only from other men, but from themſelves at different times, and on different occaſions; according as they are in the company of their ſuperiors, inferiors, or equals; according as they are in the eye of ſtrangers, or of their familiars only, or in the view of no human eye; according as they are in good or bad fortune, or in good or bad humour. We ſee but a ſmall part of the actions of our moſt familiar acquaintance; and what we ſee may lead us to a probable conjecture, but can give no certain knowledge of the principles from which they act.

A man may, no doubt, know with certainty the principles from which he himſelf acts, becauſe he is conſcious of them. But this knowledge requires an attentive reflection upon the operations of his own mind, which is very rarely to be found.

It

It is perhaps more eaſy to find a man who has formed a juſt notion of the character of man in general, or of thoſe of his familiar acquaintance, than one who has a juſt notion of his own character.

Moſt men, through pride and ſelf-flattery, are apt to think themſelves better than they really are; and ſome, perhaps from melancholy, or from falſe principles of religion, are led to think themſelves worſe than they really are.

It requires, therefore, a very accurate and impartial examination of a man's own heart, to be able to form a diſtinct notion of the various principles which influence his conduct. That this is a matter of great difficulty, we may judge from the very different and contradictory ſyſtems of Philoſophers upon this ſubject, from the earlieſt ages to this day.

During the age of Greek Philoſophy, the Platoniſt, the Peripatetic, the Stoic, the Epicurean, had each his own ſyſtem. In the dark ages, the Schoolmen and the Myſtics had ſyſtems diametrically oppoſite; and, ſince the revival of learning, no controverſy hath been more keenly agitated, eſpecially among Britiſh Philoſophers, than that about the principles of action in the human conſtitution.

They have determined, to the ſatisfaction of the learned, the forces by which the planets and comets traverſe the boundleſs regions of ſpace; but have not been able to determine, with any degree of unanimity, the forces which every man is conſcious of in himſelf, and by which his conduct is directed.

Some admit no principle but ſelf-love; others reſolve all into love of the pleaſures of ſenſe, variouſly modified by the aſſociation of ideas; others admit diſintereſted benevolence along with ſelf-love; others reduce all to reaſon and paſſion; others to paſ-

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ſion alone; nor is there leſs variety about the number and diſtribution of the paſſions.

The names we give to the various principles of action, have ſo little preciſion, even in the beſt and pureſt writers in every language, that, on this account, there is no ſmall difficulty in giving them names, and arranging them properly.

The words *appetite*, *paſſion*, *affection*, *intereſt*, *reaſon*, cannot be ſaid to have one definite ſignification. They are taken ſometimes in a larger, and ſometimes in a more limited ſenſe. The ſame principle is ſometimes called by one of thoſe names, ſometimes by another; and principles of a very different nature are often called by the ſame name.

To remedy this confuſion of names, it might perhaps ſeem proper to invent new ones. But there are ſo few entitled to this privilege, that I ſhall not lay claim to it; but ſhall endeavour to claſs the various principles of human action as diſtinctly as I am able, and to point out their ſpecific differences; giving them ſuch names as may deviate from the common uſe of the words as little as poſſible.

There are ſome principles of action which require no attention, no deliberation, no will. Theſe, for diſtinction's ſake, we ſhall call *mechanical*. Another claſs we may call *animal*, as they ſeem common to man with other animals. A third claſs we may call *rational*, being proper to man as a rational creature.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Inſtinct.

THE mechanical principles of action may, I think, be reduced to two ſpecies, *inſtincts* and *habits*.

By inſtinct, I mean a natural blind impulſe to certain actions, without having any end in view, without deliberation, and very often without any conception of what we do.

Thus a man breathes while he is alive, by the alternate contraction and relaxation of certain muſcles, by which the cheſt, and of conſequence the lungs, are contracted and dilated. There is no reaſon to think, that an infant new-born, knows that breathing is neceſſary to life in its new ſtate, that he knows how it muſt be performed, or even that he has any thought or conception of that operation; yet he breathes as ſoon as he is born with perfect regularity, as if he had been taught, and got the habit by long practice.

By the ſame kind of principle, a new-born child, when its ſtomach is emptied, and nature has brought milk into the mother's breaſt, ſucks and ſwallows its food as perfectly as if it knew the principles of that operation, and had got the habit of working according to them.

Sucking and ſwallowing are very complex operations. Anatomiſts deſcribe about thirty pairs of muſcles that muſt be employed in every draught. Of thoſe muſcles, every one muſt be ſerved by its proper nerve, and can make no exertion but by ſome influence communicated by the nerve. The exertion of all thoſe muſcles and nerves is not ſimultaneous. They muſt ſucceed

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ſucceed each other in a certain order, and their order is no leſs neceſſary than the exertion itſelf.

This regular train of operations is carried on according to the niceſt rules of art, by the infant, who has neither art, nor ſcience, nor experience, nor habit.

That the infant feels the uneaſy ſenſation of hunger, I admit; and that it ſucks no longer than till this ſenſation be removed. But who informed it that this uneaſy ſenſation might be removed, or by what means? That it knows nothing of this is evident; for it will as readily ſuck a finger, or a bit of ſtick, as the nipple.

By a like principle it is, that infants cry when they are pained or hurt; that they are afraid when left alone, eſpecially in the dark; that they ſtart when in danger of falling; that they are terrified by an angry countenance, or an angry tone of voice, and are ſoothed and comforted by a placid countenance, and by ſoft and gentle tones of voice.

In the animals we are beſt acquainted with, and which we look upon as the more perfect of the brute-creation, we ſee much the ſame inſtincts as in the human kind, or very ſimilar ones, ſuited to the particular ſtate and manner of life of the animal.

Beſides theſe, there are in brute-animals inſtincts peculiar to each tribe, by which they are fitted for defence, for offence, or for providing for themſelves, and for their offspring.

It is not more certain, that nature hath furniſhed various animals with various weapons of offence and defence, than that the ſame nature hath taught them how to uſe them; the bull and the ram to butt, the horſe to kick, the dog to bite, the lion

lion to uſe his paws, the boar his tuſks, the ſerpent his fangs, and the bee and waſp their ſting. CHAP. II.

The manufactures of animals, if we may call them by that name, preſent us with a wonderful variety of inſtincts, belonging to particular ſpecies, whether of the ſocial or of the ſolitary kind; the neſts of birds, ſo ſimilar in their ſituation and architecture in the ſame kind, ſo various in different kinds; the webs of ſpiders, and of other ſpinning animals; the ball of the ſilk-worm; the neſts of ants and other mining animals; the combs of waſps, hornets and bees; the dams and houſes of beavers.

The inſtinct of animals is one of the moſt delightful and inſtructive parts of a moſt pleaſant ſtudy, that of natural hiſtory; and deſerves to be more cultivated than it has yet been.

Every manufacturing art among men was invented by ſome man, improved by others, and brought to perfection by time and experience. Men learn to work in it by long practice, which produces a habit. The arts of men vary in every age, and in every nation, and are found only in thoſe who have been taught them.

The manufactures of animals differ from thoſe of men in many ſtriking particulars.

No animal of the ſpecies can claim the invention. No animal ever introduced any new improvement, or any variation from the former practice. Every one of the ſpecies has equal ſkill from the beginning, without teaching, without experience or habit. Every one has its art by a kind of inſpiration. I do not mean that it is inſpired with the principles or rules of the art, but with the ability and inclination of working in it to perfection, without any knowledge of its principles, rules or end.

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The more ſagacious animals may be taught to do many things which they do not by inſtinct. What they are taught to do, they do with more or leſs ſkill, according to their ſagacity and their training. But, in their own arts, they need no teaching nor training, nor is the art ever improved or loſt. Bees gather their honey and their wax, they fabricate their combs and rear their young at this day, neither better nor worſe than they did when VIRGIL ſo ſweetly ſung their works.

The work of every animal is indeed like the works of nature, perfect in its kind, and can bear the moſt critical examination of the mechanic or the mathematician. One example from the animal laſt mentioned may ſerve to illuſtrate this.

Bees, it is well known, conſtruct their combs with ſmall cells on both ſides, fit both for holding their ſtore of honey, and for rearing their young. There are only three poſſible figures of the cells, which can make them all equal and ſimilar, without any uſeleſs interſtices. Theſe are the equilateral triangle, the ſquare, and the regular hexagon.

It is well known to mathematicians, that there is not a fourth way poſſible, in which a plane may be cut into little ſpaces that ſhall be equal, ſimilar and regular, without leaving any interſtices. Of the three, the hexagon is the moſt proper, both for conveniency and ſtrength. Bees, as if they knew this, make their cells regular hexagons.

As the combs have cells on both ſides, the cells may either be exactly oppoſite, having partition againſt partition, or the bottom of a cell may reſt upon the partitions between the cells on the other ſide, which will ſerve as a buttreſs to ſtrengthen it. The laſt way is beſt for ſtrength; accordingly, the bottom of each cell reſts againſt the point where three partitions meet on the other ſide, which gives it all the ſtrength poſſible.

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The bottom of a cell may either be one plane perpendicular to the ſide-partitions, or it may be compoſed of ſeveral planes, meeting in a ſolid angle in the middle point. It is only in one of theſe two ways, that all the cells can be ſimilar without loſing room. And, for the ſame intention, the planes of which the bottom is compoſed, if there be more than one, muſt be three in number, and neither more nor fewer.

It has been demonſtrated, that, by making the bottoms of the cells to conſiſt of three planes meeting in a point, there is a ſaving of material and labour no way inconſiderable. The bees, as if acquainted with theſe principles of ſolid geometry, follow them moſt accurately; the bottom of each cell being compoſed of three planes which make obtuſe angles with the ſide-partitions, and with one another, and meet in a point in the middle of the bottom; the three angles of this bottom being ſupported by three partitions on the other ſide of the comb, and the point of it by the common interſection of thoſe three partitions.

One inſtance more of the mathematical ſkill diſplayed in the ſtructure of a honey-comb deſerves to be mentioned.

It is a curious mathematical problem, at what preciſe angle the three planes which compoſe the bottom of a cell ought to meet, in order to make the greateſt poſſible ſaving, or the leaſt expence, of material and labour.

This is one of thoſe problems, belonging to the higher parts of mathematics, which are called problems of *maxima* and *minima*. It has been reſolved by ſome mathematicians, particularly by the ingenious Mr MACLAURIN, by a fluxionary calculation, which is to be found in the Tranſactions of the Royal Society of London. He has determined preciſely the angle required; and he found, by the moſt exact menſuration the ſubject could

CHAP. II. admit, that it is the very angle, in which the three planes in the bottom of the cell of a honey-comb do actually meet.

Shall we aſk here, who taught the bee the properties of ſolids, and to reſolve problems of *maxima* and *minima*? If a honey-comb were a work of human art, every man of common ſenſe would conclude, without heſitation, that he who invented the conſtruction, muſt have underſtood the principles on which it is conſtructed.

We need not ſay that bees know none of theſe things. They work moſt geometrically, without any knowledge of geometry; ſomewhat like a child, who, by turning the handle of an organ, makes good muſic, without any knowledge of muſic.

The art is not in the child, but in him who made the organ. In like manner, when a bee makes its combs ſo geometrically, the geometry is not in the bee, but in that great Geometrician who made the bee, and made all things in number, weight and meaſure.

To return to inſtincts in man; thoſe are moſt remarkable which appear in infancy, when we are ignorant of every thing neceſſary to our preſervation, and therefore muſt periſh, if we had not an inviſible Guide, who leads us blind-fold in the way we ſhould take, if we had eyes to ſee it.

Beſides the inſtincts which appear only in infancy, and are intended to ſupply the want of underſtanding in that early period, there are many which continue through life, and which ſupply the defects of our intellectual powers in every period. Of theſe we may obſerve three claſſes.

Firſt, There are many things neceſſary to be done for our preſervation,

ſervation, which, even when we will to do, we know not the means by which they muſt be done. CHAP. II.

A man knows that he muſt ſwallow his food before it can nouriſh him. But this action requires the co-operation of many nerves and muſcles, of which he knows nothing; and if it were to be directed ſolely by his underſtanding and will, he would ſtarve before he learned how to perform it.

Here inſtinct comes in to his aid. He needs do no more than will to ſwallow. All the requiſite motions of nerves and muſcles immediately take place in their proper order, without his knowing or willing any thing about them.

If we aſk here, whoſe will do theſe nerves and muſcles obey? Not his, ſurely, to whom they belong. He knows neither their names, nor nature, nor office; he never thought of them. They are moved by ſome impulſe, of which the cauſe is unknown, without any thought, will or intention on his part, that is, they are moved inſtinctively.

This is the caſe, in ſome degree, in every voluntary motion of our body. Thus, I will to ſtretch out my arm. The effect immediately follows. But we know that the arm is ſtretched out by the contraction of certain muſcles; and that the muſcles are contracted by the influence of the nerves. I know nothing, I think nothing, either of nerves or muſcles, when I ſtretch out my arm; yet this nervous influence, and this contraction of the muſcles, uncalled by me, immediately produce the effect which I willed. This is, as if a weight were to be raiſed, which can be raiſed only by a complication of levers, pullies, and other mechanical powers, that are behind the curtain, and altogether unknown to me. I will to raiſe the weight; and no ſooner is this volition exerted, than the machinery behind the curtain falls to work and raiſes the weight.

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If ſuch a caſe ſhould happen, we would conclude, that there is ſome perſon behind the curtain, who knew my will, and put the machine in motion to execute it.

The caſe of my willing to ſtretch out my arm, or to ſwallow my food, has evidently a great ſimilarity to this. But who it is that ſtands behind the curtain, and ſets the internal machinery a-going, is hid from us; ſo ſtrangely and wonderfully are we made. This, however, is evident, that thoſe internal motions are not willed nor intended by us, and therefore are inſtinctive.

A *ſecond* caſe in which we have need of inſtinct, even in advanced life, is, When the action muſt be ſo frequently repeated, that to intend and will it every time it is done, would occupy too much of our thought, and leave no room for other neceſſary employments of the mind.

We muſt breathe often every minute whether awake or aſleep. We muſt often cloſe the eye-lids, in order to preſerve the luſtre of the eye. If theſe things required particular attention and volition every time they are done, they would occupy all our thought. Nature therefore gives an impulſe to do them as often as is neceſſary, without any thought at all. They conſume no time, they give not the leaſt interruption to any exerciſe of the mind; becauſe they are done by inſtinct.

A *third* caſe, in which we need the aid of inſtinct, is, When the action muſt be done ſo ſuddenly, that there is no time to think and determine. When a man loſes his balance, either on foot or on horſeback, he makes an inſtantaneous effort to recover it by inſtinct. The effort would be in vain, if it waited the determination of reaſon and will.

When any thing threatens our eyes, we wink hard, by inſtinct, and can hardly avoid doing ſo, even when we know that the ſtroke

ſtroke is aimed in jeſt, and that we are perfectly ſafe from danger. I have ſeen this tried upon a wager, which a man was to gain if he could keep his eyes open, while another aimed a ſtroke at them in jeſt. The difficulty of doing this ſhews that there may be a ſtruggle between inſtinct and will; and that it is not eaſy to reſiſt the impulſe of inſtinct, even by a ſtrong reſolution not to yield to it.

Thus the merciful Author of our nature, hath adapted our inſtincts to the defects, and to the weakneſs of our underſtanding. In infancy we are ignorant of every thing; yet many things muſt be done by us for our preſervation: Theſe are done by inſtinct. When we grow up there are many motions of our limbs and bodies neceſſary, which can be performed only by a curious and complex internal machinery; a machinery of which the bulk of mankind are totally ignorant, and which the moſt ſkilful anatomiſt knows but imperfectly. All this machinery is ſet a-going by inſtinct. We need only to will the external motion, and all the internal motions, previouſly neceſſary to the effect, take place of themſelves, without our will or command.

Some actions muſt be ſo often repeated, through the whole of life, that, if they required attention and will, we ſhould be able to do nothing elſe: Theſe go on regularly by inſtinct.

Our preſervation from danger often requires ſuch ſudden exertions, that there is no time to think and to determine: Accordingly we make ſuch exertions by inſtinct.

Another thing in the nature of man, which I take to be partly, though not wholly, inſtinctive, is his proneneſs to imitation.

ARISTOTLE obſerved, long ago, that man is an imitative animal. He is ſo in more reſpects than one. He is diſpoſed to

CHAP. II. to imitate what he approves. In all arts men learn more, and more agreeably, by example than by rules. Imitation by the chiſſel, by the pencil, by deſcription proſaic and poetical, and by action and geſture, have been favourite and elegant entertainments of the whole ſpecies. In all theſe caſes, however, the imitation is intended and willed, and therefore cannot be ſaid to be inſtinctive.

But, I apprehend, that human nature diſpoſes us to the imitation of thoſe among whom we live, when we neither deſire nor will it.

Let an Engliſhman, of middle age, take up his reſidence in Edinburgh or Glaſgow; although he has not the leaſt intention to uſe the Scots dialect, but a firm reſolution to preſerve his own pure and unmixed, he will find it very difficult to make good his intention. He will, in a courſe of years, fall inſenſibly, and without intention, into the tone and accent, and even into the words and phraſes of thoſe he converſes with; and nothing can preſerve him from this, but a ſtrong diſguſt to every Scoticiſm, which perhaps may overcome the natural inſtinct.

It is commonly thought that children often learn to ſtammer by imitation; yet I believe no perſon ever deſired or willed to learn that quality.

I apprehend that inſtinctive imitation has no ſmall influence in forming the peculiarities of provincial dialects, the peculiarities of voice, geſture, and manner, which we ſee in ſome families, the manners peculiar to different ranks, and different profeſſions; and perhaps even in forming national characters, and the human character in general.

The inſtances that hiſtory furniſhes of wild men, brought up from early years, without the ſociety of any of their own ſpecies

cies are ſo few that we cannot build concluſions upon them with great certainty. But all I have heard of agreed in this, that the wild man gave but very ſlender indications of the rational faculties; and, with regard to his mind, was hardly diſtinguiſhable from the more ſagacious of the brutes.

There is a conſiderable part of the loweſt rank in every nation, of whom it cannot be ſaid that any pains have been taken by themſelves, or by others, to cultivate their underſtanding, or to form their manners; yet we ſee an immenſe difference between them and the wild man.

This difference is wholly the effect of ſociety; and, I think, it is in a great meaſure, though not wholly, the effect of undeſigned and inſtinctive imitation.

Perhaps, not only our actions, but even our judgment, and belief, is, in ſome caſes, guided by inſtinct, that is, by a natural and blind impulſe.

When we conſider man as a rational creature, it may ſeem right that he ſhould have no belief but what is grounded upon evidence, probable or demonſtrative; and it is, I think, commonly taken for granted, that it is always evidence, real or apparent, that determines our belief.

If this be ſo, the conſequence is, That, in no caſe, can there be any belief, till we find evidence, or, at leaſt, what to our judgment appears to be evidence. I ſuſpect it is not ſo; but that, on the contrary, before we grow up to the full uſe of our rational faculties, we do believe, and muſt believe, many things without any evidence at all.

The faculties which we have in common with brute-animals, are of earlier growth than reaſon. We are irrational animals

CHAP. II.

for a conſiderable time before we can properly be called rational. The operations of reaſon ſpring up by imperceptible degrees; nor is it poſſible for us to trace accurately the order in which they riſe. The power of reflection, by which only we could trace the progreſs of our growing faculties, comes too late to anſwer that end. Some operations of brute-animals look ſo like reaſon, that they are not eaſily diſtinguiſhed from it. Whether brutes have any thing that can properly be called belief, I cannot ſay; but their actions ſhew ſomething that looks very like it.

If there be any inſtinctive belief in man, it is probably of the ſame kind with that which we aſcribe to brutes, and may be ſpecifically different from that rational belief which is grounded on evidence; but that there is ſomething in man which we call belief, which is not grounded on evidence, I think, muſt be granted.

We need to be informed of many things before we are capable of diſcerning the evidence on which they reſt. Were our belief to be with-held till we are capable, in any degree, of weighing evidence, we ſhould loſe all the benefit of that inſtruction and information, without which we could never attain the uſe of our rational faculties.

Man would never acquire the uſe of reaſon if he were not brought up in the ſociety of reaſonable creatures. The benefit he receives from ſociety, is derived partly from imitation of what he ſees others do, partly from the inſtruction and information they communicate to him, without which he could neither be preſerved from deſtruction, nor acquire the uſe of his rational powers.

Children have a thouſand things to learn, and they learn many things every day; more than will be eaſily believed by thoſe who have never given attention to their progreſs.

Oportet

Oportet diſcentem credere is a common adage. Children have every thing to learn; and, in order to learn, they muſt believe their inſtructors. They need a greater ſtock of faith from infancy to twelve or fourteen, than ever after. But how ſhall they get this ſtock ſo neceſſary to them? If their faith depend upon evidence, the ſtock of evidence, real or apparent, muſt bear proportion to their faith. But ſuch, in reality, is their ſituation, that when their faith muſt be greateſt, the evidence is leaſt. They believe a thouſand things before they ever ſpend a thought upon evidence. Nature ſupplies the want of evidence, and gives them an inſtinctive kind of faith without evidence.

They believe implicitly whatever they are told, and receive with aſſurance the teſtimony of every one, without ever thinking of a reaſon why they ſhould do ſo.

A parent or a maſter might command them to believe; but in vain; for belief is not in our power; but in the firſt part of life, it is governed by mere teſtimony in matters of fact, and by mere authority in all other matters, no leſs than by evidence in riper years.

It is not the words of the teſtifier, but his belief, that produces this belief in a child: For children ſoon learn to diſtinguiſh what is ſaid in jeſt, from what is ſaid in good earneſt. What appears to them to be ſaid in jeſt, produces no belief. They glory in ſhewing that they are not to be impoſed on. When the ſigns of belief in the ſpeaker are ambiguous, it is pleaſant to obſerve with what ſagacity they pry into his features, to diſcern whether he really believes what he ſays, or only counterfeits belief. As ſoon as this point is determined, their belief is regulated by his. If he be doubtful, they are doubtful, if he be aſſured, they are alſo aſſured.

It is well known what a deep impreſſion religious principles

CHAP. II. zealouſly inculcated make upon the minds of children. The abſurdities of ghoſts and hobgoblins early impreſſed, have been known to ſtick ſo faſt, even in enlightened minds, as to baffle all rational conviction.

When we grow up to the uſe of reaſon, teſtimony attended with certain circumſtances, or even authority, may afford a rational ground of belief; but with children, without any regard to circumſtances, either of them operates like demonſtration. And as they ſeek no reaſon, nor can give any reaſon, for this regard to teſtimony and to authority, it is the effect of a natural impulſe, and may be called inſtinct.

Another inſtance of belief which appears to be inſtinctive, is that which children ſhew even in infancy, that an event which they have obſerved in certain circumſtances, will happen again in like circumſtances. A child of half a year old, who has once burned his finger by putting it in the candle, will not put it there again. And if you make a ſhew of putting it in the candle by force, you ſee the moſt manifeſt ſigns that he believes he ſhall meet with the ſame calamity.

Mr HUME hath ſhewn very clearly, that this belief is not the effect either of reaſon or experience. He endeavours to account for it by the aſſociation of ideas. Though I am not ſatisfied with his account of this phænomenon, I ſhall not now examine it; becauſe it is ſufficient for the preſent argument, that this belief is not grounded on evidence, real or apparent, which I think he clearly proves.

A perſon who has lived ſo long in the world, as to obſerve that nature is governed by fixed laws, may have ſome rational ground to expect ſimilar events in ſimilar circumſtances; but this cannot be the caſe of the child. His belief therefore is not grounded on evidence. It is the reſult of his conſtitution.

Nor

Nor is it the leſs ſo, though it ſhould ariſe from the aſſociation of ideas. For what is called the aſſociation of ideas is a law of nature in our conſtitution; which produces its effects without any operation of reaſon on our part, and in a manner of which we are entirely ignorant.

CHAP. III.

Of Habit.

HABIT differs from inſtinct, not in its nature, but in its origin; the latter being natural, the former acquired. Both operate without will or intention, without thought, and therefore may be called *mechanical principles.*

Habit is commonly defined, *A facility of doing a thing, acquired by having done it frequently.* This definition is ſufficient for habits of art; but the habits which may, with propriety, be called principles of action, muſt give more than a facility, they muſt give an inclination or impulſe to do the action; and that, in many caſes, habits have this force, cannot be doubted.

How many awkward habits, by frequenting improper company, are children apt to learn, in their addreſs, motion, looks, geſture and pronunciation. They acquire ſuch habits commonly from an undeſigned and inſtinctive imitation, before they can judge of what is proper and becoming.

When they are a little advanced in underſtanding, they may eaſily be convinced that ſuch a thing is unbecoming, they may reſolve to forbear it, but when the habit is formed, ſuch a general reſolution is not of itſelf ſufficient; for the habit will operate without intention; and particular attention is neceſſary, on every

CHAP. III. every occaſion, to reſiſt its impulſe, until it be undone by the habit of oppoſing it.

It is owing to the force of habits, early acquired by imitation, that a man who has grown up to manhood in the loweſt rank of life, if fortune raiſe him to a higher rank, very rarely acquires the air and manners of a gentleman.

When to that inſtinctive imitation, which I ſpoke of before, we join the force of habit, it is eaſy to ſee, that theſe mechanical principles have no ſmall ſhare in forming the manners and character of moſt men.

The difficulty of overcoming vicious habits has, in all ages, been a common topic of theologians and moraliſts; and we ſee too many ſad examples to permit us to doubt of it.

There are good habits, in a moral ſenſe, as well as bad; and it is certain, that the ſtated and regular performance of what we approve, not only makes it eaſy, but makes us uneaſy in the omiſſion of it. This is the caſe, even when the action derives all its goodneſs from the opinion of the performer. A good illiterate Roman Catholic does not ſleep ſound if he goes to bed without telling his beads, and repeating prayers which he does not underſtand.

ARISTOTLE makes wiſdom, prudence, good ſenſe, ſcience and art, as well as the moral virtues and vices, to be *habits*. If he meant no more, by giving this name to all thoſe intellectual and moral qualities, than that they are all ſtrengthened and confirmed by repeated acts, this is undoubtedly true. I take the word in a leſs extenſive ſenſe, when I conſider habits as principles of action. I conceive it to be a part of our conſtitution, that what we have been accuſtomed to do, we acquire, not only a facility, but a proneneſs to do on like occaſions; ſo that it requires a particular

particular will and effort to forbear it, but to do it, requires very often no will at all. We are carried by habit as by a ſtream in ſwimming, if we make no reſiſtance.

Every art furniſhes examples both of the power of habits and of their utility; no one more than the moſt common of all arts, the art of ſpeaking.

Articulate language is ſpoken, not by nature, but by art. It is no eaſy matter to children, to learn the ſimple ſounds of language; I mean, to learn to pronounce the vowels and conſonants. It would be much more difficult, if they were not led by inſtinct to imitate the ſounds they hear; for the difficulty is vaſtly greater of teaching the deaf to pronounce the letters and words, though experience ſhows that it can be done.

What is it that makes this pronunciation ſo eaſy at laſt which was ſo difficult at firſt? It is habit.

But from what cauſe does it happen, that a good ſpeaker no ſooner conceives what he would expreſs, than the letters, ſyllables and words arrange themſelves according to innumerable rules of ſpeech, while he never thinks of theſe rules? He means to expreſs certain ſentiments; in order to do this properly, a ſelection muſt be made of the materials, out of many thouſands. He makes this ſelection without any expence of time or thought. The materials ſelected muſt be arranged in a particular order, according to innumerable rules of grammar, logic and rhetoric, and accompanied with a particular tone and emphaſis. He does all this as it were by inſpiration, without thinking of any of theſe rules, and without breaking one of them.

This art, if it were not more common, would appear more wonderful, than that a man ſhould dance blind-fold amidſt a thouſand

CHAP. III. thouſand burning plough-ſhares, without being burnt; yet all this may be done by habit.

It appears evident, that as, without inſtinct, the infant could not live to become a man, ſo, without habit, man would remain an infant through life, and would be as helpleſs, as unhandy, as ſpeechleſs, and as much a child in underſtanding at threeſcore as at three.

I ſee no reaſon to think, that we ſhall ever be able to aſſign the phyſical cauſe, either of inſtinct, or of the power of habit.

Both ſeem to be parts of our original conſtitution. Their end and uſe is evident; but we can aſſign no cauſe of them, but the will of him who made us.

With regard to inſtinct, which is a natural propenſity, this will perhaps be eaſily granted; but it is no leſs true with regard to that power and inclination which we acquire by habit.

No man can ſhew a reaſon why our doing a thing frequently ſhould produce either facility or inclination to do it.

The fact is ſo notorious, and ſo conſtantly in our eye, that we are apt to think no reaſon ſhould be ſought for it, any more than why the ſun ſhines. But there muſt be a cauſe of the ſun's ſhining, and there muſt be a cauſe of the power of habit.

We ſee nothing analogous to it in inanimate matter, or in things made by human art. A clock or a watch, a waggon or a plough, by the cuſtom of going, does not learn to go better, or require leſs moving force. The earth does not increaſe in fertility by the cuſtom of bearing crops.

It is ſaid, that trees and other vegetables, by growing long in an

an unkindly ſoil or climate, ſometimes acquire qualities by which they can bear its inclemency with leſs hurt. This, in the vegetable kingdom, has ſome reſemblance to the power of habit; but, in inanimate matter, I know nothing that reſembles it.

A ſtone loſes nothing of its weight by being long ſupported, or made to move upward. A body, by being toſſed about ever ſo long, or ever ſo violently, loſes nothing of its *inertia*, nor acquires the leaſt diſpoſition to change its ſtate.

ESSAY III. PART II.

Of Animal Principles of Action.

CHAP. I.

Of Appetites.

HAVING diſcourſed of the *mechanical* principles of action, I proceed to conſider thoſe I called *animal*.

They are ſuch as operate upon the will and intention, but do not ſuppoſe any exerciſe of judgment or reaſon; and are moſt of them to be found in ſome brute-animals, as well as in man.

In this claſs, the firſt kind I ſhall call *appetites*, taking that word in a ſtricter ſenſe than it is ſometimes taken, even by good writers.

CHAP. I.

The word *appetite* is ſometimes limited, ſo as to ſignify only the deſire of food when we hunger; ſometimes it is extended ſo as to ſignify any ſtrong deſire, whatever be its object. Without pretending to cenſure any uſe of the word which cuſtom hath authoriſed, I beg leave to limit it to a particular claſs of deſires, which are diſtinguiſhed from all others by the following marks.

Firſt, Every appetite is accompanied with an uneaſy ſenſation proper to it, which is ſtrong or weak, in proportion to the deſire we have of the object. *Secondly*, Appetites are not conſtant, but periodical, being ſated by their objects for a time, and returning after certain periods. Such is the nature of thoſe principles of action, to which I beg leave, in this Eſſay, to appropriate the name of *appetites*. Thoſe that are chiefly obſervable in man, as well as in moſt other animals, are hunger, thirſt, and luſt.

If we attend to the appetite of hunger, we ſhall find in it two ingredients, an uneaſy ſenſation and a deſire to eat. The deſire keeps pace with the ſenſation, and ceaſes when it ceaſes. When a man is ſated with eating, both the uneaſy ſenſation and the deſire to eat ceaſe for a time, and return after a certain interval. So it is with other appetites.

In infants, for ſome time after they come into the world, the uneaſy ſenſation of hunger is probably the whole. We cannot ſuppoſe in them, before experience, any conception of eating, nor, conſequently, any deſire of it. They are led by mere inſtinct to ſuck when they feel the ſenſation of hunger. But when experience has connected, in their imagination, the uneaſy ſenſation with the means of removing it, the deſire of the laſt comes to be ſo aſſociated with the firſt, that they remain through life inſeparable: And we give the name of *hunger* to the principle that is made up of both.

That

That the appetite of hunger includes the two ingredients I have mentioned will not, I apprehend, be queſtioned. I take notice of it the rather becauſe we may, if I miſtake not, find a ſimilar compoſition in other principles of action. They are made up of different ingredients, and may be analyzed into the parts that enter into their compoſition.

If one Philoſopher ſhould maintain, that hunger is an uneaſy ſenſation, another, that it is a deſire to eat, they ſeem to differ widely; for a deſire and a ſenſation are very different things, and have no ſimilitude. But they are both in the right; for hunger includes both an uneaſy ſenſation and a deſire to eat.

Although there has been no ſuch diſpute among Philoſophers as we have ſuppoſed with regard to hunger, yet there have been ſimilar diſputes with regard to other principles of action; and it deſerves to be conſidered whether they may not be terminated in a ſimilar manner.

The ends for which our natural appetites are given, are too evident to eſcape the obſervation of any man of the leaſt reflection. Two of thoſe I named are intended for the preſervation of the individual, and the third for the continuance of the ſpecies.

The reaſon of mankind would be altogether inſufficient for theſe ends, without the direction and call of appetite.

Though a man knew that his life muſt be ſupported by eating, reaſon could not direct him when to eat, or what; how much, or how often. In all theſe things, appetite is a much better guide than our reaſon. Were reaſon only to direct us in this matter, its calm voice would often be drowned in the hurry of buſineſs, or the charms of amuſement. But the voice of appe-

CHAP. I.

tite riſes gradually, and, at laſt, becomes loud enough to call off our attention from any other employment.

Every man muſt be convinced, that, without our appetites, even ſuppoſing mankind inſpired with all the knowledge requiſite for anſwering their ends, the race of men muſt have periſhed long ago; but, by their means, the race is continued from one generation to another, whether men be ſavage or civilized, knowing or ignorant, virtuous or vicious.

By the ſame means, every tribe of brute-animals, from the whale that ranges the ocean to the leaſt microſcopic inſect, has been continued from the beginning of the world to this day; nor has good evidence been found, that any one ſpecies which GOD made has periſhed.

Nature has given to every animal, not only an appetite for its food, but taſte and ſmell, by which it diſtinguiſhes the food proper for it.

It is pleaſant to ſee a caterpillar, which nature intended to live upon the leaf of one ſpecies of plant, travel over a hundred leaves of other kinds without taſting one, till it comes to that which is its natural food, which it immediately falls on, and devours greedily.

Moſt caterpillars feed only upon the leaf of one ſpecies of plant, and nature ſuits the ſeaſon of their production to the food that is intended to nouriſh them. Many inſects and animals have a greater variety of food; but, of all animals, man has the greateſt variety, being able to ſubſiſt upon almoſt every kind of vegetable or animal food, from the bark of trees to the oil of whales.

I believe our natural appetites may be made more violent by exceſſive

exceſſive indulgence, and that, on the other hand, they may be weakened by ſtarving. The firſt is often the effect of a pernicious luxury, the laſt may ſometimes be the effect of want, ſometimes of ſuperſtition. I apprehend that nature has given to our appetites that degree of ſtrength which is moſt proper for us; and that whatever alters their natural tone, either in exceſs or in defect, does not mend the work of nature, but may mar and pervert it.

A man may eat from appetite only. So the brutes commonly do. He may eat to pleaſe his taſte when he has no call of appetite. I believe a brute may do this alſo. He may eat for the ſake of health, when neither appetite nor taſte invites. This, as far as I am able to judge, brutes never do.

From ſo many different principles, and from many more, the ſame action may be done; and this may be ſaid of moſt human actions. From this, it appears, that very different and contrary theories may ſerve to account for the actions of men. The cauſes aſſigned may be ſufficient to produce the effect, and yet not be the true cauſes.

To act merely from appetite is neither good nor ill in a moral view. It is neither an object of praiſe nor of blame. No man claims any praiſe becauſe he eats when he is hungry, or reſts when he is weary. On the other hand, he is no object of blame, if he obeys the call of appetite when there is no reaſon to hinder him. In this, he acts agreeably to his nature.

From this we may obſerve, that the definition of virtuous actions, given by the ancient Stoics, and adopted by ſome modern authors, is imperfect. They defined virtuous actions to be ſuch as are *according to nature*. What is done according to the animal part of our nature, which is common to us with the brute-animals, is in itſelf neither virtuous nor vicious, but perfectly indifferent.

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different. Then only it becomes vicious, when it is done in oppoſition to ſome principle of ſuperior importance and authority. And it may be virtuous, if done for ſome important or worthy end.

Appetites, conſidered in themſelves, are neither ſocial principles of action, nor ſelfiſh. They cannot be called ſocial, becauſe they imply no concern for the good of others. Nor can they juſtly be called ſelfiſh, though they be commonly referred to that claſs. An appetite draws us to a certain object, without regard to its being good for us, or ill. There is no ſelf-love implied in it any more than benevolence. We ſee, that, in many caſes, appetite may lead a man to what he knows will be to his hurt. To call this acting from ſelf-love, is to pervert the meaning of words. It is evident, that, in every caſe of this kind, ſelf-love is ſacrificed to appetite.

There are ſome principles of the human frame very like to our appetites, though they do not commonly get that name.

Men are made for labour either of body or mind. Yet exceſſive labour hurts the powers of both. To prevent this hurt, nature hath given to men, and other animals, an uneaſy ſenſation, which always attends exceſſive labour, and which we call *fatigue*, *wearineſs*, *laſſitude*. This uneaſy ſenſation is conjoined with the deſire of reſt, or intermiſſion of our labour. And thus nature calls us to reſt when we are weary, in the ſame manner as to eat when we are hungry.

In both caſes there is a deſire of a certain object, and an uneaſy ſenſation accompanying that deſire. In both caſes the deſire is ſatiated by its object, and returns after certain intervals. In this only they differ, that in the appetites firſt mentioned, the uneaſy ſenſation ariſes at intervals without action, and leads

to

to a certain action: In wearineſs, the uneaſy ſenſation ariſes from action too long continued, and leads to reſt.

But nature intended that we ſhould be active, and we need ſome principle to incite us to action, when we happen not to be invited by any appetite or paſſion.

For this end, when ſtrength and ſpirits are recruited by reſt, nature has made total inaction as uneaſy as exceſſive labour.

We may call this the principle of *activity*. It is moſt conſpicuous in children, who cannot be ſuppoſed to know how uſeful and neceſſary it is for their improvement to be conſtantly employed. Their conſtant activity therefore appears not to proceed from their having ſome end conſtantly in view, but rather from this, that they deſire to be always doing ſomething, and feel uneaſineſs in total inaction.

Nor is this principle confined to childhood; it has great effects in advanced life.

When a man has neither hope, nor fear, nor deſire, nor project, nor employment, of body or mind, one might be apt to think him the happieſt mortal upon earth, having nothing to do but to enjoy himſelf: but we find him, in fact, the moſt unhappy.

He is more weary of inaction than ever he was of exceſſive labour. He is weary of the world, and of his own exiſtence; and is more miſerable than the ſailor wreſtling with a ſtorm, or the ſoldier mounting a breach.

This diſmal ſtate is commonly the lot of the man who has neither exerciſe of body nor employment of mind. For the mind,

CHAP. I. mind, like water, corrupts and putrifies by ſtagnation, but by running purifies and refines.

Beſides the appetites which nature hath given us for uſeful and neceſſary purpoſes, we may create appetites which nature never gave.

The frequent uſe of things which ſtimulate the nervous ſyſtem, produces a languor when their effect is gone off, and a deſire to repeat them. By this means a deſire of a certain object is created, accompanied by an uneaſy ſenſation. Both are removed for a time by the object deſired; but they return after a certain interval. This differs from natural appetite, only in being acquired by cuſtom. Such are the appetites which ſome men acquire for the uſe of tobacco, for opiates, and for intoxicating liquours.

Theſe are commonly called habits, and juſtly. But there are different kinds of habits, even of the active ſort, which ought to be diſtinguiſhed. Some habits produce only a facility of doing a thing, without any inclination to do it. All arts are habits of this kind, but they cannot be called principles of action. Other habits produce a proneneſs to do an action, without thought or intention. Theſe we conſidered before as mechanical principles of action. There are other habits which produce a deſire of a certain object, and an uneaſy ſenſation, till it is obtained. It is this laſt kind only that I call acquired appetites.

As it is beſt to preſerve our natural appetites, in that tone and degree of ſtrength which nature gives them, ſo we ought to beware of acquiring appetites which nature never gave. They are always uſeleſs, and very often hurtful.

Although, as was before obſerved, there be neither virtue nor vice

vice in acting from appetite, there may be much of either in the management of our appetites.

When appetite is oppoſed by ſome principle drawing a contrary way, there muſt be a determination of the will, which ſhall prevail, and this determination may be, in a moral ſenſe, right or wrong.

Appetite, even in a brute-animal, may be reſtrained by a ſtronger principle oppoſed to it. A dog, when he is hungry and has meat ſet before him, may be kept from touching it by the fear of immediate puniſhment. In this caſe his fear operates more ſtrongly than his deſire.

Do we attribute any virtue to the dog on this account? I think not. Nor ſhould we aſcribe any virtue to a man in a like caſe. The animal is carried by the ſtrongeſt moving force. This requires no exertion, no ſelf-government, but paſſively to yield to the ſtrongeſt impulſe. This, I think, brutes always do; therefore we attribute to them, neither virtue nor vice. We conſider them as being neither objects of moral approbation, nor diſapprobation.

But it may happen, that, when appetite draws one way, it may be oppoſed, not by any appetite or paſſion, but by ſome cool principle of action, which has authority without any impulſive force: For example, by ſome intereſt, which is too diſtant to raiſe any paſſion or emotion; or by ſome conſideration of decency, or of duty.

In caſes of this kind, the man is convinced that he ought not to yield to appetite, yet there is not an equal or a greater impulſe to oppoſe it. There are circumſtances, indeed, that convince the judgment, but theſe are not ſufficient to determine the will againſt a ſtrong appetite, without ſelf-government.

CHAP. I.

I apprehend that brute-animals have no power of ſelf-government. From their conſtitution, they muſt be led by the appetite or paſſion which is ſtrongeſt for the time.

On this account they have, in all ages, and among all nations, been thought incapable of being governed by laws, though ſome of them may be ſubjects of diſcipline.

The ſame would be the condition of man, if he had no power to reſtrain appetite, but by a ſtronger contrary appetite or paſſion. It would be to no purpoſe to preſcribe laws to him for the government of his actions. You might as well forbid the wind to blow, as forbid him to follow whatever happens to give the ſtrongeſt preſent impulſe.

Every one knows, that when appetite draws one way, duty, decency, or even intereſt, may draw the contrary way; and that appetite may give a ſtronger impulſe than any one of theſe, or even all of them conjoined. Yet it is certain, that, in every caſe of this kind, appetite ought to yield to any of theſe principles when it ſtands oppoſed to them. It is in ſuch caſes that ſelf-government is neceſſary.

The man who ſuffers himſelf to be led by appetite to do what he knows he ought not to do, has an immediate and natural conviction that he did wrong, and might have done otherwiſe; and therefore he condemns himſelf, and confeſſes that he yielded to an appetite which ought to have been under his command.

Thus it appears, that though our natural appetites have in themſelves neither virtue nor vice, though the acting merely from appetite, when there is no principle of greater authority to oppoſe it, be a matter indifferent; yet there may be a great deal of virtue or of vice in the management of our appetites; and

and that the power of ſelf-government is neceſſary for their regulation.

CHAP. II.

Of Deſires.

ANOTHER claſs of animal principles of action in man, I ſhall, for want of a better ſpecific name, call *deſires*.

They are diſtinguiſhed from appetites by this: That there is not an uneaſy ſenſation proper to each, and always accompanying it; and that they are not periodical, but conſtant, not being ſated with their objects for a time, as appetites are.

The deſires I have in view, are chiefly theſe three, the deſire of power, the deſire of eſteem, and the deſire of knowledge.

We may, I think, perceive ſome degree of theſe principles in brute-animals of the more ſagacious kind; but in man they are much more conſpicuous, and have a larger ſphere.

In a herd of black cattle there is a rank and ſubordination. When a ſtranger is introduced into the herd, he muſt fight every one till his rank is ſettled. Then he yields to the ſtronger and aſſumes authority over the weaker. The caſe is much the ſame in the crew of a ſhip of war.

As ſoon as men aſſociate together, the deſire of ſuperiority diſcovers itſelf. In barbarous tribes, as well as among the gregarious kinds of animals, rank is determined by ſtrength, courage, ſwiftneſs, or ſuch other qualities. Among civilized nations, many things of a different kind give power and rank;

CHAP. II. places in government, titles of honour, riches, wiſdom, eloquence, virtue, and even the reputation of theſe. All theſe are either different ſpecies of power, or means of acquiring it; and when they are ſought for that end, muſt be conſidered as inſtances of the deſire of power.

The deſire of eſteem is not peculiar to man. A dog exults in the approbation and applauſe of his maſter, and is humbled by his diſpleaſure. But in man this deſire is much more conſpicuous, and operates in a thouſand different ways.

Hence it is that ſo very few are proof againſt flattery, when it is not very groſs. We wiſh to be well in the opinion of others, and therefore are prone to interpret in our own favour, the ſigns of their good opinion, even when they are ambiguous.

There are few injuries that are not more eaſy to be born than contempt.

We cannot always avoid ſeeing, in the conduct of others, things that move contempt; but, in all polite circles, the ſigns of it muſt be ſuppreſſed, otherwiſe men could not converſe together.

As there is no quality, common to good and bad men, more eſteemed than courage, nor any thing in a man more the object of contempt than cowardice; hence every man deſires to be thought a man of courage; and the reputation of cowardice is worſe than death. How many have died to avoid being thought cowards? How many, for the ſame reaſon, have done what made them unhappy to the end of their lives.

I believe many a tragical event, if traced to its ſource in human nature, might be referred to the deſire of eſteem, or the dread of contempt.

In

In brute-animals there is ſo little that can be called knowledge, that the deſire of it can make no conſiderable figure in them. Yet I have ſeen a cat, when brought into a new habitation, examine with care every corner of it, and anxious to know every lurking place, and the avenues to it. And I believe the ſame thing may be obſerved in many other ſpecies, eſpecially in thoſe that are liable to be hunted by man, or by other animals.

But the deſire of knowledge in the human ſpecies, is a principle that cannot eſcape our obſervation.

The curioſity of children is the principle that occupies moſt of their time while they are awake. What they can handle they examine on all ſides, and often break in pieces, in order to diſcover what is within.

When men grow up their curioſity does not ceaſe, but is employed upon other objects. Novelty is conſidered as one great ſource of the pleaſures of taſte, and indeed is neceſſary, in one degree or other, to give a reliſh to them all.

When we ſpeak of the deſire of knowledge as a principle of action in man, we muſt not confine it to the purſuits of the Philoſopher, or of the literary man. The deſire of knowledge diſcovers itſelf, in one perſon, by an avidity to know the ſcandal of the village, and who makes love, and to whom; in another, to know the economy of the next family; in another, to know what the poſt brings, and, in another, to trace the path of a new comet.

When men ſhew an anxiety, and take pains to know what is of no moment, and can be of no uſe to themſelves or to others, this is trifling, and vain curioſity. It is a culpable weakneſs and folly; but ſtill it is the wrong direction of a natural principle;

and

CHAP. II. and ſhews the force of that principle, more than when it is directed to matters worthy to be known.

I think it unneceſſary to uſe arguments to ſhow, that the deſires of power, of eſteem, and of knowledge, are natural principles in the conſtitution of man. Thoſe who are not convinced of this by reflecting upon their own feelings and ſentiments, will not eaſily be convinced by arguments.

Power, eſteem and knowledge, are ſo uſeful for many purpoſes, that it is eaſy to reſolve the deſire of them into other principles. Thoſe who do ſo muſt maintain, that we never deſire theſe objects for their own ſakes, but as means only of procuring pleaſure, or ſomething which is a natural object of deſire. This, indeed, was the doctrine of EPICURUS; and it has had its votaries in modern times. But it has been obſerved, that men deſire poſthumous fame, which can procure no pleaſure.

EPICURUS himſelf, though he believed that he ſhould have no exiſtence after death, was ſo deſirous to be remembered with eſteem, that, by his laſt will, he appointed his heirs to commemorate his birth annually, and to give a monthly feaſt to his diſciples, upon the twentieth day of the moon. What pleaſure could this give to EPICURUS when he had no exiſtence? On this account, CICERO juſtly obſerves, that his doctrine was refuted by his own practice.

Innumerable inſtances occur in life, of men who ſacrifice eaſe, pleaſure, and every thing elſe, to the luſt of power, of fame, or even of knowledge. It is abſurd to ſuppoſe, that men ſhould ſacrifice the end to what they deſire only as the means of promoting that end.

The natural deſires I have mentioned are, in themſelves, neither virtuous nor vicious. They are parts of our conſtitution, and

and ought to be regulated and reſtrained, when they ſtand in competition with more important principles. But to eradicate them if it were poſſible, (and I believe it is not) would only be like cutting off a leg or an arm, that is, making ourſelves other creatures than GOD has made us.

They cannot, with propriety, be called ſelfiſh principles, though they have commonly been accounted ſuch.

When power is deſired for its own ſake, and not as the means in order to obtain ſomething elſe, this deſire is neither ſelfiſh nor ſocial. When a man deſires power as the means of doing good to others, this is benevolence. When he deſires it only as the means of promoting his own good, this is ſelf-love. But when he deſires it for its own ſake, this only can properly be called the deſire of power; and it implies neither ſelf-love nor benevolence. The ſame thing may be applied to the deſires of eſteem and of knowledge.

The wiſe intention of nature in giving us theſe deſires, is no leſs evident than in giving our natural appetites.

Without the natural appetites, reaſon, as was before obſerved, would be inſufficient, either for the preſervation of the individual, or the continuation of the ſpecies; and without the natural deſires we have mentioned, human virtue would be inſufficient to influence mankind to a tolerable conduct in ſociety.

To theſe natural deſires, common to good and to bad men, it is owing, that a man, who has little or no regard to virtue, may notwithſtanding be a good member of ſociety. It is true, indeed, that perfect virtue, joined with perfect knowledge, would make both our appetites and deſires unneceſſary incumbrances of our nature; but as human knowledge and human

virtue

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virtue are both very imperfect, theſe appetites and deſires are neceſſary ſupplements to our imperfections.

Society, among men, could not ſubſiſt without a certain degree of that regularity of conduct which virtue preſcribes. To this regularity of conduct, men who have no virtue are induced by a regard to character, ſometimes by a regard to intereſt.

Even in thoſe who are not deſtitute of virtue, a regard to character is often an uſeful auxiliary to it, when both principles concur in their direction.

The purſuits of power, of fame, and of knowledge, require a ſelf-command no leſs than virtue does. In our behaviour towards our fellow-creatures, they generally lead to that very conduct which virtue requires. I ſay *generally*, for this, no doubt, admits of exceptions, eſpecially in the caſe of ambition, or the deſire of power.

The evils which ambition has produced in the world are a common topic of declamation. But it ought to be obſerved, that where it has led to one action hurtful to ſociety, it has led to ten thouſand that are beneficial to it. And we juſtly look upon the want of ambition as one of the moſt unfavourable ſymptoms in a man's temper.

The deſires of eſteem and of knowledge are highly uſeful to ſociety, as well as the deſire of power, and, at the ſame time, are leſs dangerous in their exceſſes.

Although actions proceeding merely from the love of power, of reputation, or of knowledge, cannot be accounted virtuous, or be entitled to moral approbation; yet we allow them to be manly, ingenuous, and ſuited to the dignity of human nature; and

and therefore they are entitled to a degree of eſtimation, ſuperior to thoſe which proceed from mere appetite. CHAP. II.

ALEXANDER the Great deſerved that epithet in the early part of his life, when eaſe and pleaſure, and every appetite, were ſacrificed to the love of glory and power. But when we view him conquered by oriental luxury, and uſing his power to gratify his paſſions and appetites, he ſinks in our eſteem, and ſeems to forfeit the title which he had acquired.

SARDANAPALUS, who is ſaid to have purſued pleaſure as eagerly as ALEXANDER purſued glory, never obtained from mankind the appellation of *the Great*.

Appetite is the principle of moſt of the actions of brutes, and we account it brutal in a man to employ himſelf chiefly in the gratification of his appetites. The deſires of power, of eſteem, and of knowledge, are capital parts in the conſtitution of man; and the actions proceeding from them, though not properly virtuous, are human and manly; and they claim a juſt ſuperiority over thoſe that proceed from appetite. This, I think, is the univerſal and unbiaſſed judgment of mankind. Upon what ground this judgment is founded, may deſerve to be conſidered in its proper place.

The deſires we have mentioned are not only highly uſeful in ſociety, and in their nature more noble than our appetites, they are likewiſe the moſt proper engines that can be uſed in the education and diſcipline of men.

In training brute-animals to ſuch habits as they are capable of, the fear of puniſhment is the chief inſtrument to be uſed. But in training men of ingenuous diſpoſition, ambition to excel, and the love of eſteem, are much nobler and more powerful

CHAP. II. engines, by which they may be led to worthy conduct, and trained to good habits.

To this we may add, that the deſires we have mentioned are very friendly to real virtue, and make it more eaſy to be acquired.

A man that is not quite abandoned muſt behave ſo in ſociety as to preſerve ſome degree of reputation. This every man deſires to do, and the greater part actually do it. In order to this, he muſt acquire the habit of reſtraining his appetites and paſſions within the bounds which common decency requires, and ſo as to make himſelf a tolerable member of ſociety, if not an uſeful and agreeable one.

It cannot be doubted that many, from a regard to character and to the opinion of others, are led to make themſelves both uſeful and agreeable members of ſociety, in whom a ſenſe of duty has but a ſmall influence.

Thus men, living in ſociety, eſpecially in poliſhed ſociety, are tamed and civilized by the principles that are common to good and bad men. They are taught to bring their appetites and paſſions under due reſtraint before the eyes of men, which makes it more eaſy to bring them under the rein of virtue.

As a horſe that is broken is more eaſily managed than an unbroken colt, ſo the man who has undergone the diſcipline of ſociety is more tractable, and is in an excellent ſtate of preparation for the diſcipline of virtue; and that ſelf-command, which is neceſſary in the race of ambition and honour, is an attainment of no ſmall importance in the courſe of virtue.

For this reaſon, I apprehend, they err very groſsly who conceive the life of a hermit to be favourable to a courſe of virtue.

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The hermit, no doubt, is free from ſome temptations to vice, but he is deprived of many ſtrong inducements to ſelf-government, as well as of every opportunity of exerciſing the ſocial virtues.

A very ingenious author has reſolved our moral ſentiments reſpecting the virtues of ſelf-government, into a regard to the opinion of men. This I think is giving a great deal too much to the love of eſteem, and putting the ſhadow of virtue in place of the ſubſtance; but that a regard to the opinion of others is, in moſt inſtances of our external behaviour, a great inducement to good conduct, cannot be doubted. For, whatever men may practice themſelves, they will always approve of that in others which they think right.

It was before obſerved, that, beſides the appetites which nature has given us, we may acquire appetites which, by indulgence, become as importunate as the natural. The ſame thing may be applied to deſires.

One of the moſt remarkable acquired deſires is that of money, which, in commercial ſtates, will be found in moſt men, in one degree or other, and, in ſome men, ſwallows up every other deſire, appetite and paſſion.

The deſire of money can then only be accounted a principle of action, when it is deſired for its own ſake, and not merely as the means of procuring ſomething elſe.

It ſeems evident, that there is in miſers ſuch a deſire of money; and, I ſuppoſe, no man will ſay that it is natural, or a part of our original conſtitution. It ſeems to be the effect of habit.

In commercial nations, money is an inſtrument by which almoſt every thing may be procured that is deſired. Being uſeful

CHAP. II.

for many different purpoſes as the means, ſome men loſe ſight of the end, and terminate their deſire upon the means. Money is alſo a ſpecies of power, putting a man in condition to do many things which he could not do without it; and power is a natural object of deſire, even when it is not exerciſed.

In like manner, a man may acquire the deſire of a title of honour, of an equipage, of an eſtate.

Although our natural deſires are highly beneficial to ſociety, and even aiding to virtue, yet acquired deſires are not only uſeleſs, but hurtful and even diſgraceful.

No man is aſhamed to own, that he loves power, that he loves eſteem, that he loves knowledge, for their own ſake. There may be an exceſs in the love of theſe things, which is a blemiſh; but there is a degree of it, which is natural, and is no blemiſh. To love money, titles or equipage, on any other account than as they are uſeful or ornamental, is allowed by all to be weakneſs and folly.

The natural deſires I have been conſidering, though they cannot be called *ſocial* principles of action in the common ſenſe of that word, ſince it is not their object to procure any good or benefit to others, yet they have ſuch a relation to ſociety, as to ſhew moſt evidently the intention of nature to be, that man ſhould live in ſociety.

The deſire of knowledge is not more natural than is the deſire of communicating our knowledge. Even power would be leſs valued if there were no opportunity of ſhewing it to others. It derives half its value from that circumſtance. And as to the deſire of eſteem, it can have no poſſible gratification but in ſociety.

Theſe

Theſe parts of our conſtitution, therefore, are evidently intended for ſocial life; and it is not more evident that birds were made for flying and fiſhes for ſwimming, than that man, endowed with a natural deſire of power, of eſteem, and of knowledge, is made, not for the ſavage and ſolitary ſtate, but for living in ſociety.

CHAP. III.

Of Benevolent Affection in general.

WE have ſeen how, by inſtinct and habit, a kind of mechanical principles, man, without any expence of thought, without deliberation or will, is led to many actions, neceſſary for his preſervation and well-being, which, without thoſe principles, all his ſkill and wiſdom would not have been able to accompliſh.

It may perhaps be thought, that his deliberate and voluntary actions are to be guided by his reaſon.

But it ought to be obſerved, that he is a voluntary agent long before he has the uſe of reaſon. Reaſon and virtue, the prerogatives of man, are of the lateſt growth. They come to maturity by ſlow degrees, and are too weak, in the greater part of the ſpecies, to ſecure the preſervation of individuals and of communities, and to produce that varied ſcene of human life, in which they are to be exerciſed and improved.

Therefore the wiſe Author of our being hath implanted in human nature many inferior principles of action, which, with little or no aid of reaſon or virtue, preſerve the ſpecies, and produce the various exertions, and the various changes and revolutions which we obſerve upon the theatre of life.

In

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In this buſy ſcene, reaſon and virtue have acceſs to act their parts, and do often produce great and good effects; but whether they interpoſe or not, there are actors of an inferior order that will carry on the play, and produce a variety of events, good or bad.

Reaſon, if it were perfect, would lead men to uſe the proper means of preſerving their own lives, and continuing their kind. But the Author of our being hath not thought fit to leave this taſk to reaſon alone, otherwiſe the race would long ago have been extinct. He hath given us, in common with other animals, appetites, by which thoſe important purpoſes are ſecured, whether men be wiſe or fooliſh, virtuous or vicious.

Reaſon, if it were perfect, would lead men neither to loſe the benefit of their active powers by inactivity, nor to overſtrain them by exceſſive labour. But nature hath given a powerful aſſiſtant to reaſon, by making inactivity a grievous puniſhment to itſelf; and by annexing the pain of laſſitude to exceſſive labour.

Reaſon, if it were perfect, would lead us to deſire power, knowledge, and the eſteem and affection of our fellow-men, as means of promoting our own happineſs, and of being uſeful to others. Here again, nature, to ſupply the defects of reaſon, hath given us a ſtrong natural deſire of thoſe objects, which leads us to purſue them without regard to their utility.

Theſe principles we have already conſidered; and, we may obſerve, that all of them have things, not perſons, for their object. They neither imply any good nor ill affection towards any other perſon, nor even towards ourſelves. They cannot therefore, with propriety, be called either *ſelfiſh* or *ſocial*. But there are various principles of action in man, which have perſons for their immediate object, and imply, in their very nature,

our

our being well or ill affected to ſome perſon, or, at leaſt, to ſome animated being. CHAP. III.

Such principles I ſhall call by the general name of *affections*; whether they diſpoſe us to do good or hurt to others.

Perhaps, in giving them this general name, I extend the meaning of the word *affection* beyond its common uſe in diſcourſe. Indeed our language ſeems in this to have departed a little from analogy: For we uſe the verb *affect*, and the participle *affected*, in an indifferent ſenſe, ſo that they may be joined either with good or ill. A man may be ſaid to be ill affected towards another man, or well affected. But the word *affection*, which, according to analogy, ought to have the ſame latitude of ſignification with that from which it is derived, and therefore ought to be applicable to ill affections as well as to good, ſeems, by cuſtom, to be limited to good affections. When we ſpeak of having affection for any perſon, it is always underſtood to be a benevolent affection.

Malevolent principles, ſuch as anger, reſentment, envy, are not commonly called *affections*, but rather *paſſions*.

I take the reaſon of this to be, that the malevolent affections are almoſt always accompanied with that perturbation of mind which we properly call *paſſion*; and this paſſion, being the moſt conſpicuous ingredient, gives its name to the whole.

Even love, when it goes beyond a certain degree, is called a *paſſion*. But it gets not that name when it is ſo moderate as not to diſcompoſe a man's mind, nor deprive him in any meaſure of the government of himſelf.

As we give the name of *paſſion*, even to benevolent affection when it is ſo vehement as to diſcompoſe the mind, ſo, I think, without

CHAP. III. without treſpaſſing much againſt propriety of words, we may give the name of *affection* even to malevolent principles, when unattended with that diſturbance of mind which commonly, though not always, goes along with them, and which has made them get the name of *paſſions*.

The principles which lead us immediately to deſire the good of others, and thoſe that lead us to deſire their hurt, agree in this, that perſons, and not things, are their immediate object. Both imply our being ſome way affected towards the perſon. They ought therefore to have ſome common name to expreſs what is common in their nature; and I know no name more proper for this than *affection*.

Taking affection therefore in this extenſive ſenſe, our affections are very naturally divided into benevolent and malevolent, according as they imply our being well or ill affected towards their object.

There are ſome things common to all benevolent affections, others wherein they differ.

They differ both in the feeling, or ſenſation, which is an ingredient in all of them, and in the objects to which they are directed.

They all agree in two things, to wit, That the feeling which accompanies them is agreeable; and that they imply a deſire of good and happineſs to their object.

The affection we bear to a parent, to a child, to a benefactor, to a perſon in diſtreſs, to a miſtreſs, differ not more in their object, than in the feelings they produce in the mind. We have not names to expreſs the differences of theſe feelings, but every man is conſcious of a difference. Yet, with all this difference, they agree in being agreeable feelings.

I know no exception to this rule, if we diſtinguiſh, as we ought, the feeling which naturally and neceſſarily attends the kind affection, from thoſe which accidentally, in certain circumſtances, it may produce.

The parental affection is an agreeable feeling; but it makes the misfortune or miſbehaviour of a child give a deeper wound to the mind. Pity is an agreeable feeling, yet diſtreſs, which we are not able to relieve, may give a painful ſympathy. Love to one of the other ſex is an agreeable feeling; but where it does not meet with a proper return, it may give the moſt pungent diſtreſs.

The joy and comfort of human life conſiſts in the reciprocal exerciſe of kind affections, and without them life would be undeſirable.

It has been obſerved by Lord SHAFTESBURY, and by many other judicious moraliſts, That even the epicure and the debauchee, who are thought to place all their happineſs in the gratifications of ſenſe, and to purſue theſe as their only object, can find no reliſh in ſolitary indulgences of this kind, but in thoſe only that are mixed with ſocial intercourſe, and a reciprocal exchange of kind affections.

CICERO has obſerved, that the word *convivium*, which in Latin ſignifies a feaſt, is not borrowed from eating or from drinking, but from that ſocial intercourſe which, being the chief part of ſuch an entertainment, gives the name to the whole.

Mutual kind affections are undoubtedly the balm of life, and of all the enjoyments common to good and bad men, are the chief. If a man had no perſon whom he loved or eſteemed, no perſon who loved or eſteemed him, how wretched muſt his con-

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dition be! Surely a man capable of reflection would chuſe to paſs out of exiſtence, rather than to live in ſuch a ſtate.

It has been, by the Poets, repreſented as the ſtate of ſome bloody and barbarous tyrants; but Poets are allowed to paint a little beyond the life. ATREUS is repreſented as ſaying, *Oderint dum metuant.* "I care not for their hatred, providing they "dread my power." I believe there never was a man ſo diſpoſed towards all mankind. The moſt odious tyrant that ever was, will have his favourites, whoſe affection he endeavours to deſerve or to bribe, and to whom he bears ſome good will.

We may therefore lay it down as a principle, that all benevolent affections are, in their nature, agreeable; and that, next to a good conſcience, to which they are always friendly, and never can be adverſe, they make the capital part of human happineſs.

Another ingredient eſſential to every benevolent affection, and from which it takes the name, is a deſire of the good and happineſs of the object.

The object of benevolent affection therefore, muſt be ſome being capable of happineſs. When we ſpeak of affection to a houſe, or to any inanimate thing, the word has a different meaning. For that which has no capacity of enjoyment, or of ſuffering, may be an object of liking or diſguſt, but cannot poſſibly be an object either of benevolent or malevolent affection.

A thing may be deſired either on its own account, or as the means in order to ſomething elſe. That only can properly be called an object of deſire, which is deſired upon its own account; and it is only ſuch deſires that I call principles of action. When any thing is deſired as the means only, there muſt be an end for

for which it is desired; and the desire of the end is, in this case, the principle of action. The means are desired only as they tend to that end; and if different, or even contrary means tended to the same end, they would be equally desired.

On this account I consider those affections only as benevolent, where the good of the object is desired ultimately, and not as the means only, in order to something else.

To say that we desire the good of others, only in order to procure some pleasure or good to ourselves, is to say that there is no benevolent affection in human nature.

This indeed has been the opinion of some Philosophers, both in ancient and in later times. I intend not to examine this opinion in this place, conceiving it proper to give that view of the principles of action in man, which appears to me to be just, before I examine the systems wherein they have been mistaken or misrepresented.

I observe only at present, that it appears as unreasonable to resolve all our benevolent affections into self-love, as it would be to resolve hunger and thirst into self-love.

These appetites are necessary for the preservation of the individual. Benevolent affections are no less necessary for the preservation of society among men, without which man would become an easy prey to the beasts of the field.

We are placed in this world, by the Author of our being, surrounded with many objects that are necessary or useful to us, and with many that may hurt us. We are led, not by reason and self-love only, but by many instincts, and appetites, and natural desires, to seek the former and to avoid the latter.

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But of all the things of this world, man may be the moſt uſeful, or the moſt hurtful to man. Every man is in the power of every man with whom he lives. Every man has power to do much good to his fellow-men, and to do more hurt.

We cannot live without the ſociety of men; and it would be impoſſible to live in ſociety, if men were not diſpoſed to do much of that good to men, and but little of that hurt, which it is in their power to do.

But how ſhall this end, ſo neceſſary to the exiſtence of human ſociety, and conſequently to the exiſtence of the human ſpecies, be accompliſhed?

If we judge from analogy, we muſt conclude, that in this, as in other parts of our conduct, our rational principles are aided by principles of an inferior order, ſimilar to thoſe by which many brute animals live in ſociety with their ſpecies; and that by means of ſuch principles, that degree of regularity is obſerved, which we find in all ſocieties of men, whether wiſe or fooliſh, virtuous or vicious.

The benevolent affections planted in human nature, appear therefore no leſs neceſſary for the preſervation of the human ſpecies, than the appetites of hunger and thirſt.

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Of the particular Benevolent Affections.

HAVING premiſed theſe things in general concerning benevolent affections, I ſhall now attempt ſome enumeration of them.

1. The

1. The *firſt* I mention is that of parents and children, and other near relations.

This we commonly call *natural* affection. Every language has a name for it. It is common to us with moſt of the brute-animals; and is variouſly modified in different animals, according as it is more or leſs neceſſary for the preſervation of the ſpecies.

Many of the inſect-tribe need no other care of parents, than that the eggs be laid in a proper place, where they ſhall have neither too little nor too much heat, and where the animal, as ſoon as it is hatched, ſhall find its natural food. This care the parent takes, and no more.

In other tribes, the young muſt be lodged in ſome ſecret place, where they cannot be eaſily diſcovered by their enemies. They muſt be cheriſhed by the warmth of the parent's body: They muſt be ſuckled, and fed at firſt with tender food; attended in their excurſions, and guarded from danger, till they have learned by experience, and by the example of their parents, to provide for their own ſubſiſtence and ſafety. With what aſſiduity and tender affection this is done by the parents, in every ſpecies that requires it, is well known.

The eggs of the feathered tribe are commonly hatched by incubation of the dam, who leaves off at once her ſprightly motions and migrations, and confines herſelf to her ſolitary and painful taſk, cheered by the ſong of her mate upon a neighbouring bough, and ſometimes fed by him, ſometimes relieved in her incubation, while ſhe gathers a ſcanty meal, and with the greateſt diſpatch returns to her poſt.

The young birds of many ſpecies are ſo very tender and delicate, that man, with all his wiſdom and experience, would not be

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be able to rear one to maturity. But the parents, without any experience, know perfectly how to rear ſometimes a dozen or more at one brood, and to give every one its portion in due ſeaſon. They know the food beſt ſuited to their delicate conſtitution, which is ſometimes afforded by nature, ſometimes muſt be cooked and half digeſted in the ſtomach of the parent.

In ſome animals, nature hath furniſhed the female with a kind of ſecond womb, into which the young retire occaſionally, for food, warmth, and the conveniency of being carried about with the mother.

It would be endleſs to recount all the various ways in which the parental affection is expreſſed by brute-animals.

He muſt, in my apprehenſion, have a very ſtrange complexion of underſtanding, who can ſurvey the various ways in which the young of the various ſpecies are reared, without wonder, without pious admiration of that manifold wiſdom, which hath ſo ſkilfully fitted means to ends, in ſuch an infinite variety of ways.

In all the brute-animals we are acquainted with, the end of the parental affection is completely anſwered in a ſhort time; and then it ceaſes as if it had never been.

The infancy of man is longer and more helpleſs than that of any other animal. The parental affection is neceſſary for many years; it is highly uſeful through life; and therefore it terminates only with life. It extends to children's children without any diminution of its force.

How common is it to ſee a young woman, in the gayeſt period of life, who has ſpent her days in mirth, and her nights in profound ſleep, without ſollicitude or care, all at once transformed into the careful, the ſolicitous, the watchful nurſe of her dear infant;

fant: doing nothing by day but gazing upon it, and ſerving it in the meaneſt offices; by night, depriving herſelf of ſound ſleep for months, that it may lie ſafe in her arms. Forgetful of herſelf, her whole care is centered in this little object.

Such a ſudden transformation of her whole habits, and occupation, and turn of mind, if we did not ſee it every day, would appear a more wonderful *metamorphoſis* than any that OVID has deſcribed.

This, however, is the work of nature, and not the effect of reaſon and reflection. For we ſee it in the good and in the bad, in the moſt thoughtleſs, as well as in the thoughtful.

Nature has aſſigned different departments to the father and mother in rearing their offspring. This may be ſeen in many brute-animals; and that it is ſo in the human ſpecies, was long ago obſerved by SOCRATES, and moſt beautifully illuſtrated by him, as we learn from XENOPHON's *Oeconomicks*. The parental affection in the different ſexes is exactly adapted to the office aſſigned to each. The father would make an awkward nurſe to a new-born child, and the mother too indulgent a guardian. But both act with propriety and grace in their proper ſphere.

It is very remarkable, that when the office of rearing a child is transferred from the parent to another perſon, nature ſeems to transfer the affection along with the office. A wet nurſe, or even a dry nurſe, has commonly the ſame affection for her nurſling, as if ſhe had born it. The fact is ſo well known that nothing needs be ſaid to confirm it; and it ſeems to be the work of nature.

Our affections are not immediately in our power, as our outward actions are. Nature has directed them to certain objects.

We

CHAP IV. We may do kind offices without affection; but we cannot create an affection which nature has not given.

Reaſon might teach a man that his children are particularly committed to his care by the providence of GOD, and, on that account, that he ought to attend to them as his particular charge; but reaſon could not teach him to love them more than other children of equal merit, or to be more afflicted for their misfortunes or miſbehaviour.

It is evident, therefore, that that peculiar ſenſibility of affection, with regard to his own children, is not the effect of reaſoning or reflection, but the effect of that conſtitution which nature has given him.

There are ſome affections which we may call *rational*, becauſe they are grounded upon an opinion of merit in the object. The parental affection is not of this kind. For though a man's affection to his child may be encreaſed by merit, and diminiſhed by demerit, I think no man will ſay, that it took its riſe from an opinion of merit. It is not opinion that creates the affection, but affection often creates opinion. It is apt to pervert the judgment, and create an opinion of merit where there is none.

The abſolute neceſſity of this parental affection, in order to the continuance of the human ſpecies, is ſo apparent, that there is no need of arguments to prove it. The rearing of a child from its birth to maturity requires ſo much time and care, and ſuch infinite attentions, that, if it were to be done merely from conſiderations of reaſon and duty, and were not ſweetened by affection in parents, nurſes and guardians, there is reaſon to doubt, whether one child in ten thouſand would ever be reared.

Beſide the abſolute neceſſity of this part of the human conſtitution to the preſervation of the ſpecies, its utility is very great

great, for tempering the giddineſs and impetuoſity of youth, and improving its knowledge by the prudence and experience of age, for encouraging induſtry and frugality in the parents, in order to provide for their children, for the ſolace and ſupport of parents under the infirmities of old age; not to mention that it probably gave riſe to the firſt civil governments. CHAP. IV.

It does not appear that the parental, and other family affections, are, in general, either too ſtrong or too weak for anſwering their end. If they were too weak, parents would be moſt apt to err on the ſide of undue ſeverity; if too ſtrong, of undue indulgence. As they are in fact, I believe no man can ſay, that the errors are more general on one ſide than on the other.

When theſe affections are exerted according to their intention, under the direction of wiſdom and prudence, the economy of ſuch a family is a moſt delightful ſpectacle, and furniſhes the moſt agreeable and affecting ſubject to the pencil of the painter, and to the pen of the orator and poet.

2. The *next* benevolent affection I mention is gratitude to benefactors.

That good offices are, by the very conſtitution of our nature, apt to produce good will towards the benefactor, in good and bad men, in the ſavage and in the civilized, cannot ſurely be denied by any one, in the leaſt acquainted with human nature.

The danger of perverting a man's judgment by good deeds, where he ought to have no bias, is ſo well known, that it is diſhonourable in judges, in witneſſes, in electors to offices of truſt, to accept of them; and, in all civilized nations, they are, in ſuch caſes, prohibited, as the means of corruption.

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Thoſe who would corrupt the ſentence of a judge, the teſtimony of a witneſs, or the vote of an elector, know well, that they muſt not make a bargain, or ſtipulate what is to be done in return. This would ſhock every man who has the leaſt pretenſion to morals. If the perſon can only be prevailed upon to accept the good office, as a teſtimony of pure and diſintereſted friendſhip, it is left to work upon his gratitude. He finds himſelf under a kind of moral obligation to conſider the cauſe of his benefactor and friend in the moſt favourable light. He finds it eaſier to juſtify his conduct to himſelf, by favouring the intereſt of his benefactor, than by oppoſing it.

Thus the principle of gratitude is ſuppoſed, even in the nature of a bribe. Bad men know how to make this natural principle the moſt effectual means of corruption. The very beſt things may be turned to a bad uſe. But the natural tendency of this principle, and the intention of nature in planting it in the human breaſt, are, evidently, to promote good-will among men, and to give to good offices the power of multiplying their kind, like ſeed ſown in the earth, which brings a return, with increaſe.

Whether there be, or be not, in the more ſagacious brutes, ſomething that may be called gratitude, I will not diſpute. We muſt allow this important difference between their gratitude and that of the human kind, that, in the laſt, the mind of the benefactor is chiefly regarded, in the firſt, the external action only. A brute-animal will be as kindly affected to him who feeds it in order to kill and eat it, as to him who does it from affection.

A man may be juſtly entitled to our gratitude, for an office that is uſeful, though it be, at the ſame time, diſagreeable; and not only for doing, but for forbearing what he had a right to do. Among men, it is not every beneficial office that claims our gratitude, but ſuch only as are not due to us in juſtice. A favour

favour alone gives a claim to gratitude; and a favour muſt be ſomething more than juſtice requires. It does not appear that brutes have any conception of juſtice. They can neither diſtinguiſh hurt from injury, nor a favour from a good office that is due.

3. A *third* natural benevolent affection is pity and compaſſion towards the diſtreſſed.

Of all perſons, thoſe in diſtreſs ſtand moſt in need of our good offices. And, for that reaſon, the Author of nature hath planted in the breaſt of every human creature a powerful advocate to plead their cauſe.

In man, and in ſome other animals, there are ſigns of diſtreſs, which nature hath both taught them to uſe, and taught all men to underſtand without any interpreter. Theſe natural ſigns are more eloquent than language; they move our hearts, and produce a ſympathy, and a deſire to give relief.

There are few hearts ſo hard, but great diſtreſs will conquer their anger, their indignation, and every malevolent affection.

We ſympathiſe even with the traitor and with the aſſaſſin, when we ſee him led to execution. It is only ſelf-preſervation, and the public good, that makes us reluctantly aſſent to his being cut off from among men.

The practice of the Canadian nations toward their priſoners would tempt one to think, that they have been able to root out the principle of compaſſion from their nature. But this, I apprehend, would be a raſh concluſion. It is only a part of the priſoners of war that they devote to a cruel death. This gratifies the revenge of the women and children who have loſt their

CHAP. IV. huſbands and fathers in the war. The other priſoners are kindly uſed, and adopted as brethren.

Compaſſion with bodily pain is no doubt weakened among theſe ſavages, becauſe they are trained from their infancy to be ſuperior to death, and to every degree of pain; and he is thought unworthy of the name of a man, who cannot defy his tormentors, and ſing his death-ſong in the midſt of the moſt cruel tortures. He who can do this, is honoured as a brave man, though an enemy. But he muſt periſh in the experiment.

A Canadian has the moſt perfect contempt for every man who thinks pain an intolerable evil. And nothing is ſo apt to ſtifle compaſſion as contempt, and an apprehenſion, that the evil ſuffered is nothing but what ought to be manfully borne.

It muſt alſo be obſerved, that ſavages ſet no bounds to their revenge. Thoſe who find no protection in laws and government never think themſelves ſafe, but in the deſtruction of their enemy. And one of the chief advantages of civil government is, that it tempers the cruel paſſion of revenge, and opens the heart to compaſſion with every human woe.

It ſeems to be falſe religion only, that is able to check the tear of compaſſion.

We are told, that, in Portugal and Spain, a man condemned to be burned as an obſtinate heretick, meets with no compaſſion, even from the multitude. It is true, they are taught to look upon him as an enemy to GOD, and doomed to hell-fire. But ſhould not this very circumſtance move compaſſion? Surely it would, if they were not taught, that, in this caſe, it is a crime to ſhew compaſſion, or even to feel it.

4. A *fourth* benevolent affection is, eſteem of the wiſe and the good.

The

The worſt men cannot avoid feeling this in ſome degree. Eſteem, veneration, devotion, are different degrees of the ſame affection. The perfection of wiſdom, power and goodneſs, which belongs only to the ALMIGHTY, is the object of the laſt.

It may be a doubt, whether this principle of eſteem, as well as that of gratitude, ought to be ranked in the order of animal principles, or if they ought not rather to be placed in a higher order. They are certainly more allied to the rational nature than the others that have been named; nor is it evident, that there is any thing in brute-animals that deſerves the ſame name.

There is indeed a ſubordination in a herd of cattle, and in a flock of ſheep, which, I believe, is determined by ſtrength and courage, as it is among ſavage tribes of men. I have been informed, that, in a pack of hounds, a ſtanch hound acquires a degree of eſteem in the pack; ſo that, when the dogs are wandering in queſt of the ſcent, if he opens, the pack immediately cloſes in with him, when they would not regard the opening of a dog of no reputation. This is ſomething like a reſpect to wiſdom.

But I have placed eſteem of the wiſe and good in the order of animal principles, not from any perſuaſion that it is to be found in brute-animals, but becauſe, I think, it appears in the moſt unimproved and in the moſt degenerate part of our ſpecies, even in thoſe in whom we hardly perceive any exertion, either of reaſon or virtue.

I will not, however, diſpute with any man who thinks that it deſerves a more honourable name than that of an animal principle. It is of ſmall importance what name we give it, if we are ſatisfied that there is ſuch a principle in the human conſtitution.

5. Friendſhip

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5. Friendſhip is another benevolent affection.

Of this we have ſome inſtances famous in hiſtory: Few indeed; but ſufficient to ſhew, that human nature is ſuſceptible of that extraordinary attachment, ſympathy and affection, to one or a few perſons, which the ancients thought alone worthy of the name of friendſhip.

The Epicureans found it very difficult to reconcile the exiſtence of friendſhip to the principles of their ſect. They were not ſo bold as to deny its exiſtence. They even boaſted that there had been more attachments of that kind between Epicureans than in any other ſect. But the difficulty was, to account for real friendſhip upon Epicurean principles. They went into different hypotheſes upon this point, three of which are explained by TORQUATUS the Epicurean, in CICERO's book, *De Finibus.*

CICERO, in his reply to TORQUATUS, examines all the three, and ſhews them all to be either inconſiſtent with the nature of true friendſhip, or inconſiſtent with the fundamental principles of the Epicurean ſect.

As to the friendſhip which the Epicureans boaſted of among thoſe of their ſect, CICERO does not queſtion the fact, but obſerves, that, as there are many whoſe practice is worſe than their principles, ſo there are ſome whoſe principles are worſe than their practice, and that the bad principles of theſe Epicureans were overcome by the goodneſs of their nature.

6. Among the benevolent affections, the paſſion of love between the ſexes cannot be overlooked.

Although it is commonly the theme of Poets, it is not unworthy of the pen of the Philoſopher, as it is a moſt important part of the human conſtitution.

It

It is no doubt made up of various ingredients, as many other principles of action are, but it certainly cannot exiſt without a very ſtrong benevolent affection toward its object; in whom it finds, or conceives, every thing that is amiable and excellent, and even ſomething more than human. I conſider it here, only as a benevolent affection natural to man. And that it is ſo, no man can doubt who ever felt its force.

It is evidently intended by nature to direct a man in the choice of a mate, with whom he deſires to live, and to rear an offſpring.

It has effectually ſecured this end in all ages, and in every ſtate of ſociety.

The paſſion of love, and the parental affection, are counterparts to each other; and when they are conducted with prudence, and meet with a proper return, are the ſource of all domeſtic felicity, the greateſt, next to that of a good conſcience, which this world affords.

As, in the preſent ſtate of things, pain often dwells near to pleaſure, and ſorrow to joy, it needs not be thought ſtrange, that a paſſion, fitted and intended by nature to yield the greateſt worldly felicity, ſhould, by being ill regulated, or wrong directed, prove the occaſion of the moſt pungent diſtreſs.

But its joys and its griefs, its different modifications in the different ſexes, and its influence upon the character of both, though very important ſubjects, are fitter to be ſung than ſaid; and I leave them to thoſe who have ſlept upon the two-topped Parnaſſus.

7. The *laſt* benevolent affection I ſhall mention is, what we commonly

CHAP. IV. commonly call *public ſpirit*, that is, an affection to any community to which we belong.

If there be any man quite deſtitute of this affection, he muſt be as great a monſter as a man born with two heads. Its effects are manifeſt in the whole of human life, and in the hiſtory of all nations.

The ſituation of a great part of mankind, indeed, is ſuch, that their thoughts and views muſt be confined within a very narrow ſphere, and be very much engroſſed by their private concerns. With regard to an extenſive public, ſuch as a ſtate or nation, they are like a drop to the ocean, ſo that they have rarely an opportunity of acting with a view to it.

In many, whoſe actions may affect the public, and whoſe rank and ſtation lead them to think of it, private paſſions may be an overmatch for public ſpirit. All that can be inferred from this is, that their public ſpirit is weak, not that it does not exiſt.

If a man wiſhes well to the public, and is ready to do good to it rather than hurt, when it coſts him nothing, he has ſome affection to it, though it may be ſcandalouſly weak in degree.

I believe every man has it in one degree or another. What man is there who does not reſent ſatyrical reflections upon his country, or upon any community of which he is a member?

Whether the affection be to a college or to a cloiſter, to a clan or to a profeſſion, to a party or to a nation, it is public ſpirit. Theſe affections differ, not in kind, but in the extent of their object.

The object extends as our connections extend; and a ſenſe of the

the connection carries the affection along with it to every community to which we can apply the pronouns *we* and *our*.

> Friend, parent, neighbour, firſt it will embrace,
> His country next, and then all human race. POPE.

Even in the miſanthrope, this affection is not extinguiſhed. It is overpowered by the apprehenſion he has of the worthleſsneſs, the baſeneſs, and the ingratitude of mankind. Convince him, that there is any amiable quality in the ſpecies, and immediately his philanthropy revives, and rejoices to find an object on which it can exert itſelf.

Public ſpirit has this in common with every ſubordinate principle of action, that, when it is not under the government of reaſon and virtue, it may produce much evil as well as good. Yet, where there is leaſt of reaſon and virtue, to regulate it, its good far overbalances its ill.

It ſometimes kindles or inflames animoſities between communities, or contending parties, and makes them treat each other with little regard to juſtice. It kindles wars between nations, and makes them deſtroy one another for trifling cauſes. But, without it, ſociety could not ſubſiſt, and every community would be a rope of ſand.

When under the direction of reaſon and virtue, it is the very image of GOD in the ſoul. It diffuſes its benign influence as far as its power extends, and participates in the happineſs of GOD, and of the whole creation.

Theſe are the benevolent affections which appear to me to be parts of the human conſtitution.

If any one thinks the enumeration incomplete, and that there

CHAP. IV. are natural benevolent affections, which are not included under any of thoſe that have been named, I ſhall very readily liſten to ſuch a correction, being ſenſible that ſuch enumerations are very often incomplete.

If others ſhould think that any, or all, the affections I have named, are acquired by education, or by habits and aſſociations grounded on ſelf-love, and are not original parts of our conſtitution; this is a point upon which, indeed, there has been much ſubtile diſputation in ancient and modern times, and which, I believe, muſt be determined from what a man, by careful reflection, may feel in himſelf, rather than from what he obſerves in others. But I decline entering into this diſpute, till I ſhall have explained that principle of action which we commonly call *ſelf-love*.

I ſhall conclude this ſubject with ſome reflections upon the benevolent affections.

The *firſt* is, That all of them, in as far as they are benevolent, in which view only I conſider them, agree very much in the conduct they diſpoſe us to, with regard to their objects.

They diſpoſe us to do them good as far as we have power and opportunity; to wiſh them well, when we can do them no good; to judge favourably, and often partially, of them; to ſympathiſe with them in their afflictions and calamities; and to rejoice with them in their happineſs and good fortune.

It is impoſſible that there can be benevolent affection without ſympathy, both with the good and bad fortune of the object; and it appears to be impoſſible that there can be ſympathy without benevolent affection. Men do not ſympathiſe with one whom they hate; nor even with one to whoſe good or ill they are perfectly indifferent.

We may ſympathiſe with a perfect ſtranger, or even with an enemy

enemy whom we ſee in diſtreſs; but this is the effect of pity; and if we did not pity him, we ſhould not ſympathiſe with him.

I take notice of this the rather, becauſe a very ingenious author in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, gives a very different account of the origin of ſympathy. It appears to me to be the effect of benevolent affection, and to be inſeparable from it.

A *ſecond* reflection is, That the conſtitution of our nature very powerfully invites us to cheriſh and cultivate in our minds the benevolent affections.

The agreeable feeling which always attends them as a preſent reward, appears to be intended by nature for this purpoſe.

Benevolence, from its nature, compoſes the mind, warms the heart, enlivens the whole frame, and brightens every feature of the countenance. It may juſtly be ſaid to be medicinal both to ſoul and body. We are bound to it by duty; we are invited to it by intereſt; and becauſe both theſe cords are often feeble, we have natural kind affections to aid them in their operation, and ſupply their defects; and theſe affections are joined with a manly pleaſure in their exertion.

A *third* reflection is, That the natural benevolent affections furniſh the moſt irreſiſtible proof, that the Author of our nature intended that we ſhould live in ſociety, and do good to our fellow-men as we have opportunity; ſince this great and important part of the human conſtitution has a manifeſt relation to ſociety, and can have no exerciſe nor uſe in a ſolitary ſtate.

The *laſt* reflection is, That the different principles of action have different degrees of dignity, and riſe one above another in our eſtimation, when we make them objects of contemplation.

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We aſcribe no dignity to inſtincts or to habits. They lead us only to admire the wiſdom of the Creator, in adapting them ſo perfectly to the manner of life of the different animals in which they are found. Much the ſame may be ſaid of appetites. They ſerve rather for uſe than ornament.

The deſires of knowledge, of power, and of eſteem, riſe higher in our eſtimation, and we conſider them as giving dignity and ornament to man. The actions proceeding from them, though not properly virtuous, are manly and reſpectable, and claim a juſt ſuperiority over thoſe that proceed merely from appetite. This I think is the uniform judgment of mankind.

If we apply the ſame kind of judgment to our benevolent affections, they appear not only manly and reſpectable, but amiable in a high degree.

They are amiable even in brute-animals. We love the meekneſs of the lamb, the gentleneſs of the dove, the affection of a dog to his maſter. We cannot, without pleaſure, obſerve the timid ewe, who never ſhewed the leaſt degree of courage in her own defence, become valiant and intrepid in defence of her lamb, and boldly aſſault thoſe enemies, the very ſight of whom was wont to put her to flight.

How pleaſant is it to ſee the family economy of a pair of little birds in rearing their tender offspring; the conjugal affection and fidelity of the parents; their cheerful toil and induſtry in providing food to their family; their ſagacity in concealing their habitation; the arts they uſe, often at the peril of their own lives, to decoy hawks, and other enemies, from their dwelling-place, and the affliction they feel when ſome unlucky boy has robbed them of the dear pledges of their affection, and fruſtrated all their hopes of their riſing family?

If

If kind affection be amiable in brutes, it is not leſs ſo in our own ſpecies. Even the external ſigns of it have a powerful charm.

Every one knows that a perſon of accompliſhed good breeding, charms every one he converſes with. And what is this good breeding? If we analyze it, we ſhall find it to be made up of looks, geſtures and ſpeeches, which are the natural ſigns of benevolence and good affection. He who has got the habit of uſing theſe ſigns with propriety, and without meanneſs, is a well-bred and a polite man.

What is that beauty in the features of the face, particularly of the fair ſex, which all men love and admire? I believe it conſiſts chiefly in the features which indicate good affections. Every indication of meekneſs, gentleneſs, and benignity, is a beauty. On the contrary, every feature that indicates pride, paſſion, envy, and malignity, is a deformity.

Kind affections, therefore, are amiable in brutes. Even the ſigns and ſhadows of them are highly attractive in our own ſpecies. Indeed they are the joy and the comfort of human life, not to good men only, but even to the vicious and diſſolute.

Without ſociety, and the intercourſe of kind affection, man is a gloomy, melancholy and joyleſs being. His mind oppreſſed with cares and fears, he cannot enjoy the balm of ſound ſleep: in conſtant dread of impending danger, he ſtarts at the ruſtling of a leaf. His ears are continually upon the ſtretch, and every zephyr brings ſome ſound that alarms him.

When he enters into ſociety, and feels ſecurity in the good affection of friends and neighbours, it is then only that his fear vaniſhes,